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The pre3ent relation between theory and experimentation
in the -ran of icr. i ii jounced, or1 sa a result it is
suggested that there is a crisis in thin field of work#
C.. the on 1 ' nd, '' • - re some thee-1 en which ore supposed
to bo guide's for- -e rch as exemplified by the theory of
Shiffrin -nd \tk' ~«n, nd on the other bond there ere a
g.-r t deal of . n~'l - , or phenomena, u-Moh nr» open to
re„ o' roh and cannot be explained using contemporary
t oorie: • It in concluded that the lack of relation
t )tvveon the explanation- and the phenonena is the tunjor
source of the crisis. This conclusion is supported here
with on experimental analysis of the ideas of tra.ee, flow
of information and tores. One of the indications of
possible solution to the crisis, is the experimental
evidence in favour of the idea of memory as n. reconstructive
process. A conceptual structure for further work is
presented, which could be considered as an intermediate
step to relate in the future, in a clearer way, several
phenomena and explanations. This conceptual structure
suggests the use of a different interpretation of memory
functions; suggest the use of the idea of processes of
anipulatlon of information, and points out the diffi¬
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The basic aim of this work is to consider some
aspects of the present state of memory research, mainly
the relation between theories and experiments, from a
point of view which is not completely theoretical nor
completely experimental. The reason for taking up this
intermediate position is that neither a purely theoretical
nor a purely experimental analysis would capture the
relationship between theory and experiment, one that is
particularly important in that area of research.
From a theoretical point of view, the first problem
we meet concerns the nature of theories in psychology
generally. In this subject developments of general
theories have had many limitations which include, among
others, a lack of specification of what a theory or a model
i3, and the arbitrary adoption of examples from other
soiences. It has even been claimed that theories are not
necessary, Skinner (1950). Against this position it is
important to point out examples of theoretical work in
other disciplines from which important achievements have
derived. Consider the part played by theory construction
in the physical sciences, for example, where mathematical
formalisms are more important. Another example is afforded
by biological theories such as the theory of evolution,
which has provided a powerful working tool even without it
being mathematically formalised. Moreover, there is the
research in astronomy and economics which has been guided
entirely by theory, experiments being ruled out by either
logical or practical necessity.
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In the particular case of memory, the theories being
used or that have been used in the past, are in some
cases too simple or specific; or they are related to
particular experimental paradigms; they are the product
of ideologies or psychological schools, or even just the
random result of experimental work* Theoretical work in
this area is not well developed. Indeed a number of
scientists have already expressed discontent over the
situation: it has even been said that there is not much
difference between the theories used today and the theories
proposed around the time of Plato or of Sbbinghaus. It
has also been said that the best that can be done with
theories of memory is"to forget them"(Jenkins 1974).
One of the basic assumptions of the work presented
here is that theory in recent memory research has reached
critical state and that it is necessary to do something
about it. In our search for a possible solution to this
problem we will begin by analysing one of the best examples
of a contemporary theory, in order to see how much such a
theory can help to interpret the problems that characterize
our knowledge or lack of it, concerning memory phenomena.
k broader aim of our study will be that of providing a
guide for future research in this area.
The study of memory confronts, or should oonfront,
several broad problems, such as our poor understanding of
what consciousness is; our laok of information with regard
to the way that either voluntary or involuntary learning
takes place, and the question concerning the relationship
of memory to other psychological phenomena. Also it is
necessary to clarify the metaphores used both to describe
information (or representation) and to study the manipu¬
lations of information that take place in memory, since
they are particularly obscure. The decision to make
problems the basis from which to develop theories of
memory will have two important outcomes. On the one hand,
it is the kind of problem that can be analysed by means of
a theory that will reveal it3 limitations, and on the other
hand, it is these very problems that determine the directions
in which the research will go.
The mathematician, Hilbert (1902), elaborated a list
of problems which, according to him, confronted mathematics
at the end of the last century. This list not only gave
structure to knowledge at the time, but also had a profound
impact on the subsequent development of mathematics. The
idea of delineating a list of problems for the analysis of
the present state of the psychology of memory, as part of
this thesis, was inspired by Hilbert's example. However,
the nature of problems in mathematics is different from the
nature of problems in the experimental sciences, not only
in the way the problems are posed, but in the way that
answers to these problems are formulated. Accordingly,
it i3 difficult to determine the criteria to use for
setting up such a list. In our attempt to do so we have
held in mind developments in other areas of knowledge, not
only within psychology, but in other disciplines also,
that could indicate possible common phenomena. For
example, we have considered the need for ecological
validity in psychological explanations, whereby phenomena
are to be explained in relation to the natural complex
environment in which humans have to survive. But there
necessarily remains an element of arbitrariness in the
way that we have organised our li3t of problems within the
following categories*
A) Fundamental problems concerning the relation
between theory and experiment
3) Problems on the nature of representation or
information is stored and used
C) Problems concerning the control and
manipulation of information
3) Parametric problems in systematic research
E) Problems related to other areas of psychology.
This organization will facilitate the evaluation of
the theory we have chosen to analyse by way of an example,
namely the theory of Shiffrin and Atkinson (1969)t which
we will refer to as the "orthodox theory"• It will also
enable U3 to indicate the direction that could be followed
in future research.
A detailed analysis is unnecessary for demonstrating
that there is no direct relation between the orthodox
theory and what is considered in thi3 work as the most
relevant problems that the psychology of memory needs to
tackle, such as, the characteristics and functioning of
consciousness; the relation between memory and other
phenomena; memory and the central nervous system; sleep;
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language; logical thinking; amotion; problem solving,
and so on, and the existence of several phenomena, whioh,
though they are an evident part of everyday life, have
not been interpreted successfully so far (i.e. reminiscence,
fluctuation of memory, voluntary forgetting, memory for
plans, and so on). By examining the extent to which such
problems fall within the domain of the orthodox theory we
will gain a measure of its limitations. The outcome will
be very important, sunce this theory is considered as one
of the most representative and successful theories that
is available at the moment. hen we examine that
relationship we find that the orthodox theory is indeed
limited in its explanatory range. Possibly this is
attributable to the origins of the theory in attempts to
explain a rather limited set of phenomena to do mainly
with short- and long-term memory. On the other hand,
the orthodox theory al30 has certain strengths that are
not easy to find in other theories? it gives importance
to the manipulation of information and it places emphasis
on the development of theoretical as well as experimental
aspects of research. Also, it is important to point out
the interest of its authors in continuing to develop the
theory by incorporating a series of new elements. How¬
ever, whether or not we take the limited range of explan¬
ation to be a strength or a weakness, there will remain
doubts concerning the basic assumptions upon which it is
constructed. The general assumptions of tue orthodox
theory concern the concept of trace, the concept of levels
of processing or stages, and the concept of passive
stores that are incapable of generating "new" information.
A detailed analysis of these assumptions leads to the
conclusion that they may well be invalid. The concept of
memory trace is not clear and it is difficult to observe
the so called stages of memory, beginning with iconic and
proceeding to long-term memory. It is also possible to
find some examples of the way that new information may be
generated by the manipulation of old information only.
After examining the orthodox theory and the problems
that confront the study of memory, in chapters 1 and II,
we turn in chapter III to experimental evidence bearing
upon the basic assumptions of the orthodox theory. In
experiments I and II the phenomenon of iconio memory was
studied, a phenomenon found in most current models of
memory. This form of memory is considered to be the
first stage in information processing. It may be con¬
sidered to be the clearest example of the idea of "memory
trace". If this is so, iconic memory is a system (or
store) which maintains the information given to the
subjects, for a veiy short period of time, independently
of the characteristics of that information. In order to
test whether this strict idea of a memory trace is valid,
subjects were presented with letters, and with a series
of figures that may be considered to be novel stimuli.
Two different experimental techniques were used for the
analysis of the results, one devised by Sstes (19t>5) an<*
the other being a modif otion of the technique used by
Sperling (I960). In both experiments the responses
given by subjects were not a function of memory span, and
in the condition in which letters were presented the
results were similar to those obtained in the experiments
on iconic memory so far reported. (i.e. Sperling I960;
fiumelhart 1970; Sstes and Taylor 1966). But when subjects
received novel stimuli the results were quite different
and the phenomenon of iconic memory (or trace) was not
found. A logical analysis of this result seems to
indicate the existence of a misleading assumption found
in most experiments in human memory which use as stimuli
material already known to the subjects, such as letters
or numbers. It is not difficult to show that a great
number of learning experiments (and forgetting experiments)
do not 3eem to demonstrate how new items are learned, but
how old material is reorganised. The results of experi¬
ments I and II lead to the conclusion that the idea of a
trace in the strict sense of the term, as well as the idea
of different stages in memory, from iconic to long-term
memory, needs to be reconsidered carefully.
In a third experiment the idea of memory as a
reconstructive process, postulated by Bartlett (1932), was
considered as a possible alternative to the orthodox
theory. The idea of "reconstruction" is that subjects,
when presented with certain kinds of task, call upon
information from the past in the form of a representation
(e.g. "image"! Bartlett 193i)» and are capable of extracting
and reporting certain specific information which they
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probably did not know prior to the task by manipulating
the representation. During the experiment the subjects
were asked to reply to a series of questions such as "How
many letters are there in your father's surname?" , or "how
many angles does the letter " If' have? One group were
presented with stimulus card3 and asked to count the
number of items, such as tue angles on a given letter.
The results of this experiment seem to indicate that there
is a linear relation between the number of items to be
reported and the reaction time: the more items to be
reported the longer is the reaction time. This relation
was found in both experimental conditions. It is possible
to suggest then, that the subjects in the condition where
they did not have the stimuli present, used something,
such as an image, in order to arrive at the answer. That
is, the kinds of question asked of the subjects required
them to generate a spatial image: count the relevant
items, and generate a new response. The results of this
experiment could be taken as indicative that memory really
has reconstructive characteristics (i.e. there is an
active change in both the content of the information
acquired and possibly the ability to generate new inform¬
ation), and that to generate an answer requires not only
stores, but also different processes of manipulation of
information.
In another experiment (IV), the hypothesis regarding
images as a form of representation was explored in detail.
Employing the psychophysical technique of successive
3.
comparisons, the u^e of simple images (circles) was
studied in a reaction time task requiring comparative
judgements (bigger/smaller). It was observed that it is
not possible to sustain, in the strict sense, the hypo¬
thesis of a linear relation between reaction time and the
expansion or contraction of images in a manner analogous
to Shepherd^ (1975) idea of the mental rotation of images.
The results seem to require that we draw a distinction
between three kinds of processes. In the first, where
the comparison is easy, the reaction time is constant
(flat). In the second tnere is possibly, a relation
between difference in size of the circles and the reaction
time. And in the tnird, the difference between circles
is so small that one might offer the interpretation that
the images do not have enough fidelity to the original
stimuli to allow for a precise comparison. The results
of this experiment suggest that images may be the means
whereby information is both represented and manipulated,
but that in the same experimental situation, using the same
stimuli, different forms of information processing may
occur i.e. images may not be used. The results also seem
to suggest that even when images are used, they may not be
faithful copies of the external item. These results
indicate the need to study carefully the phenomena of
representation and especially the need to avoid premature
confrontations between different interpretations of
representation (e.g. image v. propositions).
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In general the results of these experiments can be
summarized by saying that in the experiments on iconic
memory the idea of 'trace' cannot be supported when novel
stimuli are used. It could be proposed, on the basis of
these results, that iconic memory is not one of the first
processes in the manipulation of information, but one of
the later stages of comparison between the stimuli and what
is already in store. 1'he results obtained with the use
of novel stimuli could be taken as an indication of the
existence of a misleading assumption in memory experiments
which employ letters, or nonsense syllables, or other
kinds of material already known by the subject, since in
these experiments it could be said that learning (or
forgetting) in the strict sense is not taking place, but
rather that there is only a reorganization of something
already known. Moreover, an alternative point of view
to one that emphasizes stages or memory boxes, is to be
found in Bartlett's idea of reconstruction. There is
evidence suggesting that reconstruction of information,
which may involve the use of images, is likely to occur,
and that it is possible to alter and generate new
information without any direct learning being required.
However, it i3 also possible to see in the results
obtained tnat images as a form of representation play a
limited role, and in some cases of the processing of
information, this form of manipulation is not used,
together, these results suggest therefore, that the
orthodox theory may have important limitations that make
it unreliable a3 a basis for the interpretation of memory
phenomena.
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The orthodox theory was used to analyse the present
state of memory research and it was found that not only
does it not oover many of the problems confronting us in
this area, but also that the basic assumptions of the
theory seem to be somewhat unclear or at least partially
mistaken# It could be suggested taat the next step is
to modify the orthodox theory in order to correct for
its deficiencies. A number of explicit ways of making
such a modification could be proposed, ranging from
changes to some of its parts to its total transformation
Into a new theory, one whose domain of interpretation
extends to the problems previously posed, as well as the
experimental evidence presented in Chapter III, together
with a great deal of additional experimental data found
in the literature. This task, however, is very diffi¬
cult and it is even possible that psychology is not yet
prepared for it, that the elements needed for this task
are not yet available. In this thesis something much
more modest is proposed. It consists in the presentation
of a conceptual structure that may provide a bridge for
further work towards an integrated theory. In order to
understand what a conceptual stimetore is, an example is
given, using mbbingnaus's conceptual structure and some
otherexamples of this particular kind of research tool
that has been used in recent years. Basically, a
conceptual structure gives a general view: some method¬
ological considerations} the most important variables to
3tudy, and an interpretation of some phenomena. One of
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the most important changes proposed in the conceptual
framework is the introduction, in a specific and clear
form, of tae idea of an active memory rather than a system
of stores. The form proposed here considers that memory
has a series of functions in addition to, and possibly
more important than, the storage of information. These
functions are related to the idea of a humanbeing as an
inhabitant of a complex environment in which a constant
series of problems must be solved for his survival. This
kind of human being seems different to the one iuealised
in the orthodox theory, which proposes memory as an abstract
entity separated from psychological functions and from a
real environment. Based on this argument we propose,
together with examples, which we consider to be the most
important functions of memory, such as the construction
of a model of action, the generation of hypotneses and the
storage of information. In order for such functions to
be possible, the system of memory requires processes to
allow for storage, modification and comparison of inform¬
ation, and so on. In contemporary literature experimental
evidence is found for these processes, among which some of
the most important are perhaps scanning, comparing and
labelling.
As a concluding step towards our proposal for a
conceptual structure, the storage of information is
disoussed together with the limitations in the concept of
representation in contemporary accounts. Some of the
general characteristics that an interpretation of
representation must have are also given.
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In a few words, it could be said that memory cannot
be considered as a "tabula raza" , but as a system that is
constantly processing and using information (even probably,
when a person is asleep). It could be said that a theory
that assumes information to be processed in a series of
steps, from the most simple to the most complex (i.e.from
icon to long-term memory) does not take into account that,
in a great number of situations, what a person is doing
probably is generating hypotheses before events take place,
and in many cases of a learning situation, not only storing
the information, but also using it to make comparisons and
reorganizing it in various ways.
The conceptual structure proposed contains some of
the necessary elements for an improvement in our under¬
standing of the memory system. It is possible to suggest
that in future it is going to be possible to find in
psychology (as in other areas of knowledge), scientists
who are dedicated exclusively to theoretical work, dedicated
that is, to the development and perfection of theories,
not confusing this activity with other activities not
directly relevant to theoretical psychology, such as work
in philosophical psychology and mathematical psychology,
reviews of the literature and general criticisms which,
in m„ny cases, do not produce anything more than noise
and confusion. But for the moment, we will have to
content ourselves with a kind of theoretical-experimental
study in which it is not yet clear what are the rules of
the game, or what tools are available, or in the worst case,




"After reviewing the literature on Kemory if a
person is not thoroughly confused, it is
probably because he does not know much about it.
I will sing you the song
Of a man who went to war,
Who wa3 wounded in the mountains
<»ho just fought to win some land.
Our General told us,
" Fight on with great valour
We are going to give you land,
As soon as we make the revolution."
If they come looking for me
To make another revolution
I'll tell them, "Sorry, I'm busy
Planting the fields of the landlord."
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A. THEORETICAL PSYCHOLOGY
1. The Functions of Theoretical Psychology
The general function of psychology is not the mere
accumulation of data, hut the extension and development
of our understanding of psychological phenomena, in co¬
operation with other related disciplines. Within this
general framework, theoretical psychology has two sub-
functions:
(i) the elucidation of key psychological ideas?
(ii) the organisation of those ideas.
It is true that new data may raise new questions but,
in this work, the aim is precisely not to multiply the
unknown, but rather to provide a scheme or model for
answering questions in general. Current psychology is
in need, not of fragmentation by the anarchic propagation
of questions but of unification. The main task of theory
in psychology is to meet this need.
The specific way in which this function takes place
is in the form of models or theories, which are tools
that help organize data, phenomena and observations, etc.
into conceptual formulae. These formulae contain the
characteristics of and interactions among the events
studied. According to the richness of the formula's
description it can be considered a model or a theory,
this classification depends on the generality of the event
being studied. In psychology, the distinction between
a theory and a raodel is to some degree arbitrary. In a
general sense it could be said that models are specific
16.
conceptual formulae referring to particular events, whereas
theories refer to general events.
The function of theoretical psychology is to construct,
modify and analyse models and theories in psychology.
The kind of models or theories "constructed" or "used"
is varied and cannot be limited to a definition. A
simpler way to describe the kind of theory and models U3ed
in psychology is to point out some examples such as the
theory of learning of Hull (1943) and the theory of per¬
ception of Gibson (1966) or the model of short-term memory
by Murdock (1974). In all these examples the validity
of the theory as well as its utility and explanatory force,
do not depend on specifying whether they are theories or
models but in the "skill" of the "originator"; perhaps
more important are the quality of the data obtained and
perspicacity of the experiments. ilany theories and models
have been useful in the development of psychology waich of
course have been due to the activity of certain scientists.
The function of theoretical psychology is therefore to
develop models and theories not as a by-product of experi¬
mentation but as a specific activity. One of the clearest
examples of theoretical psychology can be found in the work
of Fodor (1975) who has presented a possible theory of
representation which, as he points out, is a form of
"speculative psychology." In the work presented here when
reference to theoretical psychology is made, it is to the
kind of work done by Fodor (op.cit). Fodor tried to
describe the "language" in which information is represented
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and manipulated. He gives some of the characteristics
of this kind of representation, the "internal language",
which he considers different from the language that people
talk. He proposed that some characteristics of the
process of representation are present in the system from
birth} he also emphazised the logical characteristics of
the system. It is difficult to describe which are the
rules that Fodor used to make his "theory", the only thing
that can be seen is the end-product, which, like any other
theory or model, can be useful as a tool for developing
experimental hypotheses and for interpreting previous data.
It is important to emphazise that the task involved
in theoretical psychology (or speculative psychology) is
to develop theories or models that can be used to unify
data, promote researcu and try to give explanations. In
order to clarify what theoretical psychology is, let us
describe briefly some relations and distinctions, such as
the difference between theories and so-called "schools",
philosophical work, and various formalizations, and so on.
2. Psychological Schools and Theories
Psychological theories must be clearly distinguished
from psychological schools, membership of which depends
merely on the holding in common of a series of epistemo-
logical and methodological elements; an example is given
by varieties of behaviourism represented by Skinner, i»atson
and Guthrie. Gestalt Psychology, although having more
the characteristics of a theory, is just a school, as is
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Cognitive Psychology which, however, is harder to character¬
ise because of tue apparent lack of consensus, except for
the adoption of the name, by its members. Some members,
like Keisser and Norman, are central. Others call them¬
selves " neo-mentali^t3" , yet are oparationalists and have
a very strict behavioural methodology, for example, Kendler
and Kendler (1975) and Paivio (1975)• The approach of
many cognitivists, such as the contributors to 3stes (1975)*
have indeed evolved from behaviourism, though perhaps none
so dramatically as Premaok (1976) who was previously a
Skinnerian.
The m03t difficult case of all is Piaget who, although
a member of the cognitive school, is, in a sense, unique.
Piaget's work has received both support, and, especially
recently, criticism on empirical grounds. However, we
are not here concerned with its empirical validity, but
with the type and range of application of the theory it
embodies. Piaget has shown more interest than any other
psychologist in theory "per se" and has put forward theoret¬
ical claims in metaphysics, epistemology, logic, mathe¬
matics and biology.
3. Limits of a Single Theory
It may be supposed that the development of scientific
psychology has resulted in a "collage". In this "collage"
each of the various schools and theories although radically
different, would reflect some degree of truth or rationality.
Thi3 supposition would, however, carry the implication that
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a unified theory is impossible (e.g. Beloff 1973, Koch
1964 and Krech 1970). The situation gets really compli¬
cated if we include, for example, Russian psychology, which
has greatly developed in the last few years. The schools
of Pavlov and Yygotsky have ramified and multiplied in an
astonishing way. There are also many other new forms of
theoretical and experimental work; for example, the
psychology of the Republic of Georgia (Cole and Maltzman
1969) and that of the Republic of the Ukraine (Holowinsky
1978).
If in addition to the above, other areas, like Social
Psychology and Neurophysiology, are included, a unified
theory definitely becomes very difficult to visualise, and
instead several theories have to be suggested each for
different aspects of psychology. This in no way means,
however, that hundreds of theories, or lots of miniature
models have to be made, as is the case at the moment.
Unfortunately theoretical psychology nowadays i3 very
limited: it seems that the old interest in the search for
laws is not very great; and that interest in theories has
waned. Nevertheless, it is not so difficult to find
certain regularities that could be called laws; an example
of this, from French psychology, is the work by Floras
(1970), who, in a chapter discussing the present state of
memory research, described a series of laws of memory
mainly originating from the beginning of the century, for
example a3,Jost*s, Rallar's, Yon Re3torff's effect, etc.etc.
Another way of analysing the state of theoretical
20.
psychology is to see where places - devoted in a more or
less organised way to this kind of work — can be found.
There are only two: The Institute of Theoretical Psychology
at the University of Alberta and The Institute of Genetic
Epistemology in Geneva (dominated by the psychology of
J. Piaget). Until a few years ago the University of
Edinburgh had a Sub-Department of Theoretical Psychology
centred mainly around Dr. Longuet-Higgins and his co¬
workers in artificial intelligence, but this is now defunct.
Therefore, at the moment there are probably only two places
where there is a reasonably systematic approach to this
kind of work. The same can be said for the places where
a psychologist can receive training in theoretical work.
Giorgi (1974) was commissioned by the A.P.A. (American
Psychological Association - Philosophical Psychology
Section) to report which Educational Establishments in the
United States and Canada offered students some training in
theoretical psychology. He found that, out of 160 Depart¬
ments of Psychology, only 10 gave such facilities at the
undergraduate level and a mere five departments gave a
degree in Philosophical Psychology.
One kind of training related to theoretical psychology
is that given in mathematical psychology at some universities
in America and the United Kingdom, where there is strong
emphasis on the use of mathematical tools. This kind of
training is, however, rather different from training in
theoretical psychology, for it is limited in scope and
refers only to the use of mathematical tools rather than
to training in theoretical psychology as such.
4. Theoretical rsychology and Philosophy
For many years it was believed that the philosophy of
science was goin^ to aive a "manual" of how to make
theories, and it is only in the last few years that
philosophy of science has restricted its task (e.g.Lakatos
1974, Putnam 1973)* The philosophical analysis of the
implications of a theory seems to be subsequent to the
construction of the same, and in some cases it is the
theories of particular areas of science which have changed
philosophy and not vice versa (bee Capek 19bl). The
theory of relativity and quantum mechanics are very well
known cases. This does not mean that scientific activity
and theoretical work are not profoundly influenced by
by philosophical concepts. A recent result of philosophical
research (the philosophy of science and other related areas
of knowledge) is the demonstration of how scientific work
is profoundly influenced by specific metaphysical schemes.
This has been one of the major contributions of Kuhn (1970)
and of Popper (19u3)« Philosophical work and theoretical
work in psychology (or in any other area, e.g. physics,
biology and -o on) are different mainly in relation to the
task of elaborating models or theories about particular
events.
5. Theoretical Psychology and Pormalisation
One important aspect of theoiy construction is the
difference between theories in physics and other areas,
whire there is the help of mathematical tools, and theories
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which are nonetheless theoretical, in 3pite of the lack
of 3uch tools. In the case of a theory using mathematics,
it is important to point out that, in most cases there is
a series of fundamental ideas, behind the mathematical
formalism. Further, it is thought that mathematical
formalism does not require interpretation, except in a
few cases, e.g. that of quantum mechanics (Jammer 1974).
However, during the development of theories in physics
there have been several occasions where a formal element has
been arbitrarily introduced in response to a theoretical
need, and, with time, and the development of research, an
empirical counterpart to the element has been found.
It is important to remember that there can be a simple
or complex theory without there being a need for formalism.
A distinct and familiar case is the theory of evolution
which is a scheme of high complexity and explanatory power
but which is not a formal theory, though it is complete
(using the scientific and not the mathematical sense of
"complete", which is not to deny that it may be modified).
There are also other specific cases, like geology, where
for a few years, there has only been a simple yet highly
powerful non-mathematical theory: the theory of tectonic
plates. The case of geology is very heartening for
psychology, since, until a few years ago, it was merely a
descriptive science without theories, or general schemes,
and without much power to make predictions. The theory
of tectonic plates has, however, changed things radically.
Another very interesting and illustrative aspect of this
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theory is the fact that it is centred around the postul-
ation of hypothetical constructs; tectonic plates which
have not been seen, and of whose existence there is only
indirect evidence*
The theories of economics provide examples of con¬
ceptual theories that have the power to predict and explain
phenomena, but without the opportunity for experimental
verification. In some cases tne application of economic
measures supported by the theory alters the functioning
of the economic system in a significant way, even though
the latter is the product of the interaction of many
variables.
These examples are illustrations of theoretical work
and show how it is possible to suggest that theory without
mathematics is possible. This is sometimes forgotten when
thinking about psychological theories.
6. Theoretical work in other areas of knowledge
It is probably useful to see how theory works in other
areas of science and to try to draw some conclusions.
Physics i3 an interesting area with very good examples
of theories. As has already been mentioned, theoretical
work in physics is superficially different from that of
other areas of science because it is possible to formalize
it to a very high degree. However, when it is analysed
in detail it is not so very different from the theoretical
work done in other areas of knowledge (for example in
psychology).
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Let us start by saying that one of the most important
aspects that can be observed is the distance (not to be
confused with separation) between theoretical physics and
experimental physics. It is possible for the theoretical
physicist to dedicate himself to theory and the organization
of knowledge, rather than merely to the search for new data.
The relation between theory and experimentation is complex!
it is interesting to note that experimental knowledge some¬
times precedes and sometimes succeeds theoretical knowledge.
But even in physics, where theoretical work is so advanced,
there are no recipes for constructing theories. As a
result, a careful search through manuals and books of
physics only reveals an emphasis on mathematical tools.
In physics, as in psychology, there Just are no guides to
the construction of theories.
One thing alone is obvious; new and better theories
are constantly coming along. When one asks physicists
how they construct such theories, their responses are use¬
ful, even if they are ambiguous and vague. They usually
say that they "try to generalize to new situations", or
"look for borderline cases", or "try to apply a particular
theory to different situations and see if it work3".
Others say that they "define the problem clearly4', and so
on. In most cases, the perfect definition of problems
and the making of a series of basic assumptions are felt
to be the principal characteristics of theoretical work.
Astronomy is another interesting example, mainly
because it is not an experimental science, whereas
psychology is. Theories in astronomy are nevertheless
either acceptable or not in a very clear way. In the field
of astronomy, pressure to make a general theory to explain
phenomena is created when new observations emerge.
Astronomers* theories are based on a series of general
assumptions which can be tested in one way or another. An
interesting aspect of astronomy is the constant use of old
data in research and the development of new theories;
unlike the situation found in psychology, and to a lesser
extent in other areas of knowledge. A great number of
catalogues of photographs and other kinds of old observa¬
tions can still be found in constant use by modern
astronomers.
Economics is another area of knowledge where theoreti¬
cal work is of very great interest since there is no experi¬
mentation (as in the case of astronomy), but where not
only are predictions frequently found, but also changes
of society may result from interventions of economists.
Anotheraspect of economics which deserves attention is the
use of highly complex mathematical models (econometrics),
even though the data contain errors and are not very
precise (Morgenstern, 1963)* There is a very interesting
lesson to learn from this. It is sometimes thought that
the basis of mathematical models is the precision of
measurement, whereas, in economics on the contrary, the
indicators used have a high percentage of error.
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7. Theoretical work as a specific activity
Granted a positive attitude towards theoretical work
and the knowledge both that there are no specific rules for
theory construction and that one can find conceptual
theories, we are led to the following suggestion; given
the complexity of theoretical work, a systematic effort is
necessary if a psychological theory is to be made.
One of the best way3 to encourage theoretical work is
to have a group of researchers dedicated to this task.
3. EXAMPLES OF THEORETICAL «OHK IN PSYCHOLOGY
There has, of course, been some theoretical work done
in psychology and this has contributed to its progress by
clarifying certain areas of work. Theoretical work, which
is not to be confused with reviews of the present state
of any area of knowledge (as is often the case in many
papers in the Annual heview of Psychology), will be
illustrated below.
One of the many examples of theoretical work in
psychology is that of 3. Koch (1954), in his analysis and
criticism of the learning theory of C. L. Hull (1943)*
This theory was, as has been said (Hilgard and Bower, 1975),
of great importance in the 30's through the 50's. At
this time the major learning theories were represented on
the one hand by Hull and on the other by Tolman. Gestalt
psychology was also considered by some to be important.
As Koch points out, his work was a complete and detailed
attempt to analyse Hull's theory and it was probably one
2?.
of the most important factors contributing to the decline
of Hullean theory (Hilgard and Bower, 1975)•
In other cases theoretical work has been more con¬
structive. The work by Miller, Galanter and Pribram
(i960), was the beginning of so-called •'information
processing" models. Another case of theoretioal work
which ha3 had some impact was that expounded by Hebb(1949)»
Hebb proposed the "Cell Assemblies" theory which has
influenced an area where theoretical work is considered
dangerous and where the rule is to stay close to the
results and facts.
Another example of theoretical work which still has
an influence is Gestalt theory which, along with a series
of demonstrations of the existence of certain ph.nomena,
has retained its value. Nevertheless it cannot really bo
said that Gestalt psychology is a complete theory, even
though it has a large number of theoretical elements;
rather it is a bridge between the past and the present by
means of a psychological model of some considerable
general power.
Paradoxically, in some cases it even happens that
certain theoretical work itself helps to limit theory. An
example of this is the paper written by McCorquodale and
Meehl (1948) on the distinction between hipothetical
constructs and intervening variables which, whilst being
totally theoretical, had the effect of actually limiting
theory.
Psychophysics is another area of work which could be,
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and at the time of its original conception actually was,
considered as theoretical, in the same way as mathematics.
Nowadays, a century later, Fechner's same family of
functions are still used as a mathematical model of wider
application. The great number of phenomena, which can be
described with this kind of psychophysical functions, go
from phenomena of sensory codification, (e.g. Stevens 1957),
relations between intensities of stimuli and their psycho¬
logical report (classic psychophysics), in very different
modalities and with a large variety of forms of stimulation,
(e.g. Stevens 1966), to estimations of subjective time (e.g.
lisler 1976) and even phenomena of personal involvement in
social issues (e.g. Lunberg et al 1972). Although the
range of applications of psychophysical formulae has been
vast, it is very difficult to find an interpretation of
the formalism which is not very complex from a mathematical
point of view. Moreover its psychological meaning is not
very clear and it seems that even if there is a great deal
of power in the generalization to other phenomena, there
is not very much of interest in its interpretation.
In some cases it is even possible to find the concepts
behind, and the general idea of, theoretical psychology
explicitly stated, and even to find a supposed guide for
theoretical work, as for example the book by Greeno (1968)
initially appears to be. It cannot be denied that the aim
expressed in this book i3 of great interest and that it
agrees with the ideas expressed in this work, as regards
theoretical psychology. However, in actual fact, the
help given is limited to describing mathematical tools
which have been used in the past and in trying to make
formal models in specific areas of research, rather than
saying very much about how to make theories. Therefore,
like many others, the book i3 only interesting as regards
the applications of mathematical models to the description
of psychological phenomena or the discussion of specific
experiments in mathematical psychology.
Another very interesting oase of theoretical work, is
La3hley*s (1951) paper on serial behaviour. This work has
led to research which has in general been considered
important because it delimited a particular problem area;
but even though the article is well-known and oft quoted,
the problem it raised is still unresolved.
Theoretical work has sometimes taken the form of
advertising certain philosophical schools, or even, in
certain cases, a particular way of thinking in psychology;
an example of this is the Symposium on Motivation at the
University of Nebraska, Arnold (1976), which started with
the question: what i3 the paradigm of psychology? Several
paradigms were proposed, ranging from tnat of existentialists
and Marxists, to that of the behaviourists. The imposs¬
ibility of a paradigm was even considered.
Prom the example given, it can be seen that theoretical
work does exist in psychology and that it has an important
role to play. In most cases, however, it has taken the
form of supplementary work tacked onto accounts not directly
concerned with theoretical issues. Another aspect that
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has been illustrated is that, even if it is possible to
classify many aspects of theoretical work, it is not easy
to characterize and to describe them in a specific way.
It 3eems that although one can recognise theoretical work,
one cannot easily describe its unifyin0 factor in an
explicit way.
C. TH3 STATS 0? TL00A1TIGA1 ,Y0BK IN MSIORY
One's opinion of the state of present research is
greatly influenced by one's personal taste and the psycho¬
logical school of work to which one belongs, as can be seen
in different papers dedicated to this subject in recent
years. In some cases the papers are totally pessimistic*
Tulving and Madigan (1970), for example, 3tate tnat there
have been no changes since the work of Sbbinghaus. Other
authors talk of a crisis in memory research (Jenkins 1963)
and yet others, analysing the more important concepts and
phenomena in current research, say that there is nothing
new, and that most of the concepts and phenomena discussed
today were well known at the beginning of this century (e.g.
Murray, 1976; Moniou-Vakali, 1974; Brown and Deffenbacher,
1975; Stigler, 1978). Still other psychologists say that
research is perverted by phenomena external to the research
itself, such as certain political ideologies, (e.g. Kvole,
1975, Bakan, 1977).
An influential psychologist has said that the entire
approach to this problem during the last 10 or 30 years
has been completely wrong and that the best that can be
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done is "to forget it" (Jenkins, 1974). In other cases
a "revolution" in psychology is mentioned (Warren, 1971)»
with the emergence of a new paradigm as much in learning
and memory in particular, as in psychology in general
(Weimer and Palermo, 1973). let others consider that the
mathematical models used in memory and learning at present,
are but a gradual evolution of the work of Hull, (Greeno
and Bjork, 1973). To go even further, it can be suggested
that the basic mathematical functions for learning and
memory accorded to Hull (1943)t are the same ones that had
already been described more than a century before by the
philosopher Herbert (Bakan, 1952).
Many different authors have arrived at the conclusion
that memory research is in serious difficulty. An inspec¬
tion of the literature reveals that attacks on current
work have been completely misdirected (Ach, 19b8) and that
there has been a retreat from associationist theoretical
positions, most notably by some who were formerly in the
vanguard of that movement (Jenkins, 1974). Also, there
have been assertions that, since Ebbinghaus, there has been
no advancement (Tulving and Madigan, 1970) and calls to
reorganize and theorize, since there is a wealth of data
but a poverty of explanations (Nowell, 1973). Further,
have been assertions that the concept of memory is neither
required nor helpful in the analysis of behaviour (Branch,
1977); there have been claims that the study of verbal
behaviour is putting the "cart before the horse" (Weimer,
1974); assertions that the study of memory has only been
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a by-product of the study of language (Herriot, 1975)5 and
recognition that there are many important phenomena to
study and explain, but that simple problems must be taokled
first (Murdock, 1974). There is clear empirical evidence
that adult human subjects cannot learn by operant or
classical conditioning as such (Brewer* 1974). Also
prominent associationist (S-B) theorists are using non-
associative explanatory mechanisms and phenomena, to solve
their theoretico-experimental problems. Postman (1972)
for instance, ha3 had to postulate "selector meonanisms" ,
and Underwood (1966) postulates "rules". There have also
been suggestions that recent theories make little advance
on Aristotle's theory of memory (Maniov-Vakali, 1974).
Of course, there are some researchers who think that
there have been advances and that there are many new
discoveries and theories, which are powerful, explanatory
and predictive, for example Peterson, 1977? Postman, 1971,
1975; Baddeley, 1976; and Cotton, 1976.
All these papers are reviews of the general state of
the area of memory and are not mere footnotes in experimental
articles. This suggests on the one hand, activity in the
field, and on the other, the contradictory state of research.
The existence of contradictions and crisis is not something
entirely negative, on the contrary, it points to a vitality
in the area; but proper steps must, of course, be taken to
resolve the contradictions.
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1. A Case Study
One of the possible alternatives to solving the
contradictions of memory research and theorizing is to
take a theory that one considers one of the best and study
how well it functions as a tool. There are different
points of view that can be considered. One approach is
to ask how much is the theory helping both to generate
research and to discover new phenomena or new areas of
research. Another approach is to try to see if the theory
is wide enough to include the explanation of many different
phenomena. A third point might be to consider whether the
theory is soundt that is, how true are the assumptions
forming the structure of the theory. The idea of taking
a particular theory is the main idea of the work presented
here.
A good candidate for this sort of analysis is the
theory of Atkinson and Shiffrin (19b8) and Shiffrin and
Atkinson (19b9) this theory (which is going to be called
from now on for the purpose of this analysis; The Orthodox
Theory) has been described as the only one that can receive
the name of " theory" of memory. For instance Tulving and
Madigan (1970) said ".. we believe it to be the most
ambitious and most highly developed theory". This theory
represents in an articulated form the most important ideas
and developments in memory. Shiffrin (1975) commented
that this theory surprisingly, has many similarities with
the models of other authors (Bjork, Craik, Massard and
Murdock). Another characteristic of this theory is its
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flexibility in producing and incorporating new data. For
these reasons it is possible to use it as a representative
of theoretical work in memory research. In order to avoid
misunderstandings, the analysis of this theory is going to
concern only its theoretical aspects, following in detail
one of the best descriptions of the theory, by Atkinson and
Wescourt (1975)* ...The memory system to be described i3
extremely general. The intent is that it be
capable of supporting a broad range of cognitive
activities, from perception to language compre¬
hension, that, in common, depend on the utiliza¬
tion of stored information... The central theoret¬
ical elements of the system have appeared in
other theories. The most basic construct in
the system is the feature. Features are values
on dimensions in terms of which information can
be represented. Ordered sets of features
comprise information codes. A code is an
internal representation that defines a unit of
experience - most simply an object in the system's
environment. Codes are linked (connected,
associated) together to form memory structures.
These structures "represent" knowledge and events
within the system. Codes and structures are
stored in different memory stores of the system.
These stores are characterized by their internal
structures and by the storage and retrieval
processes that are used to manipulate information.
The system also has control processes that
regulate the representation, and storage and
retrieval processes with respect to the context
of the system's activities. Control processes
act to develop efficient strategies for performing
tasks under changing conditions... The three main
divisions of memory are the sensory register (SR),
short-term store (STS) and long-term store (LTS).
Information enters the system via its receptors
and is transmitted to the SR in a relatively
unprocessed form. The mosaic of sensory inform¬
ation in the 3R is subject to pattern recognition
processes that extract features and synthesize
them to form codes. The information in the SR
is lost rapidly either by decay or by being
"written over" by new input. The STS is a
working memory of limited capacity. Information
is copied into STS either from the output of the
pattern recognition process or from ITS. Inform¬
ation is lost from STS unless maintained by
particular control processes like rehearsal or
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imagery. The contents of STS may be thought of
as a person's "current state of consciousness"...
Information is represented in the memory system
as codes. 3aoh code is an ordered list of
features that define an arbitrary unit of
experience (an object, a relation* an abstract
concept) on some set of dimensions. Two main
classes of codes are distinguished on the basis
of the types of features that comprise them:
peroeptual codes (p-oodes) and conceptual codes
(c-codes). The p-codes are generated from the
mosaic of sensory information in the SH by pattern
recognition processes... The p-codes play an
important role in the internal representation of
objects and relations in the environment. How¬
ever they are not sufficient for the operation
of human memory... There is a higher-order type
of code that we will call a c-code. Let a
concept be a collection of memory structures
containing information about a particular objeot,
relation, or another concept? for example, the
concept of 'table' is the information stored in
memory from experiences with various tables.
Then a c-code is a characterization of a concept
as an ordered list of conceptual features— it
is, in a sense, an abbreviation of the concept..
How might memory be structured to allow rapid
access to c-codes when words denoting concepts or
objects are perceived? The perceptual features
of the p-code produced when a table is seen could
be similar to the conceptual features of the
c-codes of the concept table, but there could be
no such relation between the c-code and the word
"table" since the word is an arbitrary symbol
for the concept. Thus, there must be arbitrary
links between the c-code and the p-codes of its
symbols. Such links are defined in a functional
partition of LT3 that we will call the conceptual
store (CS). Located in the C5 are special
memory structures called nodes. 3ach CS node
is a collection of the alternative p-codes for
the word and object (if any) that correspond to
the c-code that is also stored at the node. For
example, the node for table contains the c-oode
that is an abbreviation of the concept table and
linked to it are various p-codes that are pro¬
duced when a table i3 seen, when the printed word
"table" is seen, when the auditory word "table"
is heard, etc... New information is stored in
memory by linking together copies of codes that
represent physical or conceptual events to form
memory structures. Memory structures are first
built in STS and are then copied into LTS.
Memory structures (as distinct from nodes) are
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stored in a functional partition of LTS called
the event-knowledge store ("EKS). The 3£S is
distinguished from the G3 in two main ways.
First, memory structures in SKS represent a wide
range of relationships between different code
types, as compared to CS nodes. A C5 node
represents a simple linking of the abbreviated
meaning of a concept to the alternative internal
codings produced by perception of physical
symbols or exemplars of that concept. An E5CS
memory structure, on the other hand, may have
many internal organizations that reflect the
relations between physical referents and/or
abstract concepts in events and knowledge.•• We
have represented a view of how different theo¬
retical constructs, each developed from a consider¬
ation of some aspect of memory, can be integrated
into a system that, in principle, is capable of
accounting for a broad range of cognitive
activities. The constructs of the system are in
accord with both data and logical considerations
of how memory must operate. The work of
Sperling (I960) in vision and Massaro (1972) in
audition agree with the notions of a SB and pre-
perceptual representation. The idea of alter¬
native internal codes is central to the explanation
of studies of same-different recognition (Posner,
19b9)« The CS and c-code3 reflect studies of
recognition memory (Atkinson, Herrmann and
Westcourt, 1974), semantic decision-time (Hips,
Shoben and Smith, 1973), and the requirements of
a language understanding system that must have
rapid access to the information needed to parse
input (Schank, 1972). Other constructs (for
example, those involving content-addressable
storage and the representation of processes)
reflect the influence of research in computer
science and artificial intelligence ....."
(See Fig. 1).
As we can appreciate, this theory i3 an integration
of many ideas and experiments in contemporary research, and
therefore representative of theoretical work. However it
is necessary to Bee if this theory can accommodate and cope
with critical phenomena and experiments from a theoretical
point of view. This analysis will be done in Chapter II.
But it is also important to establish if the assumptions
of the theory are valid. This analysis will be done in
37.
m A flow chart of the memory system. (Solid lines indicate paths of information trans¬
fer. Dashed lines indicate connections which permit comparison of information arrays residing
in different parts of the system; they also indicate paths along which control signals may be
sent which activate information transfer, rehearsal mechanisms, etc.)
Fig. 1: (After Shiffrin and Atkinson, 1969).
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Chapter III, paying attention iaainly to the concepts of
store and sensory register (iconic memory), the idea of
the flow of information from SB to STS and LIS, and other
assumptions, drawing on some experiments which derive from
this theory. It is important to consider this analysis
not only in relation to the particular theory in question,
hut also in relation to memory research in general. The
lengthy quotation from a description of the orthodox theory
by its authors was given because it contains a detailed
example of current thinking about memory. The authors of
this theory have also stated that: "... the description of
the memory system serves to introduce a language
that is generally useful for thinking about
memory. The memory system reflects that per¬
ception, simple retention and complex cognitive
activities all require the representation,
storage and retrieval of information and it con¬
stitutes a way of talking about them in terms of
these commonalities. Thus, it provides a means
for thinking about different problems with a
single vocabulary..." (Atkinson and Wescours,1975).
It is precisely this way of thinking which, as will be
argued herein is limited, even though nowadays in psychology
it is one of the most representative forms of research in
memory. However there are other approaches to an under¬
standing of memory phenomena which are theoretico-experi-
mental, some of which we will describe briefly below.
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D. 0TH3R MODELS AND THEORIES
1. In the Associationist Modal
The source of the associationist model lies in the
original work of Ebbinghaus (1885)1 hut it received a
strong impulse from the work of Hull and his students.
For many years this was the representative of
models in memory research. Its basic concepts arei
(1) the concept of association applied to different phen¬
omena, for example, intra-list or remote association;
(2) the concept of interference, a3 an explanation of
forgetting; and, (3) The concept of mediation which, with
its attendant experimental achievement was very important,
and lay at the core of associationist models, being
necessary to explain many phenomena of memory within the
S-R approach. This approach to memory fostered an experi¬
mental tradition using nonsense-syllables but, in a more
elaborated form, it began to be used by associationists to
study complex problems, for example, clustering and internal
organization (e.g. Eausler 1974).
The influence of this approach has, however decreased
enormously, both because of inherent limitations of such
models, and crises which have emerged in the course of
experiments and their interpretations (e.g. Jenkins 1963»
1974; Postman 1971). Some of the most outstanding re¬
searchers in this school have tried to reformulate the
general model, in order to explain new phenomena (Underwood
and Ekstrand, 1986; Underwood, 1969? Postman, 1975) while
others have withdrawn completely and have changed their
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interpretation and approach (e.g. Jenkins, 1974).
Even though this sohool has had its crises, its
influence can still be observed, in the great number of
experiments it has provoked. The most descriptive comments
about it was made by Shallioe (1973), who refers to the
period when this sohool was in vogue as "the dark ages of
the verbal learning approach to memory"• However, the
great amount of experimentation done in its name does
represent a serious challenge to the theorist; as does the
influence of it3 strict methodology.
2. Models of Artificial Intelligence
The emergence of modem linguistics and the work in
artificial intelligence has contributed to a new form of
research and possibly a new form of model construction whose
origin lies, in a very important sense, in the 3PAM Model of
Feigenbaum and Feldman (1963). This model embodies a
series of assumptions about the mechanisms of memory, and
these make possible the simulation, using a computer, of
a series of classical experiments in psychology. At the
moment, this kind of work is very important, and some re¬
searchers that were working previously with other kinds of
models have changed to this area of work; examples are
Norman and Rumelhart (1975)» Kintsch (1974) and Anderson
(1976).
These models embody a series of assumptions with
implications for the construction of theories; they con¬
cern themselves with the possible relations between words
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in complex nets of associations; and use rules similar to
syntactic rules, and certain procedural steps (programs)
by means of which it is possible to modify, store or
generate verbal responses. In most oases there is an
emphasis upon the organization of information rather than
on its acquisition. Such emphasis in these models is
relevant to the question of how information is represented
or codified in humans.
Most researchers working within this approach believe
that, in the future, they will propose specific theories
and test hypotheses, as well as study in more natural
conditions, phenomena not directly related to memory, but
which are the result of its manifestation, such as answering
a question, or more generally, knowing a language. In
general they are characterized by an interest in diverse
things like knowledge, problem solving, semantics, and so
on (e.g. Norman and Humelhart, 1975). We will probably
have to wait some time to see if they are able to do what
they plan, and to cope with such an ambitious programme.
It is interesting to see that one of the more active
researchers within this approach, one who has developed
several simulations, i3 now very critical of his earlier
work and states that it is very difficult to know whether
the assumptions of the model are correct, whether they are
implemented correctly and whichare the best for the model
(Anderson, 1976).
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3. Models of Animal Learning
For many years most learning studies were done with
animals. These studies began with the hypothesis that the
basic mechanisms of learning were present in rats, cats,
dogs, etc. and that they could be investigated in those
subjects in a more straightforward way than was possible
with humans. By this means a series of * strange' vari¬
ables, like language,were avoided. This approach was
entirely within the behaviourist and neo-behaviourist
schools. The amount of research as well as the interest
in building a general theory was very great. A clear
example of a general theory of learning is found in Hull
and another in Tolman and their followers; though there
were also, of course, other researchers and groups of
lesser importance.
The behaviourist approach to the problem of learning
is undoubtedly one that belongs to the past. The reasons
for its decline in importance are very complex, but its
theoretical influence however, is still very strong, in
different ways; for example, the concept of hypothesis
making, and confirmation in rats (Krech, 1932) is an
ancestor of a great number of concepts and pieces of work
(e.g. Bruner et al, 1956; Levine, 1975). Similarly the
experiments on paired-associate learning which can be
identified with, or at leastclosely compared with, classical
conditioning, have been influential (Dixon and Horton,
1968); and, in the same way, it is still possible to detect
a strong influence of the old controversy between gradual
and all-or-none learning (lies tie, 1965).
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The influence of behaviourism was very strong in the
associationist account of memory, but recently it has
decreased} for example, in some cases, the existence of
classical conditioning or instrumental learning in adult
humans is denied (Brewer, 1974). In other cases the con¬
cepts once used in research on human memory, are the ones
now used to explain animal learning (e.g. Medin et al,197b).
3esides these general approaches to theoretical work
in memory, there is other work which, in one way or another,
attacks the same problem from different points of view and
with different methodologies.
4. Other Points of View
Attention should be drawn to the great quantity of
neurophysiological research centred around the problem of
memory and learning, and the search for its specific bases
(chemical and electrical). A general way of describing
these works is to compare them with the search for the
M engrain" a3 did Lashley (1950). On the basis of 20 years
of research, Lashley concluded that it might well be said
that memory did not exist. Recently, this situation has
cnanged a great deal (e.g. Bosenzweig and Bennett, 197b).
But in spite of abundant research in thi3 area, progress
has been slight, and from the point of view of memory
theory, neurophysiological work has contributed little or
nothing. Neurophysiology is one of the areas in which
theoretical work has the most to offer psychology, because
of the great number of isolated findings. Some form of
3ynthe3is and orientation, as well as some systematization
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of what is known, is manifestly needed.
It must be pointed out that there are some other areas
of work that are difficult to classify, such as the work
on neuronal-networks. This approach assumes the forms of
interconnection between neurons and tries to simulate
models of specific functions of information storage by
using simple forms of binary logic or sophisticated forms
of non-binary logic. The origin of this approach is found
in the work of McCulloch and Pitts (1943) but it has
advanced a long way from there. In its simpler form., it
studies how many, and which, are the characteristics that
the Mideal neuron" has to have in order to store specific
amounts of information. In the more advanced work, the
question of the storage of information is not settled
arbitrarily, but information is considered to be stored on
the basis of certain of its characteristics, that is
associative memory (Xohonen, 1977). According to this
conception of the storage of information, the physical
position of the store is not independent of the content of
the information (as it usually is in a computer), but
rather the content of the information and its place of
storage are closely related ("content-addressed"). In
other cases, these kinds of neuronal-networks are used to
study pattern recognition by using what are generally known
as perceptrons (Minsky and Papert, 1969; Arnari, 1977;
Scott, 1977).
One very interesting aspect of this kind of work was
the influence of Hebb's book (1949) as a source of inspir¬
ation. A second interesting aspect is the minor importance
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or impact that this kind of work has made on psychological
research# probably due to the complexity of the mathe¬
matical and logical tools that are used*
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CHAPTER II
TH3 STATSnlSNT OP PHOBL1MS IN THE PSYCHOLOGY OF M3M0BY
wa lose track of what we have already
accomplished and simply go round in circles,
discovering and rediscovering the same phenomena.1'
Baddeley (1977)
"At every crossway on the road that leads
to the future? each progressive spirit





There are several reasons that motivate the search of
relevant problems to investigate in the area of memory.
One of them is to generate more research by means of con¬
fronting current models or theories with relevant phenomena
in order to see if these theories offer some explanation.
By making exploit the problems a theory might have, not
only can the theory be validated but at the same time more
research can be generated. Another reason for focussing
on problems in memory research is that, since the phenomena
studied are complex, it is necessary to specify which are
the most relevant problems, and what should be the priorities
of research. One of the criteria that seems to be relevant
in psychology is "ecological validity". Neisser (1976)
says that "... because psychology is about people it can¬
not shirk the responsibility of dealing with fundamental
questions about human nature... Theory has something to say
about what people do in real culturally significant
situations... If theory lacks these qualities, if it does
not have what is nowadays called * ecological validity* it
will be abandoned sooner or later." Therefore it seems
necessary to consider ecological validity as another
criteria in trie evaluation of theories and the search of
problems, but many theories nowadays do not fulfil this
requirement. Another reason motivating the search for
problems i3 related to the first one, and concerns the
vast number of phenomena which still have not been tackled
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experimentally. These range from the study of conscious¬
ness to countless phenomena of memory in everyday life.
Researchers seem to have taken refuge in known
phenomena and in the laboratory and to have avoided both
big philosophical questions as well as phenomena from every¬
day life (which cannot easily be taken into the laboratory
to be studied systematically and carefully). A very high
proportion of memory research (and it's the same in other
fields of science) concerns the study of known phenomena,
or parametric studies, i.e. not the discovery or search
for new things, but the repetition of what is already known
(Tulving and Madigan, 1970). However, even in this kind
of work, results often are not clear. It is often very
difficult, even when a replicable experiment is found, to
explain what the principle behind the possibility of
replication is, or what significance this might have.
Another reason that motivates the search for problems
refers to the evaluation of the progress made in psychology,
which, as some propose has not been very outstanding.
According to Tulving (1977): "... the absence of
progress in the realm of concepts is another
phenomena: the history of our science knows no
generally acknowledged solutions to problems. It
is difficult to think of a single instance where
a problem generally perceived to be such by the
majority of the practioner3 in the field, was
explained by one investigator and the explanation
accepted by most others... Some readers of the
present essay undoubtedly will think that my
assessment of the situation is not entirely
realistic. All that such readers need to do to
prove my posit as untenable is to compose a list
— even a short list - of problems that have been
solved or explained in a non-trivial or relatively
permanent sense..."
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rVhat is presented here exemplifies Tulvlng*s idea, "but
in the form of open problems.
A3 has been pointed out before, the study of the
problems has another meaning, not only the one proposed
by Tulving.
Yet another reason to point out problems relates to
the previous ones, and is to specify whioh problems can be
useful to researchers beginning to work in this field.
Some in this condition might ask what characteristics does
this list have that others do not have. The answer is
simple: there are no other lists of problems available that
could be of some use or guide to those beginning to study
or do research in this area. It should be remembered
that most models of memory are not a source of problems,
but only of explanations of data and specific experiments
(e.g. Norman, 1970; Bower, 1977). In order to clarify
the characteristics of the problems let us analyse briefly
their function, origin and how they are used in other areas
of knowledge.
B. 00KT3ST OF TH2 STUDY OF PROBLEMS
One of several tasks that integrates scientific
activity is that of establishing problems. In most cases
this task is done before the construction of an experimental
hypothesis about the behaviour of a series of variables.
Usually the hypothesis i3 a simple attempt to state a
question clearly. However, the form of question determines
to some extent, the form of answer waich is appropriate.
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Formulating a problem may in itself be enough to show
whether or not finding an answer will be feasible.
Nowadays it is realised that scientific questions are
profoundly influenced by metaphysical as well as theoretical
concepts. It is no longer supposed possible to do experi¬
ments (or make observations) from a naive vantage point,
preceding any sort of theory (Agassi, 1975) • As regards
posing or finding problems, like many other scientific
processes, there are no perfect or complete algorithms that
can be suggested contrary to the opinion of Nordbeck (1971).
The end product of different stages of scientific work are
powerfully influenced by a vast number of factors which
range from the education or training of the scientist to a
great number of sociological factors (formation of groups,
prestige, location, personality, etc.).
In the last few years the activity of research itself
ha3 been systematically studied, and it has become evident
on one hand that it is unexpectedly complex, and on the
other that there is a lack of rules, or algorithms, for its
better accomplishment. As a result the analysis of
problems and theories used in science has assumed greater
importance, and is not now considered an exclusive activity
of philosophers but as part of the scientist's job. It
ha3 been found that there are no "assumed" scientific
"steps" to "follow", which guarantee taking the scientist
forward on the road to knowledge.
The advances obtained by, for example, the sociology
of science (Kuhn, 1970) and the clarification of certain
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problems in the philosophy of science make it seem unlikely
that it is possible to give rules for scientific work.
Feyerabend (1975)» Bunge (19^7) and Harding (1975) have
conclusively demonstrated the limitations of positivist
and empiricist philosophical schools with the result that
scientists have begun to place more emphasis on the advance
of theories and or semi-theoretical systems, and less on
the accumulation of data. Of course the effect of these
advances and the study of the functions of science has had
an uneven impact upon different areas of knowledge, but in
psychology, its impact has been very strong and new con¬
ceptual tools are beginning to be used. It is inside this
new less strictly formalised context that we are going to
see the role played by problems in science.
C. TECHNIQUES IN IKS DEFINITION OF PROBLEMS
There are several alternative ways of deciding which
problems are fundamental at any given moment, but there is
no algorithm which specifies the steps to follow; on the
contrary, we do not even know which are the basic strategies.
What is certain i3 that there are several possible ways of
specifying and deciding which are the central problems in
an area of knowledge. One of the simplest possible tech¬
niques is the so-called Adelphi method (Fusfeld and Foster,
1971) which has been applied to very different situations
and problems, scientific as well as technological, (Linstone
and Turoff, 1975); it consists in asking a committee of
"experts", using special questionnaires, which are the most
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important problems relating to certain phenomena. The
pre-requisites of this kind of approach are, first, to
have 11 experts" with the ability to select those problems
in the area of interest, and second, tae conviction that
the opinion of a group of "experts" is more representative
than the opinion of a single individual.
"Hfven though it is simple to use, and has a simple
rationale, this procedure does not have much impact on the
development of scientific problems. However, there are
several other sophisticated ways in which experts can
control not only the statement of problems, but also very
many aspects of contemporary research, for example, by the
allocation of research grants, direction of research centres
and by holding editorial positions on boards of scientific
journals. This kind of control over the problems to be
investigated seems to be the most powerful. It seems
strange that, even though it is known and criticised, the
Adelphi method is not accepted, since it is merely a
systematization of what has bean happening randomly for a
long time.
In other cases, and this is especially true of the
development of psychology, a different approach has been
U3ed for determining which are the central problems in a
specific area of knowledge. According to this approach,
easily stated problems have to be solved before general
ones can be stated. For example, when NASA decided to put
a man on the moon, the general target had to be divided
into several sub-problems which had first to be solved one
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by one. Other examples are the construction of the atomic
bomb, radar or the first computer, in each of these, many
preliminary technological and scientific problems had to
be solved before the final product was obtainable. A body
of background knowledge about the problems existed in
advance, but the actual solution was accelerated by the
proximity of war.
In all these cases, both the general statement of the
problem and the relevant body of knowledge was there in
advance; this suggested the feasibility of the specific
military projects. A not unrelated problem in psychology
is that posed by Lashley (1950), as the search for the
"Sngram. The problem's importance does not seem to be
recognised, the will to solve it does not seem to exist,
and only the isolated efforts of independent scientists are
observed from time to time, without a real general state¬
ment and effort to reach the target.
Yet another approach to the statement of problems has
been the computer simulation of complex social and economi¬
cal phenomena, (McCleod, 1968). Initially, only series
of assumptions and some general data are needed to later
direct a search for more specific missing data to make the
model work, and thus simulate the phenomena under study
(Forrester, 1971). The simulation with general data gives
a way of approaching the phenomenon under study and, at
the same time, indicates the missing data a3 well as its
own theoretical limitations.
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D. TH3 STAT343NT OF PROBLEMS AS rt3SULT OP THEOiiSTICAL ACTIVITY
Without denying the importance of the techniques already
mentioned, let us consider the classic form of doing theo¬
retical work. This is the study of both old and new,
relevant literature, theories, models, other relevant
sciences, aspects of the philosophy of science, general
philosophy and the history of psychology. This systematic
work allows the psychologist to establish which are the most
important problems to study in the psychology of memory. As
mentioned above, there are no specific tools or rules for
doing theoretical work. These simply do not exist in any
body of knowledge in which theoretical work is done; in
psychology in particular, there is not only a lack of
systematic theoretical activity but a distrust even of its
possibility. However, some general ideas from the philosophy
of science, can possibly be of some use.
3. PH0BL2LIS
There are twc ways of bringing out the importance of
problems in science; the first is to argue about the
importance of their construction, and the need for their
statement, and to stress the need for recognition of the
non-explicit assumptions upon which they are based. One
can dispute the importance of a problem's generality, which
characterizes and differentiates it from a hypothesis, and
one can distinguish formal problems (by definition mathe¬
matical and deductive), from other problems of science,
which involve conceptual analysis, etc. This first kind
of analysis is both important and necessary, but it is
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limited by the state of affairs already mentioned: lack
of rules or algorithms for scientific research. This is
why we will use the second form, which consists in looking
at the function or the effects of establishing problems,
in bringing about the advance of knowledge.
1. Problems in Mathematics
The area where the function and the utility of
establishing problems is most clearly illustrated i3 math¬
ematics, where right from the beginning such an approach
has been very important.
The Pythagoreans (approximately 5thcentury B.C.) dis¬
covered the problem of incommensurable ratios (expressed in
modern mathematics as irrational numbers) and thus provoked
the first big crisis in the history of mathematios (Bar-
Hillel, 19b4| Kline, 197^)• Another problem, which produced
the second crisis, was the concept of infinity (in partic¬
ular the development of calculus) at the beginning of the
19th century. The third crisis, which occurred at the
beginning of this century and affected the basis of mathe¬
matics and logic, was produced by the problems brought
forward by the formal demonstration of the limits of the
use of axioms in mathematics. In all these cases, the
knowledge of the problem as well as its description in a
clear and comprehensible way, has had a profound effect on
research and subsequent development.
Another famous problem, that associated with the
quadrature of the circle, was only demonstrated to be
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insoluble after 2000 year3 of research by Lindemann. It
was in trying to solve this apparently trivial problem*
that significant advances were achieved in geometry (Kline*
1972). Incidentally, the demonstration of the insolubility
of a problem is very interesting, since it seems that such
a situation is only possible in mathematics.
At the beginning of the Renaissance in Italy, a group
of mathematicians dedicated themselves to exchanging
problems; apart from the social interest of this mathe¬
matical duel, the situation brought about many achievements
including the systematization of algebra and the theory of
equations.
The suspicion that the 5th axiom of Tuclid was inde¬
pendent of the others, brought another problem. Its test
and study (by Bolyai, Gauss and Lobachevski) led to the
development of a new series of geometries whose existenoe
has had a profound effect in modern physics.
The role played by problems in mathematics (and other
areas of scientific research) is very complicated, and it
is not 3imply confined to stimulating the finding of, or
demonstrating the impossibility of, a solution. For
example, the assertion by Fermat that Diophantine equations
do not have a solution has remained a constant source of
interest, (Bdwards 1977; Kline, 1977) even though it was
merely written as a note in a book that he was reading.
Fermat wrote that he had the proof, but because of lack of
space did not write it down. Subsequent attempts to
solve this problem have had quite an effect on the theory
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of numbers, a branch of one of the more abstract areas of
mathematics.
At the other extreme is the problem of finding a
mathematical system which describes tnree bodies in move¬
ment. This is a problem of applied mathematics to which
no general solution has been found. The ingenuity of men
has, however, enabled them to solve a series of specific
problems where two artificial satellites need to have a
physical contact, i.e. where there is a situation in which
three bodies (the earth and the two satellites) are in
movement even though there is no general solution to the
problem.
These examples from mathematics enable us to illustrate
several interesting points, 1) problems have played a
fundamental role in the development of mathematics} 2)
the range of problems is broad, going from "pure" problems
to those of everyday life; 3) mathematical problems are
special; 4) some problems have a profound impact on
science and technology; 5) in some cases there are no
general solutions known to a problem although partial
solutions can be found; 6) it is plausible that there i3
a continuity between mathematical and scientific problems.
The most interesting case in mathematics, one whose
effects are possibly unique, is the list of problems drawn
up by 1). Hilbert in 1900, (1902). The comprehensiveness
of the list i3 its outstanding feature. It is interesting
to note that this was a general list; it attempted to
include all mathematics, not just a single particular branch,
and that these problems were the result of a theoretical
and systematic searoh.
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Of course mathematical solutions to problems are
different from those in other sciences, since total
solution is a possibility, whilst in other areas only
partial solutions can be given and in many cases they are
constrained by a theoretical structure.
2. Problems in Science
Problems have always existed in science in either an
explicit or an implicit form and have been a constant
stimulus to research. For example, the problem of the
transmutation of metals was the central question of
alchemy which was itself responsible for the development
of a great deal of basic chemical knowledge. Even though
the problem was fundamentally misconceived and involved
an appeal to •magic* its impact on the origin and develop¬
ment of chemistry was immense. From another point of
view it is now known that the transmutation of metals is
after all possible. In fact is occurs in nuclear fission.
This example shows just how complicated the function of
problems may be.
A more concrete example of influential problems are
the 31 queries stated by Newton (1952) in his book
•'Opticks" ? these problems virtually dictated physicists*
work for many years (Bunge, 1967)• In physics the
emergence of problems at both a theoretical and an experi¬
mental level brings with it the possibility of interesting
predictions. The moot distinct examples are found in
the physics of small particles. 3. Fermi for instance,
in his calculations concerning nuclear structure, always
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found that a small amount of energy was missing. At
first he considered this due to a mistake in his numerical
calculations or a loss of a small quantity of energy, but
finally, he postulated that it was a very special particle
- the neutrino. Twenty years later the existence of the
neutrino was experimentally demonstrated.
Another interesting case, not only of problems but
of their relations with theories, is 3een in the emergence
of the Periodic Table of Elements. The origin of thi3
Table was the problem of putting the chemical substances
known at that time, in order, together with Ldendeleyev's
conviction that some system of order had to exist. This
Table, however, not only ordered knowledge but provoked
research and tne later discoveries of new elements. Prom
then on the search was not random, but was done bearing in
mind specific characteristics that, in view of the con¬
tinuity, the new elements had to have.
As we have just seen, problems appear in very different
forms. These vary from the formal statements given by
Hilbert in mathematics, to the problem of the transmutation
of metals that is generally considered to have originated
in human greed. Between these two extremes, are problems
that have their origin in more profound philosophical
questions (like, what are the basic elements of matter?;
what are the basic mechanisms of life? etc.). There are
also technological problems, like; how to simultaneously
destroy the greatest number of people in the most effective
way? with this last case, the complexity of the relation
between different components of science is illustrated.
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We can see, for example, the construction of the atom
bomb as a response to a technological problem based on the
knowledge of matter (nuclear physics).
The time is now past wuen problems of science could
be classified as either pure or applied, two options now
seen as intimately related} for instance the automatic
translation of languages was an applied problem that was,
tnank3 to computers, believed to be almost solved. This
belief was, however, wildly" over-optimistic; to solve
this problem many other problems have first to be solved.
F. EXAMPLES OF TEE FUNCTION OF PROBLEMS IN PSYCHOLOGY
It is an historical fact that a series of numerical
discrepancies in the everyday work of the Greenwich
Observatory, initiated the study of reaction times, indi¬
vidual differences, and other variables which affect the
making of precise measurements (Boring, 1950). Feohner
(as described by Boring, 1950) tried to find the relation
between body and mind until one day (22nd October 1850)
he thought of measuring sensations and relating the
intensity of the stimuli with the intensity of the response
in a mathematical form. In some cases for practical, and
in others for philosophical, reasons, a series of philoso¬
phical questions came to belong to psychology. Psycholo¬
gists then, trying to find answers, imitated other disci¬
plines and adopted the scientific method.
W. James, explicitly stated a series of problems in
his book Principles of Psychology, where he reviewed the
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current 3tate of xnowledge and discussed a series of
problems wnich were to guide mmerioan payecology for many
years. dome of the experiments and iceas are still
important today, xor example, the treatment of attention
as one of the fundamental aspects of the study of thinking
produced a disoussion which is still continuing (Keisser,
1976).
several things which happened with the beginning of
experimental psychology at the end of the last century,
should be pointed out. first, there was a transformation
of certain problems from being philosophical to being
scientific, with the attendant availability of new ways
(like experimentation) to give answers; second, many
problems previously thought to lie in the domain of other
areas of knowledge, like astronomy* or physiology, were
recognised as essentially psychoxogical (mental); third,
a great number of questions were solved by using the new
scientific method.
The problems posed at that time, not being tackled
exclusively by experimental techniques, required the com¬
bination of theoretical analysis with the postulation of
unobservabie processes like attention; this way of
answering questions was spurned during the obscurantism
produced by behaviourism, which was only interested in
problems of behaviour and performance. for instance, in
the 1920*3, the problem of attention was shelved, only to
be rediscovered as a new problem in the 1950'a. Another
case is the study of images (Aessel, 1972; Holt, 19o4),
6b*
and related phenomena that were considered very important
in psychology until the 19u0's and then rediscovered and
subjected to theoretico-experimental study. To be
precise, it can be seen that it is problems which are
fundamental in producing advances or changes in schools
and theories in psychology. It was the problem of the
interpretation of introspection as posed by Wundt that
produced the .Yurzburg school, the so-called 11 new" psychology,
with its emphasis on the 3tudy of thinking. Similarly
a series of problems in thi.3 school were the origins of
Gestalt psychology. when Watson criticized the mentali3t
psychology of Titchener, what he criticized was the way in
which problems were solved and not the problems themselves
(Boring, 1950). At the present time it is very difficult
to explain data entirely on the basis of the relation
between stimulus and response, and this has given way to
the cognitive school of psychology.
Using Xuhn's terminology (1970), we may say changes
in science are produced by crises; however, in psychology
a change in paradigm does not necessarily entail an
advance, as is pointed out by lipsey (1974). The situa¬
tion is different in physics where the change from classi¬
cal Newtonian physics to the relativistic physics necess¬
arily produced an advance.
G. GTNHAL CRITERIA IN THE SELECTION OF PAOBL'1,13 OF MdMORY
The sources of the most important problems in the
psychology of memory can be classified in three general
groups:
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1. The development, outside the field of the psychology
of memory, of theories and experiments whose discoveries
throw soma li^ut on problems of memory.
2. The lack of aaequate explanations lor macy experimental
data in tne psychology of memory (many ox the problems
raised are classical whether they are recent or old).
3. Problems that have not been tackled by experimental
research. In some cases, these can be described as
problems of everyday life, in others as old philosophical
dilemmas.
It might be suggested that any problem being studied
by experimental psychologists should be included in this
work, but this is not the case, because the fact that a
real or an artificial (laboratory-created) phenomena is
being studied does not imply that it is relevant, or has
any role in the development of knowledge; it simply points
to the fact that researchers are, within limits, free to
study whatever they want. On the othelf hand, several
problems studied are entirely the result of certain kinds
of social structures, political idealogies or philosophies,
as has been olearly indicated by Hose and Hose (1974) and
Kvale (1976). It is a similar mistake to think that all
published experiments concern problems relevant to the
development of knowledge. It is well understood that some
reasons for publishing experiments are quite external to the
search for knowledge. It has to be pointed out that the
choice of problems for discussion is not impartial but has
been influenced by a series of factors which limit one's
view of what the most important problems are.
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H. SPECIFIC INFLUENCES ON THE SELECTION OF MEMORY PHOBLMS
Possibly the most important influences on the selection
of problems are external to the researoh itself. These
influences may, of course, be positive as well as negative.
I. Philosophy
One of the achievements of post logical positivist
philosophy of science has been to clearly and precisely
indicate the metaphysical bases of many scientific problems
and theories. This goes far beyond both the positivist
idea that knowledge can be obtained by means of research
(experimentalism), and the demonstration that all concepts
and ideas in science are susceptible to experimental tests.
An extension of this point of view, is the belief
that in experimental sciences it is possible (and necessary)
to use modern logical methods like axiomatization, (Luce,
19595 laming, 1973? Taylor, 19t>8), and what has been called
the logic of partial truths (Krajewski, 1977). This last
point is tied up with the positive influence of non-Anglo-
Saxon schools, like the one represented by Bachelard (1971)
and some Russian philosophers (Mahasiah, 1973? Blakeley,
1975)» which have tended to encourage the abandoning of binary
logical systems (or two value logic). The importance of
Kuhn (1970) is the discovery that science is a phenomenon
strongly influenced by sociological aspects, as has been
mentioned elsewhere. He differs from some other authors
who still consider science from a formal idealized point
of view (e.g. Popper, 1972).
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A great deal of deliberation in recent philosophy
has been dedicated to discussing how arbitrary and un-
guided by rules scientific work is, (Feyerabend, 1975) in
contrast to other methodologists who think it possible to
give easily followable rules (or recipes) for research.
This by no means makes science less serious or less rigid
but on the contrary, demonstrates how minimal is our know¬
ledge of this human activity. A concrete example of this
'recipe' influence is behaviourism (in its different forms)
which 3tated that if several methodological steps were
rigidly followed and there was experimental rigour, know-
loedge would automatically be obtained; in fact the only
thing that was obtained was masses of data (some irrelevant).
It cannot be said, however, that behaviourism was simply
the result of the philosophy in fashion at the time, since,
although positivism was the fashionable philosophy from the
20's to the 50's, in many other areas of knowledge it was
not used at all.
2. Russian Psychology
It is very important for any psychologist to try to
see developments of his science wherever they are in the
world and not to restrict himself arbitrarily to his
country or the influence of one of the superpowers. Even
though difficult, it i3 not impossible to find out which
are the most important developments in soviet and oriental
psychology. When this information is obtained, the
vitality of this research and the interest, not only of
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its data but also of its general approach, is easily seen,
partly because the relation between studies of animals and
ones of humans is heavily stressed, as well as the study
of other related phenomena.
A clear example can be seen in the work of two memory
schools; one is represented by Smirnov (1973) who studied
and demonstrated the fundamental role of the division in
memory of voluntary and involuntary recall, a3 well as the
influence of comprehension on studies with humans. Other
interesting aspects of this school are the use of material
and natural conditions, and the importance given to images.
The other soviet school of memory research is that
represented by Beritashvili (1971), who studied the bio¬
logical basis of memory, found what appeared to him to be
imagery in dogs, cats and other animals, and demonstrated
the continuity from the moat simple problems of conditioning
to images. These studies are very important since they
are studies about the neurophysiological evolution of
images and are more extensive and detailed than the class¬
ical works of Hunter (1913)• It is not possible here to
review all the dynamics of Soviet psychology in general,
or even the work on memory in particular, however its
importance and influence on the selection of problems of
memory must be stressed.
3. Sthology
There is no doubt that one of the most important
influences on modern psychology comes from ethology, not
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only at a theoretical level hut also concerning the number
of phenomena demonstrated. Ethology brought about a
change in the 3imple naive vision that existed concerning
not only perception and learning but also other social
phenomena. When ethology is evaluated against comparative
psychology, it is clear that more relevant and important
results come from the former even though both areas started
more or less at the same time (independently).
4. Linguistics
The relation between linguistics and the psychology
of memory is rather strange. According to Chomsky (1968)
linguistics is part of psychology, but at the moment a
large part of the theory of linguistics is mathematical and
formal, whilst in psychology there are very few theories of
this kind. Another interesting aspect is the way that
linguistics has heavily influenced aspects of memory theory,
for example the works of Norman and Humelhart (1975) and
Kintsch (1970). Nevertheless there seems to be some con¬
fusion: language is the product of a series of processes,
(which are not very well understood), and yet some people
use that product as it were an explanation itself: (For
example, the explanation of certain semantic phenomena by
laws or syntactic rules (Fodor, 1977)). However, the
development of linguistics has had a very good influence
mainly in demonstrating the utility of theories and their
possibility in 11 non-exact" areas of science.
5* Artificial Intelligence (AI)
Even though it is fashionable to maintain that AI and
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cognitive psychology are closely related and influence
each other, and that AI work is inside a cognitive
psychology framework, this is not the case. On the con¬
trary, it is a fundamental role of theoretical psychology
to state that these two fields of work are quite different.
The explicit and implicit assumptions of AI are radically
different from those of cognitive psychology, Allport
(1975, 1977).
There are some cases where certain specific AI work is
very relevant to problems of memory, but this is only the
case where there are theoretical concepts. Another
example where AI and psychology relate comes from physiology.
Campbell and Robson (1968), and Ginsburg (1975) hypothesise
that the visual system is composed of a series of filters,
a concept taken from electronic engineering. They use
computer simulations to test this hypothesis, and on the
way, explain many optical illusions. It is in this kind
of work where AI is useful, but only then when there are
specific theoretical concepts to be tested rather than, as
in much AI, where processes are assumed but not specified.
AI work is based on a series of ideas which are not
strictly part of the theory of computation, but rather are
taken from linguistics (nets of interrelated concepts) or
old psychology (schemata and frames). All of these are
very important in their original form but not as reinter¬
preted by artificial intelligence. AI shows an interest
in theories, but makes the mistake of thinking that, in
one way or another, the programs and languages which are
used in AI are themselves theories. At the moment psycho¬
logists are using many ideas and conceptstaken from AI,
or from computation, (these are two different bodies of
knowledge) but the usefulness of doing so remains to be
proven. It is difficult at the moment to find psycholo¬
gists seriously criticising the use of AI work, two of the
few exceptions being the works by Neisser (1972, 197b)
and Allport (1977) who deny the possibility of using this
work to construct psychological theories.
6. Piagetian -Psychology
The influence of Piaget is extensive, not only experi¬
mentally, but more fundamentally in the kind of theory
he presents. Piaget's kind of approach has highlighted
three fundamental aspects of phenomena and problems of
psychology^
1. the evolutionary character of psychological
processes}
2. the constant interrelations between different
processes;
3. the complex and non simplistic nature of explan¬
ations of processes
On the other hand, some aspects of the Genevan research,
like the emphasis placed on verbal responses of children
(introspection), are rather limited. Work by T. Bower
(1977) has demonstrated both the limitations of empirical
evidence and the inadequacy of the notion of stages of
cognitive development inside a Piagetian scheme.
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A second aspect which limits Piaget's influence on
the present work (and probably on others) is the lack of
a systematic presentation by him of the main points of hia
theories. There is also a lack of good reviews of his
work done by other people. The work of Piaget and Inhelder
(1973) in memory is a clear example both of how processes
are interrelated and of their complexity. It is important
to emphasise that one of the few influences (and references)
that Piaget acknowledges in his works is that of Bartlett.
7« Infant Psychology
This is one of the areas most influential on both the
statement of problems of memory and theories. In the last
few years the work on this area (T. Bower, 1977) clearly
shows how rich and complex these processes are and how
explanations for many phenomena of memory may be found in
this kind period.
8. Animal Learning
Recent experiments in this area have resulted in a
series of new problems whose impact is not yet being felt.
The original idea of animal learning research was that it
was possible to study learning processes in animals, in
simple experimental set ups with few variables; since it
was supposed that the basic mechanisms of learning were
common to all different animals. However our ideas of
the processes involved and the kinds of learning necessary
have been significantly altered due to*
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1. the phenomena of classical conditioning! which do not
adjust themselves to the "normal" parameters of this kind
of learning! for examplef the phenomenon known as the
"Sauce Bemaise" , (described by Wickelgren, 1977).
2. the suspicion that the first stage of operant con¬
ditioning is itself a phenomenon of classical conditioning
(Hinde and Stevenson-Hindef 1973).
3. the complex interrelations between learning by
imitation and inherited biological mechanisms (Ilinde and
Stevenson-Kinde, 1973).
4. the demonstration in primates of learning of complex
behaviours like certain forms of "language" (Humbaugh,
1977; Premack, 1976).
5. the experimental evidence that animals are possibly
aware of what they are doing (Griffint 1976).
6. the study of very simple animals like molluscs
(especially aplysias) where neuronal nets which control
specific aspects of reflexes have been found and where the
existence of neurophysiological meoaanisms which can
interrupt not only reflex responses but also habituation,
(and active dishabituation) in an active form (Kandel and
Spencer, 1968) have been demonstrated.
There are two important conclusions:
i. Animal studies are both complex and important.
The inadequacy of the mechanisms proposed so far
leads one to say that a more "cognitive" kind of
interpretation is needed for these data, using
"cognitive" in the sense of Tolman i.e. "more complex"
and with, the participation of more "active" phenomena,
Medin (1976).
ii. It is not known whether there are enough adequate
interpretations of classical and experimental con¬
ditioning experiments. It is not possible to give a
theoretical explanation of these conditioning mechanisms.
This is the reason why this kind of work forces us to
see problems in memory from another point of view? not
only in animal research but also in humans.
I. PROBLEMS IN THE PSYCHOLOGY OP MEMORY
To penetrate right into the business of stating
problems i3 far from easy. Psychology, by the very
nature of its methodology and objectives, is difficult and
there is little by way of guidance from the philosophy
of science.
One of the few guides that can be used, to a certain
extent, is the classical work of Hilbert (1902). This
kind of statement of problems had quite an effect in math¬
ematics at the time and is possible to see the continuing
impact in the present research (Pang, 1970).
The differences between formal and other problems in
science has already been mentioned. These same factors
limit the statements of problems in the psychology of
memory (and in other areas of psychology).
Some comments are necessary before the problems are
presentedi
- the number of problems vary, it is not possible to
give a definitive number.
- some of the problems (the first ones in eaoh
categorie) are more important than others.
- the language used is general, there are no attempts
to give definitions.
- it is difficult to establish whether a problem has
been solved, the only thing that can be said is that there
is some knowledge concerning it.
- in some cases problems are mentioned, and references
given, mainly of those working on, or with data relevant
to, those problems.
- in some cases the problems mentioned are being
investigated but a theoretical analysis and interpretation
is still required.
In order to simplify the use of these problems in
the evaluation of the orthodox theory as well as in the
analysis of the possible areas of development of memory
research, the problems have been classified in:
A) Fundamental problems concerning the relationship
between theory and experiment.
B) Problems on the nature of representation or how
information is stored and used.
C) Problems concerning the control and manipulation
of information.
D) Parametric problems in systematic research.
2) Problems related to other areas of psychology.
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As it has been mentioned, this classification is
arbitrary and many of the problems can be considered in
relation with one or more of the five categories given
above. But more important than a classification this set
of problems can be used a3 a guide in research. The cate¬
gories are more or less in order of relative importance,
since for instance, it is going to be difficult to explain
the problem of voluntary forgetting without advancing in
the knowledge about the characteristic of the working memory
and in general about thinking.
A) Fundamental problems concerning the relationship
between theory and experiment
These problems can be described as those which any
future theory has to make reference of, and there must be
attempts to explain them. Any attempt to eliminate any
of these subjects in the theory has to be justified. In
some of these problems it might be possible to find clear
and precise theoretical developments. On the other hand
some of these problems are about a conception of memory
which is different from the present ideas about memory
(i.e. voluntary forgetting) as a passive system.
1. The Problem of Consciousness
It is diffioult to find another problem as important
as this, yet at the same time, as difficult to tackle in a
theoretico-experimental way.
At times in the history of psychology, it was con¬
sidered that consciousness was THE phenomenon that
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psychology studied, Boring (1933, 1950), Klein (1970),
Kuhlman (1906). however, differing conditions changed
its epistemologicai status. It is possible that certain
advances in the 3tudy of consciousness could be made at
the moment, with the help of new theoretico-experimental
tools. For example, Shallice (197k) and Culbert3on (I960)
suggested the use of a series of analogies from cybernetics
and mathematics (the theory of networks) which could allow
us to postulate a mechanism of dominance in a mathematical
system through which certain characteristics of the
"principal controller" could be given. Another possibility
lies in the work on memory in children, which attempts to
study the way information i3 stored, i.e. whether we in
3ome sense "know" rules of behaviour, or whether behaviour
is based on rules that are not verbally reportable. In
these situations the information stored is tied up with
the possibility of saying or snowing that the subject does
or does not know that he has it stored.
In neurophysiology certain examples can be found
showing how problems are studied without worrying too much
about their definition or complexity, (Buser and fiougeul-
Buser 1978). For example in the work of bperry (1977),
the central aim of study ha3 always been to find the
physical basis of consciousness, looking to see whether or
not it is present in subjects with differing neurological
lesions. In other cases the basis of this process has
been studied using simple distinctions, like talking of
the two cerebral hemispheres,(Besiraju 1976).
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Problems in this area have reached a state where some
people hypothesise which are the specific structures
involved in the process of consciousness (Diamond and
Blizard, 1977). Even though the way used to analyse
consciousness in this kind of research is merely to dis¬
tinguish between its presence and absence without specifying
it in detail, the results are still encouraging.
Another kind of approach to this problem i3 the one
given by Griffin (1976) who studies whether animals have
a certain form of awareness of their behaviour, or of the
possible effects in the future of certain behaviour. This
kind of approach presupposes that primitive forms of con¬
sciousness can be found in animals and it is an interesting
way of tackling the problem.
These cases are illustrative of some of the ways in
which this particular problem can be studied, without using
classical philosophical discussions, which have in many
cases been sterile. The strategy that has been followed
by these authors, is to decompose the problem into subunits,
for example, to say that one of the forms in which the
process operates is as a control which can answer 'yea'
or 'no' to the question X (e.g. 'do you know the rivers of
Europe?'), where, in a sense, the system does not need to
laboriously search its memory to see whether or not it has
the information; but rather has something like a cata¬
logue of the information that it contains. In other cases,
a central "demon" which takes decisions in the recognition of
patterns (Lindsay and Norman, 197*0 is hypothesised. This
kind of study, supposing the existence of demons, ghosts,
or homunculi, has a useful function in science, as is
acknowledged by Arbib (1972) (or in physics by Maxwell).
The foundation for new developments concerning con¬
sciousness will possibly consist of the following
realisations!
1. That consciousness is constituted by several
processes of information manipulation.
2. That it is a system which controls other activities
in order to handle information.
3. That these processes are implicit in the different
forms in which information is elaborated.
4. That processes of which it can be said that in
one way or another there i3 conscious control, and
other processes that are automatic and of which there
is no conscious control, must be distinguished.
5. That the almost total loss of the process itself,
in certain (clinical) cases, is a way of approaching
the study of the problem of consciousness.
b. That this process concerns tne aianipulation of
information tied to real events; it is not an empty
process "in vacuo".
7. That this process is one of the man:/ forms of
manipulation and control of information.
8. That this process must be assumed in order to
explain results in perception, learning and the study
of thinking which cannot be explained otherwise.
Another way of studying the problem of consciousness
is to use a behavioural point of view, but rather than
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making reference to behaviour, to use instead mathematical
models, (theory of filters) as is done in theories of
attention. This approach is very interesting since for
several years (from the 20*s to the 50*s) it was left on
one side. Now it is reappearing (Neisser, 1967, 1976).
The study of attention involves the (human and animal)
ability to select a part of the total number of stimuli
as "useful" or "relevant". This selection is not a
function of the characteristics of the stimuli, but is a
central decision. The study of attention is related to
many otheraspects of research in memory and other areas
of work.
2. The -Problem of the -Physical Basis of Memory
This is among the most important problems of memory,
not only because there is no relevant research, but because
it is treated quite differently in psychology to the way
it is treated in other areas of science. In some cases,
for example in neurophysiology, there is a great deal of
research and a great quantity of data about memory, but no
theory at all (Hosenzweig and Bennett, 1976). In other
cases there are models and theories about the phenomena
and processes related to memory, but no importance is
placed upon the form which those processes take as regards
their physical embodiment; in artificial intelligence for
example, this problem is sometimes even considered irrelevant
(Anderson, 1976). In other cases, formal theories deny
the importance of memory and its physical basis, (Suppes,
1969).
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The dangers of forgetting this problem are very real
and include the construction of completely dualist theories
(in the philosophical sense) where the problem of memory
and that of its basis are considered to be independent,
a3 well as the disorganized search for data without a
guiding theory or the construction of models and analogies
in which the kind of physical base suggested is incom¬
patible with physiological knowledge. To acknowledge the
existence of this problem does not entail accepting a
reductionist thesis nor that all psychological processes
are biological processes, nor to be even more extreme,
the result of physico-chemical processes.
It is important to tackle the problem of memory and
it3 basis in a unified way and not as more or less inde¬
pendent subject of study. It i3 clear, furthermore, that
this problem is addressed more to theory than to the search
for data, and that it concerns the way in which two general
areas of research with different methods of study and
experimental analysis relate to each other.
3« The Problem of the Intentionality of Learning and Memory
There is some experimental evidence relevant to this
kind of problem, (Bjork, 1972; Katona, 1940) in particular
the work of the Russian memory school (Smirnov, 1973;
Kots, 1977) wnich maintains that voluntary (or intentional
processes are one of the most important variables facili¬
tating both learning and forgetting. The main obstacle to
the solution of thi3 problem has been the difficulty of
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defining the process, as well as manipulating it experi¬
mentally. However, it has "been possible experimentally,
to demonstrate some of the characteristics of this process
in a limited way (Bartlett, 1932).
The possibility of researching further into this
area depends, to a certain extent, on how liberated re¬
searchers can become from behaviourist psychology. On
the other hand, the problem of intentional, or voluntary,
behaviour, is one found in many other areas of work (Kimble
and Perlmutter, 1970).
4. The Problem of Voluntary Forgetting
This problem can be considered as the counterpart of
the previous one. For theoretical reasons, it may be
supposed that there is a basic mechanism of intentionality,
related to other processes in different way3 and this is
specially true in this case. The problem could be tackled
by looking at the great amount of information that humans
can receive, for example, in one day, and realizing that,
for reasons of economy, it is necessary to separate certain
irrelevant from other, relevant, information (by means of
attention) and then to forget the irrelevant information.
Forgetting is not simply the passive erasing of
things from a memory store, but rather an active process,
in the sense that the activation of certain mechanisms is
required in order to forget (Luria, 1968). The case of
something very difficult to forget, e.g. a traumatic
experience, shows it necessary to suppose an active process
is required in order to forget.
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5. The Problem of the Reorganization of Information
Clearly one of the characteristics of the functioning
of memory is that it work3 with elements already learned
in the past; what it does is to acquire and then re¬
organize already known elements. In a sense, adult humans
do not learn at all but merely modify elements already
known. Bartlett (1932) said that this kind of memory work
was the rule and not, as is still generally considered, an
exception. For example, in the case of nonsenss syllables,
what is learned is not a completely new entity but a com¬
bination of elements already known (letters); this analysis
can be extended to a great many phenomena where subjects
supposedly learn but in fact are just reorganizing known
information.
This problem appears to raise a paradox. On the one
hand, learning seems to presuppose the acquisition of some¬
thing new, and, on the other, it is really difficult to
find situations where something really new is being
presented to the subjects. For this reason, the problem
should ideally be divided in two; the problem of the re¬
organization of information; and the learning of new
elements. The process of reorganization is very important,
but it has been ignored as an experimental problem and few
relevant studies can be found (Scandura, 1970; G. Bower,1972).
If there is a problem of reorganization, it seems
logical to ask whether the laws of reorganization are them¬
selves learned or whether they are inherited. However,
the distinction between reorganization given by inherited
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factors versus learned reorganization is very simplistic;
the literature suggests that there are two kinds, but their
relations are not clear, especially in relation to memory.
It is important to point out the difference between
the organization of information like the grouping of
elements in categories, given by the subjects, and subjec¬
tive categories (Gofer, 1976). In these cases the
association of ideas or clustering (a3 it was called a few
years ago) is involved, (Bousfield, 1953). Here the way
in which 'new' elements are presented in the form of new
combinations, is emphasised, what the subjects have to
learn is supposedly a new stimulus. In all these cases,
it is here suggested that what the subjects are really
learning are known elements. The question of the reorgan¬
ization of information concerns how a series of known
elements can be reorganized into new combinations like the
5th symphony or Hamlet. Extreme cases of this form of
reorganization of elements have often been considered as
creativity; however if the activity is considered as a
very complex form of reorganization of old information, it
is possible to penetrate to its origins and the way it works
without 3imply postulating a •faculty' as is the case if we
attribute creativity. Another case in which the process
of reorganization is clearly illustrated with very inter¬
esting implications, is the study of language in primates
and other animals (Premack, 1976). Sometimes reorgani¬
zation of information may be caused by the presentation of
environmental stimuli, at others it is an active process
on the part of the subjects WuO combine, modify or make
new classes.
To emphasise tue existence of this phenomenon does
not, of course, say anything about its origins, it only
points out its neglected importance for research. In a
sense, it could be said that there is a process of re¬
organization whose function is to operate on information.
The following section is going to describe how that
information can have two completely different origins.
6. The Problem of defining the Basic Units of Memory
From the experimental point of view, this problem
originates in the work of Sbbinghaus (1885), and one of
its latest manifestations is found in Simon (1974). During
this long period of researoh, the idea that there are some-
1* ||
thing like minimal physical units called atoms, has per¬
sisted, and there have even been attempts to define these
units by means of physical measurement. In physics, and
many other areas of knowledge too, this kind of approach
has long since been abandoned, as it has been found that
these units are composed of other sub-units. The basic
idea of finding units is itself a simplification which
only leads to the use of more complicated theoretical
structures. In other words, the nature of the supposedly
simple events is in fact complicated and requires complex
ideas and tools. This is not to deny that atoms (or other
experimental particles) are, from a naive point of view,
the "bricks" of the Universe, but the idea that these
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bricks are simple seems unacceptable. The same could
possibly bo said of the psychological study of memory,
when it is asked what the elemental parts of memory are.
Perhaps there are no fundamental particles as such,
although grouped elements form interesting phenomena for
study. For example, a series of lines, ordered in a
certain way, are called letters and are considered as such
in so far as they can form words eto.; however the lines
are not the 'basic* elements; a series of dots ordered
in a certain way could be said to be the basic elements
of lines. One could go on for ever trying to find
•fundamental' elements in this way.'
This strategy of trying to find something simple in
order to explain complex phenomena is based on the principle
of parsimony, which has been demonstrated to be useful in
psychology but not so useful in physics and other disci¬
plines. This is not to deny that certain phenomena
procede others (like atoms precede molecules). It is
from this point of view that the study of different ele¬
ments of memory is going to be considered and that is why
the problem of organization receives more attention than
the problem of elements. Certain events can be studied
as events preceeding others but that does not mean that,
by themselves, they have much importance. It may be that
some forma of codification of environmental information
procede others. Perhaps humans store certain events which
are elements of more complex information structures.
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An alternative way of approaching this problem is to
suppose that memory works, not by the use of elements and
by building new combinations, but on the contrary, by
using general events, and actively constructing or defining
new sub-categories. An illustrative example of this can
be found in children, who do not learn a total of sounds in
order to say a certain work, but from a set of different
sounds (words) begin to form categories of certain parts
of that total in order to derive the elements. Generally
speaking, the process of constructing new structures by
the combination of new elements, and by the categorization
of large amounts of events, in order to define new sub¬
classes, are not two different processes, but two forms of
describing the reorganization which results in the enrich¬
ment of the stored information. The first way of des¬
cribing reorganization in memory has guided much research;
but the second way, even though it raises the same number
of problems, seems to be more interesting.
The problem of the elements of memory, if it is studied
as a completely psychological problem, as it has been up
to now, does not make as much sense, considering the
problem in relation to the physical basis of the "engram"•
It is in relation to neurophysiology, that the solution
of this problem stops the search for "ghosts" (bits or
chunks) and becomes realistic, linked up with a central
problem of neurophysiology - the study of neuronal codes.
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7. The Problem of Simulation in Memory
Organisms have the capacity, in one way or another,
to simulate "in memory" a series of events which have not
happened or the effects of certain behaviours which they
have not performed. This is the classical phenomenon
of covert trial and error behaviour. The idea that humans
can solve problems without needing to actually perform, or
have any overt behaviour, raises this problem. Subjects
may use past information (which is remembered), and pre¬
sent information (which is perceived) in order to solve
certain kinds of problems. This kind of phenomenon has
much in common with the previous problem} in both there
are conceptual and behavioural variables involved, yet,
for human beings at least, both are part of a single
phenomenon.
To suppose internal simulation does not say how it
happens, and it i3 a theoretical blunder to use the visual¬
ization of objects by the eye as a close analogy of similar
internal visualization (imagery). It may be supposed that
some ways or other of representing objects are used, but
where temporal and spatial dimensions are concerned, they
cannot be identical or even similar to the way in which
objects are manipulated by overt motor behaviour. Empirical
evidence shows that the way in which these simulations are
done is rich in information, but the language of simulation
(brain language) is not known. The phenomenon os simu¬
lation does not exclusively involve problem solving, it is
a process which takes place constantly in order to manip¬
ulate stored information.
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An example of simulation in memory is given by the
following situation: when an athlete runs to catch a ball
in the air there are three bodies in movement, one static
and two dynamics, (this is a classical problem in physics).
The athlete, as well as many other humans and even animals,
easily solves this problem, yet the mathematical algorithm
method needed to solve the problem is not known, making it
very difficult to program a computer to solve the problem,
even though humans solve it, and, to do so, have to simulate
their position in advance in relation to the position of
the ball and place themselves where the ball is going to
fall.
B. Problems on the nature of representation or how
information is stored and used
Over the last few years, there has been interest in
thi3 area of research but even though few have been the
results which can be considered as relevant and clear.
8. The Problem of the Supra-Organization of Information
A problem different from, but related to, the previous
one, is the suprn-organization of information (the way in
which information is organized in large categories, or as
it has been called, concept learning). The first traces
of organization are found in the way in which information
is acquired. There are certain form3 of temporal and
spatial relations inherent in the data, these relations may
be preserved in the organism perhaps forming the first
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elements of supra-organization. In other cases the
organization is learned, two or more different independent
elements being grouped together in the same category,
possibly with the introduction of a label or arbitrary name
(like "flowers", "machines", and so on).
The way in which categories are formed is vary diffi¬
cult to explain} simple explanations like generalization
of stimuli or concepts like pattern recognition cannot be
used, since supra-categories include elements with totally
different physical characteristics, Tulving and Donaldson
(1971). The important problem is not, however, how these
supra-categories are formed, a field which has generated
a great deal of research, but how the facility of acces3
to information grouped in big categories is possible.
What form of codification classifying the search for
information can be supposed? However, the problem is
even more complicated than this. In many situations it
is difficult even to know into which category something
has been classified in memory, and it is then necessary
to make a hypothesis involving yet another mechanism to
help in the search for information.
Another area which could be of great relevance to this
process is the study of meanings in special languages. It
may be supposed that context affects meaning, as is the
case with "net", "fruit", "a certain way", "a certain
ta3te", etc. The events integrated in this net of meaning
are not simple phenomena like colours, but many and varied
phenomena. In the same way, these events are not
exclusively defined by a single concept and a single event
may satisfy the definition of many different concepts.
This problem provides a strategy for studying important
phenomena. On the other hand, the concept of supra-
organization refers to other situations as well, like
motor skills, where a group of motor movements form a
supra-category which is different to the individual units
which make it up, the new skill being unable in an automatic
way, Stelmach (197b), Scandura (1970). This supra-cate-
gorization of elements can also be seen at a simpler level
as with certain motor behaviours where the elements are
different or changing but the supra-category remains the
same, (Bernstein, 1967). The processes related to this
problem are not two different concepts or pieces of be¬
haviour, but probably a unified process.
9« The Problem of Performance and Change in Memory
Several researchers (bartlett, 1932; Piaget and
Inhelder, 1973; and Koffka, 1935) have maintained that
memory is not static (static-trace) but that on the con¬
trary, one of its main characteristics is being dynamic.
Bven though this idea is important, researchers have not
regarded it as such; and this may be one reason why, at
the present, it is so difficult to know whether or not
there is an internal representation or code, or, even more,
how to study possible changes in such a representation.
Another reason could be methodological; the form in which
subjects are asked to answer questions in experiments is
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restricted and systematized. Perhaps what is needed is
a free way of answering so that changes in memory can
emerge. The analysis of 3uch answers is however very
difficult (Riley, 1962).
Thi3 problem, is, however, being researched; Kvale
(1974) has demonstrated in different experiments not only
that there are changes of memory, but also that it is
possible to predict and control the direction of change.
He has also apparently demonstrated that changes are dynamic,
for which some other empiricalevidence can be found in the
above mentioned works of Piaget and Bartlett.
It is relevant to emphasise that the theoretical
implications of this problem are very important, as has
been suggested before (Kvale, 1974). These are probably
more influenced by the dominant philosophy of present Anglo-
American psychology, than by the reality of research as
has also been suggested by Neisser (1967)• It is possible
that AI studies, on the one hand, and the work on short
and long term memory, on the other, limit the study of this
kind of problem, by their methodology, philosophical con¬
ception and the kind of theories which they propose.
10. The Problem of Tacit Knowledge
This problem can be illustrated in the following way:
if a subject is given a text to read, and he is afterwards
asked to write exactly what he read, the subject is capable
of accurately pointing out where his report and the original
text differ, but he is incapable of filling in the missing
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parts. Ia other words, the subject Knows the complete
text, but is incapable of generating it (Plorea, 1970).
In other cases, subjects can point out that one photograph
(or something) is missing from a series presented before,
but cannot name it. This kind of phenomena is vary common
in everyday life, but knowledge concerning it is scarce.
Another more sophisticated example of this problem arises
when a person (for example, an artist) has an idea of what
he wants but does not have the details to integrate the
idea. As can be seen, this proolem is difficult to
specify, but it still seems to represent a real phenomenon
which has to be studied. There are, however, some approaches
to its research (Polanyi, 1966j Aeber and Lewis, 1977).
11. The Problem of Associative Memorw
One of the easiest way3 of appreciating the critical
state of current theories and research in memory is to look
at the theoretical status of the associative memory model.
The basic explanatory concept in 3-A psychology was that
of association. Nowadays it is said that this kind of
explanation has been abandoned, but its presence can still
be felt in one way or another, for instance, association
has been transformed into programs for computers (Anderson
and Bower, 1973} Anderson, 1976: Kintsch, 1974) and the
change of associations to linguistic structures has been
modelled (Collins and ^uillan, 1969). In these cases the
abandoning of association has been a purely verbal matter,
the very same phenomenon and its laws have been adopted
under a different name.
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The theoretical and experimental limitations of the
notion of the association of ideas are numerous and were
expressed many years ago (Boring, 1950), but the model and
its new forms are 3till being used, Rapaport (1974). This
is probably due to the fact that in psychology there has
not been an effort to separate psychological theory from
the philosophy which nurtured it. It is difficult to for¬
get the "doctrinal tyranny of associa.tionism" as Asch
(1968) clearly indicated.
Dixon and Horton (1968) give many examples of how S-H
psychologists have found this associationistic approach
not only limited, but wrong. However, years have gone by
and this model is still in use. The most depressing
aspect of this problem is that computer scientists (Kohenen,
1977; Jacks, 1971) have taken over this model and tried
(without muoh success) to apply it to new forms of storage
of information in computers. tfhen they do not succeed in
doing so, and find it difficult to understand why, they
consider the failing due to the limitation in programming
techniques rather than a mistake in the fundamentals of the
theory they are using.
It may be asked why, if the limitations of this theory
have been clear since the time of the English association-
ists, the conception has been so popular. The limitations
of this theory have been explicit since around 1891 in the
famous "Hoffding-step" , in the examples and illustrations
of Gestalt psychology and in the self-criticisms of the
followers of the stimulus-response approach, and yet it
is 3till in use. The answer may ba that, even though the
theory is limited and even wrong, the phenomena to which it
refers are real, though not understood. What is needed
is a systematic theoretical study describing the phenomenon
but with a structure different to the one already proposed.
One of the latest developments in the theory of memory
is the distinction between semantic and episodic memory
(Tulving and Donaldson, 1971) - an important categorization.
However, even when the internal functioning of the semantic
memory has been described, the kinds of models used are
essentially associative descriptions (Anderson and Bower,
1973)* This leaves us with the original problem of explain¬
ing associations.
As oan be seen, this problem requires a theoretical
effort; the phenomena described are very interesting and
important to the theory of learning and memory, but the
explanations given are limited. One way of clarifying the
problem may be to relate it to habituation from a neuro-
physiologic&l point of view, and to consider the origins of
associative phenomena as complex habituations; in this way
association would not only be related to the repetition of
tne external events, but also to the repetition of internal
11 activity", as another form of habituation.
12. The Problem of Images
The history of the status of this concept is well
known, (laivio, 1971) and it has had the useful effect of
promoting the abandoning of behaviourist ideas. However
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the way in which it is analysed varies from the interpre¬
tation of imager/ as an internal dream to its interpretation
as a digital process (Pylyshyn, 1973). There is evidence
to suggest that subjects are capable of using the tempero-
spatial information they have in different tasks, what i3
not clear is how subjects manipulate that information.
Apart from the usual problems of interpretation, there
are many special problems in the use of this kind of
information, for example, musicians are capable of manip¬
ulating "sounds" in different ways, and the same is true
of blind persons. ./hen this problem is taken out of the
laboratory, the possibilities of research multiply, since
examples of the performance of subjects can be used as a
source of information for hypothesis and data#. Hannay (1971).
In the same way work in physiological psychology is a rich
source of possible interpretations of this phenomena,
(Pribram 197k, 1977). The problem of studying mental
images is tied up with the problem of representation. Per¬
haps it may usefully be said that mental images are the
trivial parts of the problem of internal representation, the
real emphasis is on codes and codification itself.
A phenomenon familiar for many years is that exempli¬
fied by the following situation: a subject is asked to
imagine a banana. At the same time, on a screen placed in
front of him, a faint picture of the target object is
projected. The subject is asked to describe the fruit, and
in many cases the percepts and the self generated image
correspond perfectly (Perky, 1910). This 3ame experiment
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has been replicated with better controls, with the same
results (Segal and Fusella, 1970). The relation between
this data and hallucinations, where people behave in res¬
ponse to their internal events as if they were external and
real, is interesting. The implications of these experi¬
ments, together with other data (Shepard 1978) are that the
distinction between external and internal events is not a3
clear as had been supposed. A more concrete example of
this phenomenon is the study of attitudes where the subject's
behaviour is a result of his/her attitudes, as opposed to
external factors.
13» The Problem of the "Effect of Old Information and
Meaning on New Learning
One of the most difficult early problems of memory
research was that of minimising the offacts of meaning and
previous learning on memorization (Boring, 1950). After
years of research the situation is still the same; it is
difficult to control these variables, and these effects
are particularly unwanted in the area of research purporting
to study how completely new information is acquired. Others
think that what most affects how something new is memorized
is, how the so-called new material is related to the known
Information, i.e. that it is the interaction between the
old and the new which may be able to help us understand
the functioning of memory.
One reason why it is difficult to find completely new
material for adult subjects could be that mostexperiments
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are done with, nonsense syllables, where the letters are
known and only their combination is different. In this
sense, many experiments on adult humans are studies about
the reorganization of information and not really about
"pure" learning at all.
It is perhaps because there is no "pure" information
that experimenters can report that subjects are capable of
recognising 10,000 pictures that have been presented only
once (Standing, 1973)* or of having more than 90?' of
answers correct in experiments on associated pairs, when
2,200 pairs of words have been presented (Wallace et al,1957).
This paradoxical situation suggests the use of the
problem itself to find a solution; that is, to study a
fundamental variable of the information already known, and
see how this affects learning. It seems that perhaps the
only way in which this process of learning could really be
studied is in infants.
It is important to know the characteristic of the
information available from the beginning to adult humans,
that is, to know how much the system contains before
trying to increase its contents. It may ^eem a bit pessi¬
mistic to say that adult subjects do not learn anything
new, but merely reorganise old material; but if one
thinks strictly of what is new, and what is old, and of
what the known elements are, than this conclusion inexor¬
ably follows. Note that there are no criteria for saying
whether a person is learning, or is incrementing his memory,
since no quantitative measurements have been devised;
specifically quantitative experiments, where the state of
the system is described in a numerical form, are no longer
in fashion. Among many other reasons accounting for the
lack of quantification of complex phenomena, is the fact
that the tools used, like bits or chunks, etc., are simple.
Progress is needed in developing more sophisticated forms
of quantification in order to find such relations and to
be able to express them in a numerical form (Gavanagh,
1972; Simon, 1974).
14* The Problem of Relations within Knowledge and Internal
Contradictions
When subjects' performance in everyday life is
emphasized, two aspects are apparent; first is the great
amount of information that a normal person has; second
is that this information is not always manipulated in a
logical way. This is obvious in the behaviour and
decisions taken by people, for example, when subjects know
that smoking is a health hazard and yet cannot stop
smoking. The same applies to other habits like driving
without a seat belt, and so on. There are other everyday
examples. People often complain "If I only had known how
to do it.." leading one to conclude that having all the
elements of knowledge, guarantees the correct and approp¬
riate answer; on the contrary, in many situations, people
behave in illogical and contradictory ways. No doubt
there are many variables involved in this phenomenon, but
nevertheless, the centre issue of the problem can be
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studied from the point of view of memory.
The process of relating information may he active,
and the fact that subjects have the knowledge and the
logical ability to correctly manipulate information does
not guarantee they will do so; effort and/or external
pressure are required to bring this about. The existence
of these phenomena is important for the understanding of
logical processes.
C. Problems concerning the control and manipulation
of information.
hven though a great deal of research is said to be
about "information processing" the definition and explan¬
ation of what is information and what is control of inform¬
ation are not clear and much less the multiple forms of
processing that could be mentioned. This is the reason
why the study of processes and controls which are independent
of the kind of information have to be analysed carefully.
15* The Problem of Memory for Plans or memory for
the Future
The underlying idea of memory researchers is that
memory is a complex process of storing past events. How¬
ever, it may be that memory does not only bring back past
information or skills but also organizes events forming
sequences of future behaviour. Hxamples of this latter
organization are: the way one remembers the day's appoint¬




ideas of a subject by means of an automatically generated
but coherent and logical talk, or, to take a more 0eneral
case, the way a person deciues on a series of general
goals to attain during a year, without planning specific
steps. In this sense, it may be that there is a memory
process for the future, operating by general control of
the influx of information.
Lashley (1951) stated this problem clearly; what has
to be stressed is that the problem of serial order involves
not only motor beuaviour or verbal syntax, but more general
plans (sometimes mere schemes). One of the most important
extensions of this problem concerns that aspect of linguistic
syntax similar to the phenomenon of serial order. This
takes us to the next problem.
16. The Problem of Complex learning Without Awareness
Could it be that humans learn and perform behaviours
controlled by rules without themselves knowing, or being
aware of, these rules? This question, which is so import¬
ant for psychology, has not been studied by many people,
and there are only a few relevant experimental studies
(Smith, 1973; Foss, 1968; Bernted and Dixon, 1969; Sriksen,
I960), which demonstrate the possibility of this kind of
learning. A positive response given to this question
would have great consequences, for example, for the study
of the relation between deep and surface structure studied
in linguistics. However, even though there are a few
experiments which support the claim for this kind of learning
knowledge of how it operates is limited. For instance,
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it is not known whether children ere capable of this kind
of learning, whether it begins at a certain stage, and so
on. In the same way, its importance, in terms of more
global (e.g. social) behaviour, is not known, and neither
is whether new learning can modify the rules themselves.
17• The Problem of Uross Model functions in Memory
An example of the limits imposed on contemporary
experiments by the lack of theories, is the confusion
between different perceptual modalities and the way in
whioh information is represented and processed in them.
Most researchers believe that the information given to a
sensory modality is codified in a specific way, resulting
in different codes for different modalities. This belief
only demonstrates the gulf between neurophysiology and
psychology. In neurophysiology it is well known that once
stimuli are received by the nervous system they are trans¬
formed into a series of eleotro-chemical events (e.g. axon
potentials) whioh are the same for all sensory modalities;
that means, that there must be a single code used in the
brain (although it is not known) (Wallach and Averbach
1955)* This supports the idea that it is a mistake to
talk of different forms of representation, for example,
visual or verbal memory, where the distinction is made in
terms of the way in which the stimuli are represented. In
reality it is not possible that the brain has two or more
different forms of storing this information. Prom a
theoretical point of view, the codes of the brain can be
considered, as single, and the way in which these codes
101.
are stored as well as the way in which they are manip¬
ulated can be considered as a series of electrophysiologi¬
cal processes. If this were taken more into consideration
in psychology, it would considerably influence the ways in
which theories are proposed. No doubt, this problem does
present a series of difficulties to research since our
knowledge of how the brain works is limited. However
there are clear examples of how it is possible to investi¬
gate these problems from the point of view expressed above.
A different approach to the solution of cross modal
function problems in memory comes from experiments of
cross modal matching in animals (Davenport et al, 1973}
Wright, 1970). Here the animals have to compare two
stimuli presented in two different modalities, and respond,
for example, if the stimuli are equal (or different).
Since, in these experiments, the participation of "language"
is minimal, the way in which the stimuli are codified is
not specific, and comparisons may be drawn. Averbaoh and
Sperling (1974) have demonstrated that visual and spatial
information have a common form of representation in humans.
In the same way Bower (1977) has suggested, theoretically
and experimentally, that babies have a single way of rep¬
resenting and, on the other hand, studies in psychophysics
(Stevens, 1966} Teghtsoonian, 1971) have demonstrated by
other techniques, the possibility of a unique form of
cod ification.
These examples illustrate that the problem has inter¬
esting and important implications for the study of memory,
in spite of its difficulties.
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18. The Problem of Probabilistic Aspects of Memory
Many aspects of the memory process use probabilistic
analysis. Classical examples are those of attention and
pattern recognition. In both cases it might be thought
that to accomplish this kind of task the brain has to per¬
form a statistical analysis, based on stored information
and inputs to make an evaluation of a probabilistic kind
and generate a response. On similar lines, it may be that
the occurrence of certain events in everyday life with a
greater or smaller degree of probability facilitates certain
kinds of responses. Examples of this are the experiments
on word frequence effect (Broadbent, 19b7; Treisman, 1978;
Morton, 1969)$ showing that the words most frequently used
in everyday life are the most easily recognised and used in
experiments on memory. However this effect may lie not
in the words themselves, but in the way they are presented
(Oldfield and Wingfield, 1964). Furthermore, it is not
only the frequency of external events in general which is
statistical. Probabilistic relations in particular situ¬
ations are also important. Different contexts facilitate
differently structured set3 of information; for example,
for children, school facilitates a different set of memory
events from that facilitated by a theatre.
The use of probabilistic concepts has two uses in
memory, one as an analytical tool and the other, perhaps
more importantly, as a theoretical model (Estes, 1976). In
this latter connection, probabilistic operations are
particularly useful in facilitating the manipulation of
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information being described in a series of processes.
2xamples of this kind of use of models are given by Godden
(1976) who proposed that subjects have "a statistical
model of the world that is considerably more optimal than
has previously been suggested", or by Peterson and Beach
(1967) who also consider that "men are intuitive statisti¬
cians" • With this problem the lack of experiments is not
so relevant as the correct utilization and interpretation
of the data which is available. It is necessary to relate
studies of attention, in which these concepts are frequently
used, to models of memory (a3 well as other areas of research).
19. The Problem of the Control of Information
The models of Shiffrin and Atkinson (1969) and of
Norman (1969) had the most important characteristic of
emphasising the necessity of control mechanisms in inform¬
ation processing. Ihren though this idea of systems of
control of processes was to be found in many forms in
psychology, the explicit discovery of it in computer tech¬
nology had a very healthy effect on the development of
models (Norman, 1970). However there has not been much
research on it.
Shiffrin and Atkinson (1969) have referred to at
least nine processes of the control of information which
have not been systematically studied and on which research
has been limited, for instance, the process of scanning.
Of course, there i3 a danger in postulating too many
mechanisms for the control of information, almost one
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mechanism for every different task, but it is very diffi¬
cult to find only two or three mechanisms adequate for all
necessary information control; Schneider and Shiffrin
(1977) consequently emphasised the initiation of processes
rather than the processes themselves.
Of course the question of how these processes begin
is very interesting since it alludes to the question of
automatic or voluntary control. However the study of the
control of information is rather more specific and refers
to the postulation of different processes some of which are
possibly innate, and some learned, and it is even possible
that some forms of optimising the control of information
(Hunter, 1964) could be proposed.
The processes of information control postulated, and
investigated, at the moment are very imprecise, and often
taken from computer science, or are very mechanical des¬
criptions, as is the case when imagery is considered as an
internal dream or digital process. Perhaps these kinds
of intermediate postulations must be proposed before more
sophisticated models, like the filter model of Ginsburg
(1975) to explain optical illusions, can be.
]). Parametric problems in systematic research
These problems are a clear indication of the lack of
systematic data collection necessary to help future research.
For instance lets ask how are the persons called mnemonists
distributed in a certain population? Or what are the
curves of forgetting and recognition for odours'? These
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kind of parametric data are the one3 that help to make
mathematical models. Maybe if this data were available,
the possibility of having models of this kind would be
increased.
20. The Problem of Training the Memory
The history of this problem is long and rich and there
are several so-called techniques for improving the memory
or the amount of information stored (Yates, 1966). How-
the efficacy of the old techniques (e.g. loci) has been
demonstrated in a strict way (G. Bower, 1970; Hoffman and
Senter, 1978). If it is true that our knowledge of memory
has increased, it should be possible to demonstrate this
by creating new "technologies" to help us improve memory.
However the contribution that research is making to
practical memorization, or even to educational psychology
in general, is little, perhaps because our knowledge of the
way in which memory works is not very clear, or because
real efforts to develop new technology have not been made.
No doubt there is social pressure on psychologists to
solve educational problems, to contribute to the training
of people, to better confront the problems of sophisticated
technologies and to solve tne problems of developing
societies, but psychologists cannot give much advice and
in the few cases they do give it, it is of doubtful, even
poor, quality. Their recipes for the improvement of
memory sometimes go back 2000 years (Higbee, 1977» Yates,
1966).
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21. The Problem of the Mnemonists
In essence this problem centres on how the performance
of these talented people is produced. Is it the product
of training or of genetic characteristics? There is no
doubt of its existence: several studies relate different
cases (for a short review 3ee Baddeley, 1976) and there are
several relevant anecdotes (Barlow, 1952). The study of
these subjects, as well as the literature about them,
gives a clear example of a memory phenomenon which evi¬
dently has important implications for a theory of memory.
However it has not been studied as it should be. A3 Brow
and Deffenbacher (1975) indicate, some of the more extensive
studies in this area have been ignored by researchers. Two
aspects of this problem are particularly interesting, one
i3 how muoh the "capacities" of mnemonists differ from
those of normal subjects, and the other is how possible
it is to increase the performance of normal subjects, so
that their performance would equal that of mnemonists.
Wallace et al (1957) suggest that normal subjects can
memorize 2,200 words and Standing (1973) reports that they
can recognize 10,000 photographs, both in more than 90^ of
cases. These studies, as well as careful observations of
people in every day life, indicate that sometimes the per¬
formance of the mnemonist is not 30 special or different
from that of normal subjects, but more studies are needed
in order to be certain of this.
Belated to this problem is that of the "supercalculist"
(Hunter, 1964) where a vast memory is combined with an
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enormous capacity to handle information. The effect of
training is clear in these subjects as is the use of many
learned strategies to solve complicated numerical operations.
22. The Problem of the Fluctuation of Memory
Some researchers (Hunter, 1964? Wickelgren, 1977) have
shown that it is more or less easy to find inhibition or
facilitation of memory, if subjects are under the effect
of transitory states like emotions or alcohol. Memory
fluctuations can be seen in other stiuations, for example,
certain places facilitate memory of events that are other¬
wise not remembered, even though, in those instances, the
place and the event are not directly related.
In other cases, there is evidence that remembering
something can make the generation of other related memories
more easy (Coltheart et al, 1975). This could give evi¬
dence on how information is stored: perhaps the transitory
states are codified together with certain events, and
afterwards this relation facilitates or generates the
response. This kind of relation is easily seen in emotional
states.
23« The Problem of Forwards Association
This prbblem has been studied for many years (Kausler,
1974) and extensive empirical evidence exists concerning
it, yet its theoretical relevance has not been appreciated
for models of memory. In its "pure" form, this phenomenon
refers to the facilitating effect that an event (e.g. a
nonsense syllable) has on the memorization of something
108.
afterwards presented. This must not be confused with
backwards inhibition, which is probably not its counterpart,
each being controlled by a different mechanism (Dixon and
Morton, 1968). Neither does this phenomenon refer ex¬
clusively to verbal learning, (as originally studied),
there are other situations where it is possibly present as
well, for example, in operant conditioning where reinforce¬
ment has an effect on a behaviour that just happened.
In spite of the simplicity of this phenomenon, its
interpretation and generalization in terms of memory is
very important. One interesting aspect of the problem is
that it was very well studied inside a S-R (Stimulus-
Eesponse) approach about 10 or 20 years ago, when it was
part of the "associationistic theory of memory" in its more
or less pure form: however, the problem is still of great
importance even though its origins are found in a theore¬
tical model which very few persons nowadays accept.
24« The Problem of Reminiscence
The idea that research within the S-R conceptual frame¬
work i3 limited to problems inside the theory and is isolated
from classical problems, is mistaken (Underwood, 1948}
Brown, 1976). The difference between the classical ideas
of reminiscence (Flores, 1970} Buxton, 1943), and the
studies within the S-R approach, consists in a change of
name. What was known as reminiscence is, in the "more
objective" methodology, called "spontaneous recovery4'.
Within the S-R tradition, little progress was made, mainly
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due to the difficulty of explaining it with the simple
and parsimonious ideas used to explain forgetfulness,
interference or the decay of the trace. Recent experi-
^ ments re-confina the existence of this phenomenon (Brown,
1976). The relation between this work and the classical
studies of Pavlov, who found that after an extinction of
a response it reappeared in a spontaneous way, may be seen.
The implications of this problem are profound since,
in a sense, there is no forgetting; all learned informa¬
tion is to be found in the system, the difficulty is in
recovering it. This may be shown by three different lines
of evidence: amnesia, state dependent learning, and
repression. By means of different types of manipulation
it can be demonstrated that all learned information is in
the system, but that there are variables and processes
which limit the use of it.
This phenomena also yields interesting data concerning
the codification of stored events, and the existence and
functioning of voluntary actions in memory. Experiments
in this area, indicate the difference between the concepts
of memory store and memory processes, and show that it is
necessary to postulate and study processes which manipulate
stored events. If it is true that stored information and
processes of manipulation are so complicated, it may be
possible to confirm the studies of Piaget and Inhelder
(1973), who found that, in some cases, performance in
memory tasks, improves with time. This conflicts with
currently held beliefs. This fertile idea opens up a new
field of ways in which phenomena can be conceptualized and
performed.
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25. The Problem of the Memory of Simple Sensations
Our understanding of memoiy is fragmentary and this
can nowhere be 3een more clearly than in this area of
study. Knowledge here is scarce, possibly because memory
for simple sensations (e.g. smell, taste, pain, etc.) is
not very important in humans for survival. For many
animals, of course, the role of this information is crucial.
At the moment, there is no data about the functions
of forgetting this kind of information, nor data about the
interaction of it with other kinds of information. This
suggests the need for more experimentation in this area.
Any valid theory of human memory has to deal with the
handling of this kind of information rather than to limit
itself, as present models do, to data taken only from the
vidual and auditory systems.
26. The Problem of Temporal Coding
A variable always present in experiments is the di¬
mension of time. However, in spite of its importance, the
way in which humans process and U3e this dimension is far
from clear. The idea that time is measured by a physio¬
logical and/or psychological clock is inadequate and it may
be that the time dimension is independent both of external
events (physical time) and internal physiological ones
(bio-rhythm). In the case of memory, a series of processes
determine particular ways of interpreting information
(Michotte, 1963). The kind of temporal relations that
affect codification may be classified in two ways. First
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there are the temporal relations restricted to experi¬
mental situations, e.g. backward and forward masking (at
a perceptual level as well a3 that of information) and
inter- and intra-list associations. Second, there are
the general temporal relations on which learned responses
are dependent, e.g. the answer to: "which was the first,
the independence of the United States or the French revolu¬
tion?" , where temporal relation not contained in the inform¬
ation presented, but rather learned.
The processes of the manipulation of temporal variables,
a3 well a3 the effects of these variables on these and
other processes of memory, have not been sufficiently studied.
3. Problems related to other areas of psychology
Some researchers who could be called "specialists"
sometimes seem to forget that the classifications of diff¬
erent "areas of research" are largely artificial and are
not real divisions in the objects of study. On the other
hand it is necessary to have soma flexibility in order to
be able to find relations with other areas and with other
phenomena,(having in mind that this task is very difficult).
27. The Problem of the Relation Between Memory and Sleep
(with reference to dreams)
A problem completely opaque with regard both to data
and explanation i3 that of what happens to all the inform¬
ation that humans have stored when they are asleep. The
only certain thing is that the machine cannot be said to
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toe "turned off"» having a period of rest. There are two
different sources of evidence that several things related
to the manipulation of information occur during sleep;
the first from the literature, gives evidence that dreams
occur even though subjects often cannot report them;
secondly, the experiments of Jenkins and Dallenbach (1925)
suggest that performance in a memory task is improved
after a period of sleep (Cohen 1974)«
Other interesting phenomena are related to this problem.
In most cases (although not always), people can report
what they dream, tout what is strange is that in many cases
this is not possible immediately on waking up, tout only
later on, when they suddenly remember what they dreamed.
In other case3, people maintain that they never dream, a
claim which just does not seem to toe true from the evidence
of physiological signs of sleep.
Another interesting phenomena is that some subjects
report in their dreams people, situations or real objects,
whose interrelations are odd; they dream with big units,
specific objects, situations, and so on, rather tnan with
3imple elements like colours, sounds, odours, etc. This
may give clues on the one hand about how information is
stored, and on the other, about the functioning of
consciousness. Many people report that they have solved
complex problems during sleep; this phenomena i3 well
documented at the level of verbal reports (Koestler, 1964),
and suggests that, in one way or another, processing and
manipulation of information continues during sleep.
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The questions which can he drawn out of this problem
are varied and very interesting; for example, do animals
and infants dream? Could one economise on hours of sleep
in order to increase working or training time? .Vhat sorts
of mechanism keep working during sleep? And so on.
28. The Problem of Memory and Language
!3ven though linguistics is nowadays considered as an
important independent branch of research, and in spite of
the importance of verbal learning research in the past
decade, the psychological process whereby humans acquire
grammar and syntax is very little understood (in contrast
to the linguistic product which is acquired). It is
important to distinguish between grammar and semantics from
the linguistic point of view (Steklis et al, 1976), as
formal descriptions of abstract structures, and grammar
and semantics from the psychological point of view, as
descriptions of how the brain works).
In other words, it is probably very useful to investi¬
gate how information is codified and how it is learned,
this may help to organise elements of our theory of memory
and in turn explain aspects of the behavioural aspects
of language, Rumbaugh (1977). In the same way, it is
possible that more light could be thrown on the problem of
memory were it known now stored information is interrelated
in memory.
29« The Problem of the Memory of Logical Operations
fith the publication of the book by Piaget and
Inhelder in 1968 (English version 1973), a new area of
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research was opened up which has still not been assimilated
in the psychological literature. The basic idea is that
memory does not work with information presented in the way
of a simple store, but that in the very act of perception,
several operations form new configurations of information.
In the same way, information already stored can be modified
in several ways. The operations made on the information
can be stored for later use or modification. This way of
studying memory in relation to logical operations is
completely different to the way in which it has been studied
previously, with the possible exception of the work of
Bartlett (1932).
A significant criticism of thi3 kind of work is its
dependence on verbal response and the emphasis on the be¬
havioural performance of a child with a pattern of stimuli.
It has been seen lately, that when more sophisticated
research techniques are used, unexpected abilities are found
in younger children (T. Bower, 1977). However, the ideas
underlying this kind of experiment are very rich and
relevant to memory research. For example, it could be
that logical operations are themselves a way of codifying
information, or else the result of operations (the ones
that are going to be stored). A potential development
might be the attempt to understand and find operations
more complex than the ones Piaget studied, which are
basically classifying operations or logical operations
concerning quantity, quality and number - all operations of
mathematical logic. It may be that these are not the
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only ones human beings use, perhaps there are others to
be discovered. It is important too, to discover the
actual nature of the operations done in humans, as well as
their stages of development; for example, in mathematics,
a series of operations have been discovered, which are of
great use in the manipulation of mathematical entities, and
which do not correspond to the operations human beings are
supposed to use.
In conclusion, it may be that it is precisely the
richness and complexity of operations done on information
that allows memory its great capaoity to generate complex
behavioural patterns. In the same way, the operations on
information, which are beginning to attract attention, are
those which create so-called human knowledge.
30. The Problem of the Sffeot of Smotional Marking on Memory
One interesting phenomenon found in some people is the
ability to remember situations or events that have high
emotional content (Dutta 1975)* It seems that, in these
cases, emotional factors are powerful elements which
facilitate codifioation and easy recall (Brown and Kulik
1977)* On the other hand, there is also a negative effect:
emotional states sometimes exert negative influences on
learning. For instance, punishment has negative effects
not only on performance but on generalization to new situ¬
ations (Wickelgren, 1977).
For many years, the ooncept of drive reduction was a
fundamental element in theory and research. After a great
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of research, it was demonstrated that drive reduction (and
motivation) is not important to explain learning and its
study was put on one 3ide; nevertheless, nowadays, it is
necessary to reinstate the problem (though in a new way),
and to point out that memory and certain motivations or
drives can be intimately related, and can facilitate or
inhibit learning.
It has already been mentioned that, on the one hand,
emotional states may facilitate or make recall more diffi¬
cult; on the other, it can be postulated that there is an
active process involved in the forgetting of situations
which may produce emotional states (e.g. a car accident).
In most cases, people recall the situation perfectly and
many of its details, without re-experiencing the original
emotional 3tate (although this doe3 sometimes occur).
There are complex relations between memory and emotion
but the situation is ipiite different to what was thought
several years ago. This demands a restatement of both the
data and its interpretation. It is also of interest that
certain emotional states can be provoked and controlled by
means of chemicals. Thi3 could facilitate the study of
the relations between neurophysiology and memory. It may
also be possible to provoke emotional states without using
chemical products or causing any actual damage to the
subjects, and to study the ensuing effect on memory. The
actual situations of much human learning can be realistically
reproduced in this way, 3ince in many everyday learning
situations people are under the influence of emotional
states. This variable has received little attention.
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31. The Problem of Working Memory
Since the time of Greek "psychology", (Sorabji 1972)
there have been metaphors referring to the existence of a
place where people perform a series of operations with
information. For example, if somebody is asked to multiply
23 by 68, in his "mind", the subject can, with effort, give
the correct answer. Supposedly that person did the opera¬
tion of multiplication by applying a known aeries of rules
to use stored information, like using multiplication tables.
Several examples of this kind of operation on information
can be given, nevertheless this process is quite different
to the one of "recalling" (e.g. what happened last Christmas)
where information from the store or "a place" is merely
moved or "read" (imagery).
There are several important aspects of the Greek
metaphor:
1. It points out that a place exists where the
manipulation of information takes place;
2. It supposes that the result of this manipulation
is something new, that is, was not as such in memory
before;
3. That it is an active process of manipulating data;
4. That it requires an effort;
5. That it is done consciously;
6. That it is a serial process where only a series
of manipulations can take place, one by one, rather
than several at the same time.
This metaphor is not simplistic. For a long time it
was suggested, for instance, that there is no physical
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plaoe where this manipulation of information takes place,
hut that it was a process performed in different structures,
a result of many specific individual activities.
It has also been suggested that there is parallel
processing of information as wall as serial. Sometimes
the way these processes work has been confused or mixed up
with the memory buffer, or, at others, with short- and long-
term memory. I3ven though there are difficulties, in
defining this problem, as well as studying it (Baddley and
hitch, 1974), the research into it is completely open.
In some ways, this problem is similar to that of con¬
sciousness, which has been discussed above, and it is also
related to the 3tudy of imagery. The study of working
memory is a good candidate for helping us to understand the
great problem of consciousness. Moreover, it can also help
in the study of problem solving, or the even more general
problem of thinking, since it concerns stored information,
and rules of manipulation of this information, which are
two areas where data is available.
To achieve results with this problem, it must be
realised that the concept or memory as a store of informa¬
tion is limited in use and that it is better to give it a
more active role. 3ven though there is evidence in the
contemporary literature for both parallel and serial pro¬
cessing (Sternberg, 1975; fhei03, 1973) the full implica¬
tions of these data have not been incorporated into present
models. More generally, the more realistic study of memory
as an active entity is only Just beginning.
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F. CONCUTS ION
Searching for problems i3 difficult and complex, but
the result of doing so is to allow one to see the limita¬
tions of present work as well as to gain a perspective on
future research. It also allows one to see that questions
from the long history of science are still unanswered,
although there have been attempts to explain and under¬
stand them.
A positive aspect of searching for problems is the
number of questions it causes to be posed. These can be
taken into the laboratory and thus help make experimental
work more creative rather than being limited to the repet¬
ition - with minor changes - of old research. From this
point of view, finding problems is a form of progress.
There is some merit in saying that even a single new
small fact demonstrated experimentally is important, since
replication of results, and clearly stated facts, are needed,
and that a series of more general questions is not relevant
to this. However, the emphasis on performing perfectly
controlled experiments can lead to a sterile field of
endeavour, where many experiments with many different inter¬
pretations are gathered, many of them with irrelevant con¬
clusions and lacking coherence.
The most important aspect of this list of problems is
as a system which can be used to test the variability or
limitations of the models and theories of memory, in
particular the orthodox theory. For the present, the
intention is not to carry on a logical analysis or to
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evaluate the validity of the experiments which give support
to the different aspects of the orthodox theory; rather,
interest is centred on possible relations among the post¬
ulated mechanisms and processes related to the questions
developed in the list given above. Although it is naive
to ask for a theory to explain all known experimental
phenomena, it is also naive to consider that it is only
useful to explain certain phenomena, mainly for those for
which the theory was created. It is not necessary to be
very critical in order to see that the orthodox theory and
the problems posed do not have a very close relation, except
perhaps where they both employ similar language. The
biggest difficulty is that the problems are many and varied
and are also related to problems in everyday life, e.g.
dreams, emotional marking, voluntary forgetting and so on.
On the other hand, the orthodox theory 3eems to be related
more to events in a laboratory, e.g. short term memory,
transfer of information from one place to another and so on.
Another difference between the problems and the orthodox
theory is centred around situations which can be considered
simpler and normal and does not explain special situations
such as mnemonist3, tacit knowledge and others. Another
characteristic of the orthodox theory is that it is related
to a school of thought about memory which is in a way
associationist or based on stimulus-response doctrine.
Several kinds of phenomena are outwith the 3cope of this
general approach to memory. For instance, it has difficulty
interpreting phenomena such a3 reminiscence or the possibility
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of changes in memory (e.g. Bushke, 1974). This kind of
difficulty illustrates the restrictions that a theory
imposes on the form and kind of experiments that will he
made by its followers.
One of tue points that is interesting to point out is
the possibility that memory could be studied not as a
product but as a means of dealing with situations in every¬
day life. This approach emphasizes the limits of the
orthodox theory. Some phenomena (which often have not been
well studied), such as memory for logical operations, are
clear examples of the limits of the arthodox theory. These
limitations suggest the necessity of the search for better
ways to relate memory to other area3 of psychology. One
way to describe this limitation of the orthodox model is
to say that it is a passive system, which does not take
into account a number of situations, human memory processes,
not only collect information and store it, but the inform¬
ation is altered, modified and where possible, the generation
of new information takes place.
Summarizing, it could be suggested that tne limits of
the orthodox theoryt
a) Are based in a series of experiments and are interested
in some limited aspects of memory research; however, as
time went by the authors have modified the theory in such
a way that nowadays it incorporates a great deal of
explanations which allow the interpretation of a greater
number of experiments, but even though the basic structure
12H .
has not been altered and the theory still maintains the
idea of trace and the basic characteristic of stages in
the flow of information.
b) As it was previously mentioned, the orthodox theory
introduced the idea of processes of control of information,
however it does not give a detailed analysis of these
processes with the exception of one experimental study of
the difference between controlled and automatic processes
(i.e. Shneidar and Shiffrin, 1977)» but not realising all
the potentialities of these processes. If all the examples
of process available in the literature are analysed care¬
fully, a different kind of memory theory could be presented,
which could be more active, as discussed in chapter IV.
c) As it is common in the psychological literature
influenced by the positivism and the experimentalism, the
authors of the orthodox theory are more concerned about the
development of specific predictions, details, particular
experiments and mathematical models than to explain and
generalize the theory to other problems, (as it is even
recognized by the same Shiffrin, 1977» after an evaluation
of the theory).
d) The theory is centred around the purest phenomena of
laboratory and no attention is payed to limiting cases or
to the application of the theory to phenomena more related
to everyday life or to phenomena where there is a partici¬
pation of other psychological phenomena.
e) Most of the experimental evidence of the orthodox
theory is found in experiments where letters or nonsense
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syllables are used, and a3 it will be described later
(see chapter III), this can lead to serious mistakes in
the interpretation of the results. In other words, the
orthodox theory i3 not flexible enough to interpret and
be able to cover a wide range of phenomena and problems
found in numan beings as most of the problems described in
this chapter.
In some cases the problems that have been referred to
are not empirical, but theoretical. For instance, in the
case of the physical basis of memory the possible relations
between psychology and neurophysiology are unclear, not
because a theory unifying both areas of work has been
searohed for, but because the two areas are usually regarded
as embodying two separate theories, since they employ
different sets of experiments. To resolve this difficulty
requires not only more attention and study but possibly a
point of view less dualist or at least with a clearer and
more explicit dualism.
It i3 not possible to state that everything is wrong
in the orthodox theory, on the contrary, in a certain way
the orthodox memory theory can be considered to be one of
the beat examples of theoretical psychology. In partic¬
ular the developers of this theory can be described as a
good example of devoted researchers interested in data and
at the same time interested in developing better and more
powerful models. Tne ortnodox theory has been modified
according to new evidence, and new aspects have been
incorporated into it. However, tne limits of the orthodox
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theory are clear, primarily those aspects emphasized
herein, that is the limited range of phenomena covered by it.
An important question can bo posed at this juncture,
if the orthodox theory does not have a sufficient range,
wide enough to cover the problems of memoxy, would it not
be easier to extend the theory instead of proposing a new
one? The answer depends on the potentialities that could
be discovered within the theory, especially if in the basis
of tho theory, the necessary elements can be found for
substitutions and extensions.
As has already been mentioned in chapter I, some
authors have a negative attitude about all areas of memory
research. However, the critical articles are not enough,
it seems necessary to use better arguments than logical
analysis, which was the purpose for the list of problems
proposed here.
One of the functions of this list is to serve as a
test for theories of memory. It is then necessary to
demonstrate empirically the mistakes and limitations of
the assumptions of the orthodox theory as a step towards
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The .reseat L te of ..emory re rcL c n be elm racter-
izod as ver^ active, possibly as one of the areas where
there are a great .any scientists discovering (or at least
trying) new and interesting phenomena. However, the results
obtained in the experiments do not give a clear picture eaey
to interpret. This is mainly because there are a great
deal of isolated data which only indicates the complexity of
the phenomenon ir. study. At the s: ti.se it is difficult
to find theoretical developments, in the form of models or
theories to be used to put order or give a general perspective.
It is not difficult to find that models usin0 boxes and
arrows (as the one described in Chapter I) and its relatives
like the level of processing, working memories, information
processing systems, and so on, are not capable of giving an
interpretation or answer to the question posed by Newell
(1973) about how are we going to put together all this data.
It is possible that this question is in the mind of many
re3s refers in this area, worried about the "general picture"
and not only interested in the "new data". But it could
be thought that in general this situation of confusion in
the general picture, is due to the present models and
theories which are limited. Maybe it is necessary to sub¬
stitute them by better "pictures". The idea of proposing
the use of a new nod el or theory i not simply the interest
in a change (as a fashion change) or by the simple desire
of having a "scientific revolution". The reasons to
abandon a model or theory have to bo scientific or philoso¬
phic. In the particular case of the models and theories
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of memory (03 ir. -p.- oth^r area of re- croh) the logic and
conceptual limit-tiona h^ve to be d emonstreted by means of
theoretical analysis, or the limits in the assumptions or
id ess bchind the mod olo hove to be demonstrated experimentally.
In fact several -uthorn are trying in one way or another to
demonstrate the lo ic or conceptual limitations of the present
theories, (some of which have been already mentioned in
Chapter I). One of the moat inter tin; analysis in relation
to this problem and the subject of this chapter, is found in
the .'per by Soedinger (1978) who after a detailed analysis
of the models and theories used in the literature, found
that all the interpretations used can be reduced to 30
metaphors, as the metaphor of stores as boxes, or the meta¬
phor of images as pictures, or to consider flow of informa¬
tion as electric current and so on. But the moat interesting
conclusion io that most of the metaphors can be reduced to
the idea of trace. If it io true t / t a great deal of ths
interpretations of memory available nowadays are metaphors,
it is easy to suggest that there are not enough metaphors
to expl-in many experimental phenomena, and possibly that
another Icind of tool is necessary in the construction of
interpretations to explain the data. In addition it is
possible that part of ths problem is related to the idea of
trace, which as discussed later, has 0 long history and a
strong influence in contemporary research.
Supposing th t it could be possible to give an experi¬
mental demonstration of the limits in the models and present
theories, apart from the logic and conceptual arguments
found in the literature, there i3 no doubt that if the
demonstration fulfils tie characteristics of experimental
rigidity and solidit/ required, this demonstration would be
a ver/ significant contribution to research. Nowadays
there are only a few persons who believe that one experiment
is enough to decide if a model or theory is false, however
an experiment givin^ an experimental evidence of the limits
of the models and theories can initiate a series of system¬
atic efforts to elucidate the basis of the present models.
Supposing that it is possible to present a considerable
mount of solid and well founded logic and experimental argu¬
ments against a theory, even though at the end, the only
thing remaining would be more data and more ignorance; and
this is not the basic idea of research which tries to gather
more knowledge. The ideal situation would be perhaps to
demonstrate that something is wrong and at the same time,
what is more important, give an indication of another direc¬
tion and also give evidence in favour of the alternative
suggested.
hue to these several reasons just mentioned, in the third
chapter a series of experiments are going to be presented
which can be classified in two groups. The experiments I
and II are an attempt to evaluate some of the most important
assumptions of the present models of memory, as the one des¬
cribed in Chapter I which can be considered as a prototype of
the theories and models of memory. In particular these two
experiments are an attempt to analyse the concept of trace
which is clearly exemplified in the experiments in iconic
memory. The second group is composed of experiments III and
IV which are an attempt to give empirical evidence in favour
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of a different kind of idea about m-moiy and that ore one of
the possible altern-■ tivos to the orthodox models (see Chapter
I) and that can he described as a "more cognitive position"
which w 3 originated by Bartlett (1972). It is difficult to
find experimental evidence "bout these ideas and at the same
time it can be considered as one of the theoretical inter¬
pretations of more popularity over the last few years.
These two roups of experiments are °n attempt to fulfil
the characteristics mentioned of ar experimental study in
relation to the orthodox theory of memory (Chapter I). That
is, to give evidence against it on one hand and on the other
evidence in favour of a possible alternative. It is for this
reason that the experiments are different and are classified
in two groups.
The experiment I is an attempt to see if the kind of
material or stimuli used, (novel versus old or familiar) has
an effect in a situation, of iconic memory using the technique
of Tstes (1965). The results of this experiment indicated
that in order to have more arguments a ainst the idea of
tr^ce, and to be sure of the conclusions it was necessary to
do another study (experiment II) following another methodology,
as the one originally used in the experiments on iconic
memory. It i3 possible to say that the experiment I is a
study which questions the assumptions of the .models of memory
not only for its results but also for the logic of the problem.
However given the importance of the problem it is important
to have more empirical evidence in order to demonstrate using
the conditions and the original methodology, the problems
involved in the interpretation of iconic memory.
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Bfcperi~«mt TIT an attempt to give evidence in favour
of ^n nlt»rnetivo view of memory, which was originally pre—
seated by Bartlett (1932) and that nowadays can be tested
with more sophisticated and quantitative methodologies# It
is surprising that even though Bartlett has received nowadays
a lot of attention for his ideas, one of the most important
aspects of hia theory, in general, the reconstructive aspect,
has not received much experimental support#
Sparinent XV is directed towards she atuay ox some
specific aspects ox the possible form la whicn Bartiet«
suggests that representation takes place, that is with imagds*
Shis experiment is uireetsu towards tae ^tuuy of some of the
limits and characteristics of the images and is related to the
contemporary discussion auout the possible ideas of how to
interpret representation, mainly making reference to the poai-
tion of Shepard (1973). The results of this experiment are
more ---ecific, and oven throw some light on the difficulties
found in the study images.
It is important to remember that this work is directed
towards theoretical aspects of memory research, but since
the area, of theoretical psychology is not sufficiently
developed to maintain en exclusive theoretical level of dis¬
cussion (or speculative psychology - Fodor 1975), it is
necessary to introduce experimental evidence# However, it
seems important not to forget that the attempt of this work
is towards tue development of models or theories# It is
important to recognize that the task of discussing and devel¬
oping models and theories is very difficult; it is for this
reason that in the following chapter via^pter IV) some ftener-
allsationa are going co oe described, wmicu can serve as
directives in the development of a possible conceptual structure.
to help in the future construction of bettor theories and models.
This possibility is considered as remote, not for lack of
results or ideas, but for lack of interest in theoretical work#
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The concoct _ ... tatio truce of -mmory i- one of the
most important ids: a in which contemporary models of memory
are based. A specific demonstration can be found in the
experiments of iconic memory. In this work a review of
the literature about the origins of cl.j concept of static
trace is presented, nd it is sug^o-ted that the experi¬
ments in thii ar h; va been done n.,-. ..r the influence of a
misleading assump tion, whereby letter- : re considered to
be novel stimuli. Two different techniques were used to
replicate the studies of -perling, using letters and novel
stimuli. In this case different results were found
according to the familiarity of the subject with the stimuli*
This was taken s.a evidence to suggest that iconic memory
cannot be found if novel stimulation is used, which could
mean that iconic memory -nay not be the first independent
step in processing information, since it seems to depend
on the novelty of the stimulation. The results of the
two experiments reported here question a great deal of
other experiments in memory where letters are used as
stimuli, and suggest a limitation of memory models and in
general of the ideas of a static trace, in its strict sense,
flow of information and stores.
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INTRODUCTION
It is possible to suggest that the phenomenon called
"Iconic memory" plays an essential role in so-called
"cognitive psychology1', (Neisser, 1967). As well as in
memory research (Coltheart, 1976). The origin of the idea
behind this phenomenon can be divided in two for its
analysis. The first part refers to the concept of a
"memory trace" found in philosophical psychology which has
a long history. The second part refers to the transform¬
ation of these ideas into a scientific problem, which took
place at the end of last century.
1. The Concept of Trace
Prom the point of view of the development of philos¬
ophical psychology and in particular from the point of view
of the study of memory, the concept of trace has played a
very important role. Since the beginning it has repre¬
sented a theoretical point of view mainly in the development
of the present conception of psychology.
There are two ways in which this theory of memory
trace can be interpreted. The first, in its literal sense,
refers to "one of the earliest and most tenacious views of
the physical basis of memory", (Gomulicki, 1953). This
view considers the brain as a wax tablet upon which, like
a stylus, sensory impressions engrave physical traces which
persist until effaced by time. The second way in which
the trace concept can be considered is to propose, in a
more general way, a physical process intimately related to
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the memory trace. This is done in a more metaphorical way,
nevertheless denying, the participation of other meta¬
physical entities. In this way, the limitations of the
proposed physical substrate are recognized and considered
a problem due to lack of knowledge which does not deserve
to be ignored simply because of this.
Since the concept of trace was postulated it has had
a very complicated history (as Gomulicki, 1953) puts it.
For instance, Zeno the Stoic (340-265 B.C.) extended
Socrates' and Plato's ideas and made explicit the concept
later known as "tabula rasa". Another important develop¬
ment was done by Aristotle who used for the first time the
concept of trace in a strict sense assigning to the heart
and the blood ("pneuma") the functions which today are
assigned to the brain and the nervous system. He considered
that sensory impressions were transmitted from the sense
organs to the heart by movements in the pneuma. Movements
persisted, though on a decreased scale, after the external
stimuli had ceased. In the same way Aristotle explained
memory and imagination as movements of the pneuma. This
idea of the heart as the principal organ of psychological
phenomena was often discussed. Bristratus, (c310-250 B.C.)
working with Herophilus (330-280 B.C.) carried out dis¬
sections of the human brain and thereby studied some of
its characteristics and connections. They accepted that
some functions could be ascribed to the heart, but others,
the ones referred to as "mental" processes, were ascribed
to the brain.
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later on, Galen (A.D. 138-201) was more specific and
named specific parts of the brain for certain functions
(e.g. memory). By this time, there were many concepts of
trace and many interpretations of the concept. At the
same time the first attempts to apply the idea of memory
in a more practical sense began to emerge. Thus began
the development of techniques for memorising, or mneao-
teohniques, although little attention was paid to the
substratum of the phenomenon, (e.g. Cicero 106-43 B.C.);
Quintillian, first century A.D.; for detailed review see
Yates, 1966).
2. Evolution of the Concept of Trace
The discussion and the study of memory continued with
the introduction of new interpretations, such as those
given by the Christian philosophers, represented for example
by Saint Augustine (A.D. 354-430), who maintained a dualist
point of view, giving some psychological phenomena to the
soul and some to the brain.
This development continued and was enriched in the
XVIIth and XVIIIth centuries, primarily by early attempts
to give a more detailed explanation of the workings of
memory. For instance, memory traces were related to
electric and magnetic phenomena (Sanotti, 1693-1777). At
the same time, the first attempts to quantify memory
phenomena started! for instance, it was estimated by Von
Haller (1708-1777) that one third of a second was required
to produce an idea. On the basis of this estimation,
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Hsller and others computed that in fifty years an individual
would accumulate some 1,577,800,000 traces or ideas. More
or less at the same time Hamilton stated that the number
of elements that a person can enumerate without counting,
the 30-called span of apprehension, was more or less 7.
(Handler, 1974). By the end of the XVIIIth century, the
number of developments and different points of view had
multiplied greatly, e.g. (Burnham, 1888-1889)? Gomulicki,
1953? Klein, 1970).
A concept which was present since the origins of the
concept of trace wa3 the idea of association, which became
increasingly important in the development of experimental
psychology, in the XlXth century.
As can be appreciated from the above historical
sketch the idea of trace has had a long history, and is
indeed a very old idea. Its most important aspect as an
explanatory idea is that it allows interpretations which
attempt to describe the physical basis of memory. These
interpretations have been either strict or general, but
that has been a function of the amount of specific data
about the processes involved. It is important to point
out that since its beginnings, the concept of trace has
been considered as something static, which is not modified:
a trace only disappears gradually, or is substituted for
another trace. In a general way the trace concept has
been seen as the substrate or fundamental interpretation
of memory processes.
The transformation of philosophical ideas into psycho¬
logical problems is clear in the origins of modern psychology,
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(e.g. Fechner; Wundt and so on). Sbbinghau3 (1885)»
recognised in the introduction of his hook that his
interest was to quantify the phenomenon of forgetfulness,
in the same way as Fechner (i860) had done for sensations.
Although Sbbinghaus does not state so explicitly his theory
and experiments have their origins in the concept of traoe.
One important aspect of memory research in scientific
psychology is the attempt to control and isolate the static
aspect of memory, whose influence can be felt nowadays.
This static approach to memory has only been interrupted
by sporadic attempts to elaborate alternative points of
view, (e.g. Bartlett, 1932) attempts which have met with
little success. Only in the last few years is it possible
to see that other alternative explanations are emerging,
(e.g. Neisser, 1987; Piaget and Inhelder, 1973).
The origins of the modern use of the concept of trace
can be found to a great extent in Sperling's (1980) work.
Originally his work was not directly related to the concept
of trace, but nowadays is seen to represent the best example
of the application of this concept to memory. The approach
derived from Sperling has been described and analysed in
detail by Diok (1974) Coltheart (1976) and Holding (1975)-
3. The Original Experiments of G. Sperling
The original question asked in Sperling's series of
experiments was "how much can be seen in a single brief
exposure of stimuli?" Besides the theoretical importance
of the question, Sperling (I960) suggested that it has
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practical value for the study of reading. In previous
reports to which Sperling makes reference, it was
suggested in several ways that the subjects insisted on
having seen more than they could report. This made
Sperling propose a general hypothesis that "more is seen
than can be reported"« It was in this way that the
classical studies of span of apprehension began to be
concerned not only with perception but also with memoxy.
It was suggested that a subject had more information
available than he could report. Therefore, the problem
was to demonstrate that this was true. The hypothesis
that the subjects can report only a certain number of
events led to a very important experimental manipulation;
subjects were asked to give a 'partial report' of what
they had just seen rather than try to report all the
stimuli presented. Apparently, the idea of a partial
report was taken from ordinary schoolroom examinations,
where teachers ask questions which are about only a sample
of the total amount of information the students are
expected to have. However, analysing the answers, an
estimate of the knowledge of the student can be given.
It was with this logic in mind that the idea of a partial
report emerged. It became relevant to indicate to the
subjects after the stimuli had been presented, which stimuli
he had to report. The stimuli consisted of a matrix of
3x3 or 4x4 letters presented in a tachistoscope. The
matrix was drawn on white cards which were viewed at a
distance of 45 cm. The subjects' answers consisted of
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writing the line of letters indicated by a cue. The due
originally used was a tone of 0.5 sec which began after
the stimuli had been presented. This tone could be low
(250Hz) or high (2,500 Hz). This difference in tone
indicated which part of the stimuli (the low or high line)
the subject had to report. In other experiments, an
intermediate tone (650 Hz) was introduced, in this case
the middle line was the one to be reported. The delay
between turning off the stimuli and the one was a very
important variable to study. Delays of 0.1 to 1.0 sec
were used. The answer was considered a sample of the
total amount of stimuli presented. Therefore, if the
subject reported 90^ of the sample, thi3 was interpreted
a3 if the subject was in fact capable of reporting 90?£ of
the total amount of stimuli.
Sperling used five subjects and tested them contin-
uously for several weeks. In his experiments Sperling
indicated that hi3 subjects report an average of 9*8 of
12 letters presented. This performance decayed gradually
with delays it was observed that with a delay of up to
300 msec between the stimulus and the cue the amount of
letters reported was the same as the normal span (4»5
letters), when the subjects were asked to report all the
letters without the technique of partial report. The
results suggested that in fact the subjects remember more
letters than the ones they can report for approximately
300 msec.
These experimental results were interpreted by
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Sperling to support the idea of an "image" of the stimulus,
which is available to subjects after the extinction of
the stimulus. He concluded that the high accuracy of the
partial report observed in the experiments does not depend
on the order of report or the position of the letters, but
rather it depends on the ability of the observer to read
this "visual image" that persists for a fraction of a
second after the stimulus has been turned off.
Following Rummelhart (1970), we may represent the









Sperling's results were replicated in several laboratories
and subsequently his interpretation was incorporated into
many general theories of memory.
4« Later Developments
In order to avoid confusion in our own description of
this phenomenon let us use a contemporary terminology and
point of view (e.g. Dick, 1974; Holding, 1975)* The first
significant experimental development was the replication
of Sperling's original studies by Aberbach and Coriel
(1961). In this case a visual mark was used instead of
a tone. The mark used was a bar or a circle indicating
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the place where the stimuli to be reported were. la this
case the same results reported by Sperling were obtained.
Mackworth (1963) also obtained the same results and
did a detailed study of the effects of the time of pre¬
sentation of the stimuli. He found that these have a
significant effect only in some cases. However he did not
maintain the same levels of luminance throughout the experi¬
ment, which makes the interpretation of his results about
this point, difficult, to interpret.
The next step in the development of the concept of
iconic memory was done with use of different methodologies.
Por instance a vibrotactile cue was applied to the sub¬
jects' fingers to indicate which part of the stimuli display
he had to report (Smith and Hamunas, 1971). In this oase
similar results were obtained. A different approach was
the one used by Sates and Taylor (1964); Sstes (1965) and
3stes and Taylor (1966). They developed a technique in
which the subjects had to answer 'yes* or 'no' to the
presence or absence of a stimulus known by the subject in
advance, (called the target stimulus). Py means of a
statistical analysis, the number of stimuli perceived by
the subject were determined. Again the results obtained
with this technique agreed with the previous ones.
Humelhart (1970) analysing iconic memory which produced
similar results, used temporal integration of fragmented
forms. This technique was developed by Iriksen and
Collons (1967). His experiments involved the presentation
of two fields in rapid succession, both fields containing
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a group of "random" dots patterns. When both fields were
superimposed, three letters could be seen. Manipulation
of time between the presentation of fields gave similar
results to the ones obtained with other techniques.
Hav^r and Standing (1970) devised another technique.
Subjects were presented with a 3x3 matrix of letters which
they did not have to report, and at the same time with a
clicking sound. The subject could change the time at
which the click was on, and his task was to make the sound
coincide first with the beginning of the stimulus (letters)
and second witn its disappearance. The subjects were
expected to synchronize the click with their impression of
the stimulus and not really with the stimulus per set
that is, it was supposed that the subjects reacted to the
trace which persisted after the stimulus had actually been
turned off. Analysing the differences in time, the experi¬
ments confirmed that subjects did not respond directly to
the physical presence of the stimulus, but to something
considered to be the trace. These studies were oonfirmed
soon after by Sfron (1970).
From a methodological point of view, it seems that
the phenomenon is not qn. artefact of the technique used,
since different echniques lead to the same results. There¬
fore, the next step was to see which are the most important
variables involved. One of the most important variables,
in relation to the subject's performance seems to do with
the characteristics of the post-exposure field; that is,
with wnat appears in the tachitoscope after the stimulus.
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Sperling (I960, 1963) and Aberbach and Sperling (1961)
found that a dark post exposure field decreases the number
of correct responses. Turvey (1973), Turvey et al (1974)
and Dick (1974) consider that this variable i3 the one
that most affects the trace in iconic memory.
Changing trie time of exposure of the stimuli between
15-500 msec, Sperling (I960) found that there was no change
in the number of letters reported. However, Dick (1974)
said that although this variable can be important, the
necessary experiments to establish it have not been carried
out.
The kind of material used as stimuli, that is letters,
numbers, colours, position, etc. is another important
variable which can indicate the kind of processes involved.
Different experiments using different stimuli agrees with
the original experiments which used letters or numbers,
von Wright (1968) used colour and Mewhort et al (1969) used
letters with a different degree of similarity to the ones
used in English and found that experience improves per¬
formance. Holding (1970) found different performances
using English letters or Arabic characters, English speaking
persons performing poorly with Arabic characters. Eayer,
(1974) found that using 3imple shapes like circles or
4 or 8 sided shapes, led to different results. As the
complexity of the stimulus increased, the performance
decreased.
As can be seen from this brief review iconic memory is
a reproducible phenomenon which is affected by several
variables.
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A logical extension of the study of iconic memory was
to see if the phenomenon could he observed in other sensory
modalities than vision. Crowder and Morton, (1969) have
worked in the auditory system and called this phenomenon
acoustic storage. However, the results are not very clear
and several alternative explanations can be given. Some
extensions of this work have been done, unfortunately with¬
out much success in establishing the phenomenon (e.g.
Treisman and Rostron, 1972).
5. The Concept of Iconic Memory
It is important to analyse what is the status and
modern interpretation given to the iconic memory concept.
As has been emphasised, iconic memory so far has been
analysed with a present perspective in order to study a
series of experiments which are nowadays grouped under the
term "iconic memory"• Neisser (1967) proposed this term,
but several other names have also been given, in some
cases suggesting a different interpretation. For instance,
it has been called sensory register (Atkinson and Shiffrin,
1968); visual persistence (Coltheart, 1976); sensory
storage (Holding, 1975); visual memory (Sperling, 1963)
and iconic storage (Heyer, 1974). In all these cases
reference is made to the same experiments and phenomena;
however, the differences in name are something other than
personal choice and refer possibly to different interpre¬
tations of the phenomena. About the history and evolution
of the concept, hick (1974) states that "theorising about
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Sperling's work came more slowly, but Neisser's theoretical
discussion served to solidify the notion of a rapid decaying
memory". He continues saying that in general terms,
"ioonic memory can be described as a large capacity, short
duration image". Thi3 description is, in a way, the
"official doctrine" on iconic memory (e.g. Bower, 1977).
"The official doctrine" is that the iconic memory
process is the first step in human information processing.
It is supposed that iconic memory is a store which contains
precategorical information, where part of the information
is lost if it is not transferred to another stage for its
elaboration. Sperling (19b3>1976) was the first to try
to give a detailed explanation of the different character¬
istics of information processing. In his attempts to
produce a model he proposed a simple scheme with a visual
information store (viz) that receives light patterns and
stores them for a limited time (trace). A second 'scan'
mechanism, is supposed to take certain elements from the
vis and keep them by rehearsal. Also an auditory inform¬
ation store was proposed (Sperling, 1963). This simple
model was used as the basis for more elaborate ones,
(Sperling, 1967) and postulating six different long-term
memories, he stated that "the proper development of all
six of these long term memories is a prerequisite for the
effective operation of all the information processing
system".
However, as Holding (1975) comments, none of the
attempts to develop a general model to explain information
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processing, had much impact in research. Prom the point
of view of the experiments, it has been more important to
differentiate iconic memory from other phenomena such cs
visual persistence. Coltheart (1976) states that these
phenomena are identical, however in his experiments, non¬
sense stimuli, such as lights or moving points are used;
whereas in the others more complex information such as
letters, colours or numbers are used.
Also from an experimental point of view, there have
been attempts to distinguish between the afterimages and the
trace, (or icon). It could be that the traces left by
stimuli, called icons are simply negative afterimages.
However, this kind of afterimage can be observed in dark
post-exposure fields in a tachistoscope precisely where
iconic memory decreases significantly (Sperling 1963). If
the icon and the negative afterimage were the same, the
icon could be facilitated in a dark field. On the con¬
trary, iconic memory is found in illuminated fields where
it is not possible to observe negative afterimages (Julesz,
1971). Such a clear difference has not been observed
between the icon and a positive afterimage, and it is
possible that they could belong to the same class of
pnenomena, or be the same thing (Dick, 1974). However,
this ha3 not been studied systematically.
Another interesting distinction which has been investi¬
gated is that between iconic memory and short-term memory.
Both kinds of memory have been studied under different
circumstances, subjects being presented with different
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stimuli in varying quantities. In the iconic memory
stage it has been postulated that information is pre-
categorical information! whereas in the short-term memory
stage it has been proposed that information is categorical.
Studying the relation between these two memory stages
Turvey (1966) asked the subjects to retain 5 letters,
5 numbers or 5 binary digits while doing a typical Sperling
iconic memory task with letters. He found that the inform¬
ation held in memory did not affect the partial report of
the subjects in the Sparling task. He suggested therefore,
that short term memory did not affect iconic memory, but
that iconic memory could interfere with short-term memory.
These studies have been replicated and extended by Doost
and Turvey (1971) and Spencer (1971)• Phillips (1974) did
a detailed and extensive study and found that different
nonsense stimuli produced different curves of forgetfulness.
He proposed two distinct classes of visual memory: a high
capacity sensory storage which is tied to spatial position
and is maskable and brief, and a schematic short-term
visual memory which is not tied to spatial position, is
protected against masking, and which becomes less effective
over a few seconds, but not over the first 600 msec. How¬
ever the distinctions between the visual short term memory
stage and the iconic memory stage is not yet clear. In
general the first few stages in human information processing
are still rather poorly understood.
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6. Criticisms of Iconic Memory
Iconic memory, as a phenomena and as a concept is
established strongly in the experimental literature,
although its relations with the rest of the stages involved
in human information processing are at the moment subjected
to a great speculation (Bower, 1977). Although iconic
memory has its place in the psychological literature, it
has been criticised (Holding, 1972, 1975)* These critic¬
isms, however, have themselves been rejected for lack of
clear arguments and experimental support (Coltheart et al,
1974; Coltheart, 1975)• In fact part of Holding's criticism
is both tenable and presents some important implications in
the thesis be presented here.
In his first criticism, Holding (1970) referred to the
ways in which data were analysed in the original experiments
partial report. He emphasised that if the trials were not
carefully balanced, subjects might be able to predict which
column in the matrix of letters they were going to be asked
to report. In that way the subjects will pay attention
only to that column, thus invalidating the results. Holding
designed an experiment where he could manipulate directly
the guessing behaviour of the subjects and found that this
manipulation affected performance. However, although this
argument applies to Sperling's (I960) experiments, it does
not apply to others, such as Averbach and Coriel (1961).
Holding (1972) reported another experiment, in this
case in a situation similar to Sperling's (I960) original
experiment, in which he found that performance was similar
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to that already reported if he used the 3nglish alphabet
but if he used Arabic characters performance deteriorated.
Although these results are interesting and could indicate
that iconic memory is dependent on information already
known by the subject, other interpretations can be given.
For instance, Coltheart, et al (1974) indicated that if a
subject is not familiar with the stimuli he cannot rehearse
and transfer this information to a short-term memory.
Although the criticism made of Holding's experiment (1972)
is valid, that is the subjects are limited in the number
of events that can transfer to STM, the implications are
important that is the study of iconic memory using novel
stimuli. 'Iconic memory' has been described as one of the
most representative forms of the idea of 'trace* nowadays,
the concept having therefore, ancient origins. The useful¬
ness of this concept in the development of psychology cannot
be denied. It has been an important factor in the develop¬
ment of the idea of memory as a phenomenon based on certain
physical processes (neurophysiological) and not in the
soul or mind, as an entity different and separated from the
body (or brain). In a more specific way, iconic memory
represents in the contemporary literature, the first step
in a long chain of vicissitudes which information suffers
during its processing. However, in the experiments on
iconic memory, a misleading assumption can be found which
it is very important to point out. Ihi3 mistake may derive
from the kind of theory used. It consists in assuming
that the subjects are acquiring new information. In all
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cases where the stimuli are familiar (letters; numbers)
the only thing that can be concluded is that the subject
is learning a new combination of the information he already
has. The idea that in these situations the subject is
learning something new started with ISbbinghaus (1885), and
since then a great number of workers have made the same
misleading assumption. TJven nowadays, psychologists are
trying to study processes of acquisition of information
using stimuli which in struct 3ense are not novel. If
this i3 so, it is very important to ~tudy whether iconic
memory is still observed in the absence of familiar
stimuli, that is, using completely novel stimuli. This
of course, presents a methodological problem, since the
information given has to be easily reported by the subject,
in other words, the answers should not be affected by the
difficulty in generating or transforming the output. And
at the same time the same conditions as in other experi¬
ments have to be repeated. The following experiment is
an attempt to solve this methodological problem and to
investigate whether iconic memory can 3till be observed in
the absence of familiar stimuli.
7. Methodological Considerations
In iconio memory experiments, it is possible that the
results might be different when novel material is presented.
The problem is to find an optimal experimental situation
where the generation of a response does not oall for a
difficult transformation.
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As was previously mentioned one of the techniques used
to replicate experiments of iconic memory was that devised
by Uste3 (op cit). This technique allows for short
tachistoscopic presentation (e.g. 100 msec) of a matrix of
3x3 or 4x4 letters where one of two target stimuli are
present in the set of letters. The target stimuli are
letters which the subject knows at the beginning of the
experiment. The subject has to indicate whether the
target stimuli were present or not in the matrix just
presented. The position and the use of the stimuli are
presented in all possible combinations. The other stimuli
of the matrix were selected at random. Sstes and Taylor
(1964) reported that with this technique the problem of
retention los3 is minimized since it is not necessary for
the subject to give an extensive verbal report a3 in other
techniques.
The choice of statistical analysis for this type of
experiment is very important. Since subjects had to indi¬
cate which of two stimuli were present on the screen, in
the first place it was possible to see if the answers were
given at random and; and the second place, to calculate
the number of elements processed (detected) by the subject.
As the authors put it, "for most theoretical purposes it is
desirable to convert the raw data in terms of proportions
of correct responses into estimates of number of elements
effectively processed at various display sizes. To do
this the successes achievable were corrected for guessing
152.
behaviour according to the formula:
+ <1 - j?> i
where PQ represents probability of correct response; r the
number of elements effectively processed and i) the number of
elements in the uisplay. The oasis of this relation is
that since the critical elements are randomly placed in the
displays, the probability that the critical element falls
among the P elements perceived is P/j; and when the critical
element does not fall among those perceived, the probability
of a correct response is $ since both critical elements
occurred equally often in random sequence. Replacing PQ
by the observed proportion of correct detections at a given
display size, it is possible to solve the question for P
and thus obtain an estimate for this theoretical quantity
in terms of observables:
P * (2P„ - 1) J)
v
This technique has been used by 3stes and Taylor (1966) to
reproduce the original studies of Sperling (19bO) and it
wa3 found that their data agree. This technique nas also
been used to study other aspects of memory and stimulus
detection, (e.g. 3stes, 1972; 3stes, 1974} Welford, et al,
1968).
A second methodological aspect necessary for testing
the present hypothesis has to do with the stimulation
itself. The basic idea of this experiment is to try to
diminish the effects of learned information using relatively
novel stimuli and compare this situation with a situation
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where the subject is familiar with the stimuli. Schem¬









A kind of stimulation which can reduce variables
introduced by familiar information was devised by Dick and
Loader (1974). The stimuli formed by 3 vertical,
3 horizontal and 2 oblique lines which together form the
following shape:
Fig. 3» Configuration from which lines were randomly~
selected to produce the stimuli.
The stimuli are formed taking 2 lines at random (Fig. 3).
Those sets resembling a letter were discarded.





Ten volunteers, students of the University, 5 from the
Department of Psychology. None had any visual defect and
none wore glasses. They were randomly assigned to two
groups, i.e. an experimental group who received "novel"
stimuli and a control group who received familiar stimuli
(letters). The subjects ware naive with respect to this
experiment and they were told it was an experiment on
perception. Memory was not mentioned.
Prooedure:
The stimuli were displayed on a two channel tachi-
stoscope, (Colne Instruments, Co. Ltd). The first channel
was continuously on, with a card with a black dot in the
centre as a fixation point. In channel 2, the stimuli
were presented for 50 or 200 msec. The brightness of
the screen was approximately 9»5 Pt Lamberts, measured with
a Macbeth Illuminometer.
The stimuli were divided into two sets, one of letters
and the other of novel stimuli. The letters were combined
at random into groups of 3» 6 and 9 from a set of 20 capital
letters (Letraset, Block BOB, 4). The letters were trans¬
ferred on to white cards. These were all consonants from
the Latin alphabet; the "W" was not used. Bach letter
occurred in every possible position in a 3x3 matrix.
Pifty four cards were made up according to the following
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rules; 1 - no cards contained the same letter twice.
2 - Where there were only three letters on a card, a line
or column was avoided. The novel stimuli were made up
following the procedure of Dick and Loader (1374), previously
mentioned. Two lines were randomly selected from the
figure containing 8 lines of the same length, (3?ig. 3 and 4)»
All the possible combinations of two line3 were selected
except those resembling a letter, such as the T» The
lines were drawn in cards using indian ink and a leroy-Pen
No. 5« The total number of forms obtained in this way
were 20, which were distributed in the same way as the
20 letters, that is, at random in a matrix of 3x3* The
size of the matrix was 5x5° (degrees) of visual field,
every stimulus being 1x1° (degrees) approximately.
By the side of the tachistoscope where the subjects
could see it at any time, between trials, was a card of
20 x It.5 cm. with two target stimuli. In the case of
letters, the target stimuli were j? and 3. In the case of
novel stimuli, the targets were H and ""J . The subjects
had to report which of the target stimuli was present in
the matrix of stimuli presented in the tachistoscope.
The probability of any of the target stimuli appearing
in any of the 9 different positions in the matrix of the
tachistoscope card was the same and the order of presenta¬
tion of any of the target stimuli on the cards was random.
The total of 54 cards was presented twice, once with a
tachistoscopic presentation of 50 msec and the other with
200 msec. Half the number of subjects started with a
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different 50 or 200 msec time in order to counterbalance
the groups.
Approximately 4 sec before each trial, the experimenter
gave the signal "ready" and then proceeded to take note of
the subject's response. The experiment lasted a total of
20-30 min.
Results
Pigs. 5 and b show the mean of the subjects* response
in the two conditions, experimental (novel stimuli) and
control (letters), with the two times of tachistoscopic
presentation (50-200 msec) as a function of the number of
stimuli presented in the display (3, b or 9). See Table 1.


































Fig. 5: Number of stimuli processed (P). letters versus
novel stimuli as function of the stimuli in the
display (D), with 200 msec of presentation, using
Estee' Technique.
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Pik. 6: Number of stimuli processed (P). Letters versus
novel stimuli as function of the stimuli in the
display (D), with 50 msec of presentation, using
Estes* techniques*
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As previously mentioned the method devised by Tste3
(1965) was used to calculate the number of processed
stimuli. This method provides a formula which includes
the number of stimuli presented (D) and the possibility
of the subject guessing the responses. The statistical
analysis shows that there is no difference statistically
significant between the presentations of 50 and 200 msec
within the groups. There is a difference statistically
significant in the number of correct responses between the
control and the experimental groups when the number of
stimuli presented was 9. The difference was significant
for both durations of tachistoscopic presentation (Table 1).
The number of letters processed in the control condi¬
tion agrees with the results presented by 33stes (1964) and
Sperling (I960), but not the results obtained in the experi¬
mental group with novel stimulation.
There is a difference between the number of novel
stimuli processed and the duration of the tachistoscopic
presentation. Table 1 gives the mean values and the
standard deviations obtained by the subjects on both con¬
ditions at the two times of tachistoscopic presentation.
No difference was observed between the amount of processed
stimuli and the duration of the presentation.
Discussion
The results obtained in this experiment suggest that
the number of detected stimuli is significantly affected
by the nature of t-.e stimuli presented, (in this case» novel
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stimuli versus letters). The number of novel stimuli
which are processed is not significantly affected by the
duration of tachistoscopic presentation given in this
experiment (50, 200 msec). The number of novel stimuli
processed does not appear to be influenced by the number of
events on the screen, which varies from 3 to 9» However,
in the case of letters, the greater number of stimuli in
the display, the greater the number of letters processed.
3ven though as hypothesised, there is a difference in
the results according to the kind of stimuli presented,
the results are not as clear as they should be, because it
can be argued that this paradigm is not the same as the
one used in the original experiments of iconic memory.
However, the number of letters processed with the control
experiment is the same as in the experiments reported by
Sperling (I960), Eumelhart (1970) and Sstes, (1964). Given
the conditions of this experiment, it is possible to
suggest that this was more a task of target stimuli recog¬
nition, than of extraction of information by iconic memory.
These considerations led to the second experiment in which
the original paradigm of iconic memory is replicated with
a modification (in order to avoid the problem that the
novel stimuli could not be reported). The modification
consists of changing the subjects' responses by asking
them to simply say whether the stimulus on the third pre¬
sentation was the same or different as the one displayed in
the same place in the first presentation. The aim of this
experiment was to examine the effects of new information
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on iconic memory as before, but this time following the
original experimental paradigm used by Sperling.
The reason to do experiment II is found in the meaning
of the results obtained, since although it is true that
the difference in performance is found between novel and
old information in the experiments of iconic memory, the
implications are going to include a great deal of situations
and phenomena, as all those situations using letters in
the experiments which do not compare the results of using
novel stimuli. Therefore it is important to do experi¬




Ten volunteer students of the University, with the
same characteristics as the subjects in experiment I.
These subjects did not participate in any other experiment
in this series.
Procedure:
The stimuli were presented on a tmree channel tachi-
3toscope (lialph-Gerhands Go. I3-B1). The brightness of
the 3 screens was made ecqual to 9*5 Ft. Lamberts, measured
with a Macbeth illuminator. The novel stimulus cards from
experiment I were used as stimuli (presentation cards), and
another set of new stimuli was introduced (test cards).
Fifty per cent of these test cards had the same stimulus
in the same place as the preceding presentation card, and
lt>3*
50l_° had a .stimulus not present in any of the presentation
cards. The probability of any stimulus appearing on any
of tne nine different positions in the matrix on the
tachistoscope's card was the same and the order of present¬
ation -was random. daoh trial began with a "ready" signal
given by the experimenter. One second later the screen
number 1 was illuminated for 50 msec, displaying the pre¬
sentation stimulus. subsequently the second screen wa3
illuminated for an inter stimuli interval (III) of 50,200
or 500 msec. finally, the third screen was illuminated
with a test stimulus on the same place as the presentation
one, beina either tne same or a completely different one.
The subject, was instructed to report whether the test
stimulus was the same or different from the presentation
stimulus. Jach series wa3 made of 108 trials and three
replications were done, each one containing every 131.
luring each series the 131 was the same, for half of the
subjects it was in increasing order, and for tne other
half, in a decreasing order of magnitude.
Results
The analysis of the results was done as in the first
experiment, correcting for the subjects' guessing factor
U3ing the formula of 3stes (19o4). figures 7 and 8 and
Table II show that the number of stimuli processed decreased
as the 131 i3 increased. Tnis could be interpreted as
a phenomenon of iconic memory in agreement with data
presented by Sperling (I960).
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The number of processed stimuli is different and
independent of both the ISI and the number of stimuli
present on the screen (D). There is a significant differ¬
ence statistically between the control and the experi¬
mental groups in the number of correct responses as the
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0.85 3.00 - 0.00*
50 6 1.28
+
0.93 5.27 ± 0.28*
9 1.46
+
0.76 5.30 - 0.39*
200 3 0.97
+
0.85 3.00 - 0.00*
6 1.19
+
0.91 5.00 - 0.41*
9 1.40
+ 0.87 7.61 ± 0.38*
3 1.65
+
0.76 3.00 - 0.00*
500 6 1.40
+
0.90 4.70 - 0.37*
9 1.15
+
mm 0.82 4.65 - 0.35*
*P < 0.05 (T Test)
Discussion
The results obtained in this experiment suggest that
processing novel stimuli is different from processing









Fi£.7 : Number of stimuli processed (P). Letters versus
~ "
novel stimuli with 3 different inter-stimulus-
interval (I.S.I.), and the amount of stimuli in
the screen (D) using Sperling's Technique.
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D
Number of stimuli processed (P). Letters versus
novel stimuli with 3 different inter-stimulus-
interval (I.S.I.) in msec and the amount of











This control experiment waa done with the purpose of
obtaining the apan of apprehension of the subjects; tuese
data are important since they allow us to compare the
results of the experiments of iconic memory with the experi¬
ments of apprehansion as an additional control.
Method
Subjects:
Six volunteer students from the University with the
same characteristics as in previous experiments. Two
subjects participated in the previous experiment, but more
than two months had elapsed between tests.
Procedure:
The stimuli were displayed on a Cambridge two channel
tachistoscope (Colne Instruments Co. Ltd.). The first
channel, which was kept on continuously, contained a card
with a black dot in the centre. In channel 2, the stimuli
were presented for either 50 or 200 msec. The stimuli used
were exactly the same as the ones used in experiments 1
and II. The subjects were instructed to write on paper
all the stimuli they could remember. The rest of the
procedure and the settings of the tachistoscope (e.g.
brightness) were the same as previously.
Results
Table III present the results of this
experiment.
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*P < 0.05 (1 Test)
hl30U33i0n
The results of this experiment agree with the experi¬
ments reported by Sperling (I960) and Sates (1964), the
span of apprehension with novel stimuli is very poor.
This result allows a better oomparison with the results
obtained in the previous experiment (with letters), and
allows us to make sure that the instruments do not change
significantly from the ones used in other studies.
GINSAAL JISCESSION
The results of these experiments do net argue against
the existence of iconic memory for letters or any other
kind of postcategorical stimuli, but do indicate that if
unfamiliar novel stimulation is presented, the type of
processing is different. If iconic memory is found only
for familiar stimuli, it i3 difficult to maintain that it
is a store of information, that is a processing structure




















3.00 £ 0.00 *
4.40 £ 0.21*
4.61 £ 0.24 *
3.00 £ 0.00
4.52 £ 0.10 *
4.64 £ 0.20 *.
luS*
The fact that t^e difference in the number of stimuli
processed is found between familiar and novel stimuli,
suggests the nead for new interpretation of iconic memory
as one which is not solely in terms of structure. Goltheart
(197b) and Allport (1975) have suggested that it is necessary
for all the stimuli entering the system to contact the
information previously stored (possibly long term memory)»
in order to be processed.
In studies of visual persistence (Sfron, 1970;
Allport, 1970), it mas been observed that the results are
different if lights are used instead of letters. This is
in agreement with the results obtained in the experiments
reported here. It indicates that familiarity of the
information somehow affects the processing of information
entering the system.
Age seams to be important in visual persistence,
10 year old children, tend to save shorter visual persis¬
tence than adults, (Stanley and liolley, 1970). This
could suggest that this phenomenon and Iconic memory,
although usually considered to be the same thing, are in
fact different. If the iconic memory trace is considered
only as a function of the input, there should be no diff¬
erence according to age.
A problem in the interpretation of iconic memoiy has
been to explain what happens with the information once it
is in the form of a trace. Is all the information trans¬
ferred to a more permanent store or only part of it? How
does this process take place? Since early studies it has
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been the necessity of explaining these points. Sperling
(1967) interpreted this process of transference of inform¬
ation, postulating several steps between the trace or icon
and the more permanent store. These steps include a
process of scan, a buffer and a process of rehearsal as
well as the participation of other processes lixe an
auditory store. Even tsough it is important and necessary
to interpret this problem, data has not helped on its
solution (see Coltheart, 1971). Perhaps a dynamic relation
should be proposed between iconic memory and the later
stages of information processing, in order to integrate all
the information available.
Phillips (1971) has given additional evidence for the
participation of learned information in iconic memory. In
his experiment, subjects had to compare nonsense words,
each one made up of 7 letters. In the second word one
letter was different from the first word and the subject
had to indicate which one. It was found that the subjects
performed differently if they were families? with the words,
subjects with no previous experience performed less well.
In other experiments, Lefton (1973) and Merilcle et al
(1971), found a small difference in performance according
to the order of approximation of the words to English.
Scheerer (1974) enalysed the position of the stimuli in
the screen, and found that the amount of correct responses
was related to the position of the stimuli. He related
his results to the reading habits of the subjects, that is
from left to right, even though the rapid presentation of
the stimuli should not allow for scanning of the visual field.
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There are other results pointing out that iconic
memory is not only dependent on the input or stimulation
that the subject receives but also related to other
phenomena, such as learned information. Holding (1972)
has already proposed a more complex process for iconic
memory as has already been mentioned. If Snglish speaking
subjects have to report Arabic characters, their perform¬
ance is poor compared to the situation where they have to
report the letters of the "English alphabet. These experi¬
ments have been criticised for the way that subjects were
asked to give their answers. However, the results pre¬
sented in this chapter agree with the hypothesis, although
in this case the subjects gave their answers in a different
way.
Dick and loader (1974) found a strong effect on iconic
memory according to the degree of education of the subjects.
They tested adult students of the University and students
in the 4th or 6th grade (primary school). They also
studied other subjects; for instance, Hebrew subjects who
learned the language when they were children, and subjects
who learned it as adults. The authors observed that the
subjects who learned the language during childhood per¬
formed better.
In all experiments where learned factors and experience
were manipulated, there was always an effect on the per¬
formance of the subjects. This evidence indicates once
more that there is a relation between iconic memory and
learning, experience or long term memory. These reports
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agree with results reported here, novel stimulation
impairs iconic memory.
The basic problem in interpreting the results of
iconic memory experiments lie3 in the idea of iconic memory
itself, mainly a3 a static trace and in general as flow
of information, where memory i3 regarded as only passively
storing information. It could even be proposed that the
experiments on iconic memory are not really studying the
trace left by a stimulus, since no such trace is found
with novel stimuli. In the same way it is not possible to
say that iconic memory is one of the first stages in the
processing of information, since it is possible to suggest
that other processes are involved simultaneously, such as
processes of scanning and matching between the input and
what is already stored (e.g. letters). Also it is possible
to suggest that the limit in the buffer which generates
the response i3 itself involved in iconic memory. In
other word3, the processes studied in iconic memory could
be considered as belonging to the final stages and not to
the first stages in information processing. This does
not suggest that iconic memory does not exist as a
phenomenon, but that the level at which it is working and
the processes involved are other than those previously
assumed. It could be 3aid that far from being a relatively
peripheral process, iconic memory should be considered
part of the more complicated central systems of information
processing. These require for their explanation other
procmses, such as meaning, comparison, buffering and
response generation, involving learned information.
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Subjects made times estimates of the number of
elements in a specified set. In two of four experimental
conditions the stimuli enumerated were physically available
to the subjects for inspection, or open counting. In
two other conditions the stimuli were not so available,
and this was termed closed counting. Subjects counted
objects, letters in words, or angles in letters. Mean
response latencies were found in all instances to correlate
positively with the number of elements correctly reported.
This effect was present in .oth open and closed counting
tasks. Mean RT's in open counting tasks were nevertheless
the more rapid. Within closed counting conditions,
response latencies were also found to vary with the nature
of the items enumerated. The results indicate that the
processes underlying both open and closed counting are
fundamentally alike. In closed counting, however, prior
reconstruction of an appropriate internal representation
of the set seems to be a prerequisite. The major impli¬
cations of these results are discussed in relation to




Bartlett's studies have been made innocuous by con¬
sidering them as classical (Kvale, 1975)*
"... In spite of its theoretical shortcomings and the doubts
that have been oast on the general validity of some of the
experimental findings, Bartlett's book has remained some¬
thing of a classic in modern psychology.(Z.angwill, 197k).
"... In some ways a measure of Bartlett's stature .. nobody
seriously questions the factual results of his experiments."
(Broadbent, 1970).
Bartlett's influencial theory of memory has given
rise in the literature to a curious paradox. On one side
it is widely considered one of the most significant ideas
in modern psychology, as can be seen in the influence that
it has had on the contemporary literature. Neisser (1967)
considers that one of the most important aspects in a
theory of memory (from the point of view of cognitive
psychology), is what Bartlett called the reconstructive
aspect. Piaget and Inhelder (1973) recognise the
influence and relation that Bartlett has had in their work
on memory and intelligence in children. Kinsky (1974)»
from the point of view of artificial intelligence, has
developed a specific theory about perception and visual
information storage, based on Bartlett's concept of schemata.
On the other hand, it is difficult to find in the liter¬
ature, mainly about memory, experimental support for
Bartlett's ideas. There are very few studies that have
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tried to repeat his original experiments. dauld and
stephenson (I9b7); Kay, (1955) and Bomulioki, (195b) nave
studied the same problem and their results indicate that
memory is more a process of abstraction tnan reconstruction,
and this has made it oven more difficult to find work
relating to Uartlett1s experiments.
This situation presents a paraaox ~ince a great deal
oi workers refer to Bartlett as bein^ the main influence
on them, or as proviuin0 one of the major alternative
approaches to the study of memory. Tuis situation could
be interpreted by supposing that hartlett's book (1931)
provides experimental evidence for a theory. However, his
theory is difficult to extract or describe. for instance,
Coffer (1973) comments that Bartlett "did not have a
detailed or uighly scientific theory, that his views were
essentially an emphasis or orientation"• Another way of
reconciling this lack of theoretical expiicitness in
Bartlett•s work with the extent to which it is quoted is
to say that psychologists are still using a positivist
point of view regarding memory phenomena. A way to
illustrate this point of view, mainly the kind of material
used is founa in hvale (1975) comments that"a series of
isolated elements without meaning were employed in almost
90^ of the experiments and thus, the material was already
tailored to fit the metapnysical conception of a world
constituted of unequivocal and isolated elements even
before the experiments began." A positivist position
togetner with a ri0id methodology could be the reason for
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the lack of development of theories and experiments
following Bartlett's points of view. Inertia in research
can be observed, for instance, even in such attempts
Gauld and Stephenson (1967) who used the same type of
stimuli a3 Bartlatt: short stories read to the subjects
like " The War of the Ghosts".
Bartlett (1932) says about memory that "... remembering
is not the re-excitation of inumerable fixed lifeless and
fragmentary traces, it is an imaginative reconstruction
or construction built out of the relations of our attitude
towards a whole active mass of organized past reactions
or experience... an image is a device for picking bits out
of schemes for increasing the chance of variability in the
reconstruction of past stimuli and situations for surmounting
the chronology of presentations., none can set a ring
around memory and explain it from within itself.." This
quotation gives a taste of Bartlett's ideas. His studies
took place approximately between 1914-1916 and were very
simple. The most important work was done using the
method of repeated reproduction. This method consists
of reading twice to subjects a story of 200 to 500 words,
and having them reproduce the story in writing. Time
between the presentation of the story ana its report was
variable between 15 minutes to several months. The
results of these experiments were described in a qualitative
form and discussed in great detail. The author reported
that there was a reduction in the number of words reported
compared to the original story, that the subjects abstracted
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the most important points, retaining the meaning in a
condensed form eliminating and coanging the words# lie
suggested that the subjects altered and confabulated the
contents of the stories# In some cases the alterations
were related to the social and cultural background of the
subjects. These points suggested to Bartlett his idea
that memory is an active process, rather than a fixed
lifeless trace.
The explanations given by Bartlett were in turn
derived from Head's (1926) concept of 'shemata'.
One of the best ways of understanding Bartlett is to
contrast his ideas with those of others such as 3bbinghaus
(1389) the latter's followers, like Iduler and Pilzeker
(1901) and Newman (1913)# This task is easy since
Ocbinghaus' ideas are described in a number of places. It
is an important task since this school still dominates
modern psychology in one way or another, and still has had
an important influence on recent work in memory. The main
ideas in Bbbinghaus' work are based on the notion of a
trace which stores information. Thi3 trace can be erased
by a new trace (interference) or can be obliterated by
lack of use. It is suggested that the traces are organized
by mechanisms of association and that a trace which has
not disappeared completely can be strengthened by practice
(rehearsal). This point of view about memory can be con¬
sidered to be opposed to that of Bartlelt who does not
accept the idea of a static trace, having stated that
memory is an active process of change and constant use,
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where images ^re tools available to alter and modify
memory contents. Bartlett proposed that information is
■organized in schemata. Norhtway (1940) found the
following four different uses of this concept by Bartlett:
"1) The schemata are considered to be forces within the
individual which determine what tue suoject's re¬
construction wi31 be:
"Determination by schemata is the most fundamental
of all ways by which we can be influenced by reactions
and experiences which occurred sometime in the past"
(p * C. v/1 J •
"What, precisely does the * schema• do? Together
with tue preceding incoming impulse it renders a
specific reaction possible. It is, therefore, pro¬
ducing an orientation of tne organism towards whatever
it is directed to at the moment. But that orientation
must be dominated by tne immediately preceding reaction
or experience. To break away from that the 'schema*
must become not merely something that works the
organism, but something with which the organism can
work. The organism discovers how to turn around on
its own 'schemata*. In other words, it becomes
conscious", (p.207).
2) Tne schemata are tne forms in which the individual
preserves material.
"It looks a3 if that presentation of material
which is required in recognizing is normally a preserv¬
ation of schemes, of general settings, of order or
form of arrangement" (p.195)*
3) The schemata are 'storehouses' in which content is
retained while it is being reorganized.
"In fact tnis is one of the great functions of
images in mental life: to pick items out of the
•schemata', and rid the organism of over-determination
by the last preceding member of a given series" (p.209)«
"All of us in reference to some of our 'schemata'
have probably oompljted the model and now merely
maintain it by repetition" (p.103).
4) 'Schema' is used in a way approximating the notion of
the apperceptive mass.
"I think probably the term 'organized netting'
approximates aost closely to the notion required"(p.201).
The influence of the 'schemata' 13 influenced by the
past. In its scaematic form the past operates en
masse, or not strictly en masse because tne latest in¬
coming constituents whicu go to build up a'scneme' have
a predominant influence" (p.202).
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As can be appreciated, this concept anu the use given
by its author, is complex. It is therefore misleading
since it can receive multiple interpretations. The con¬
cept is similar to that of 'paradigm' proposed by Kuhn
(1970) in the sense that it has bean considered a powerful
tool in research, providing it does not fall into the
hands of the pouitivist-operationalist philosophers (or
psychologists in this case).
A fundamental aspect of 3artlett's theory is its
reconstructive character, that i3, to consider tnat inform¬
ation can be used to generate something "new". This is
the most elaborated idea of abstraction, involving reduction
and store of the constant aspects of information. In the
reconstruction, these constant aspects are reduced and
stored, but also it is possible to change or modify the
information.
Goaulicki (1958) challenged both Sartlett's theory
and the data and provided support for an alternative
notion of memory as abstractive rather than reconstructive.
• Zangwill (197*0 later endorsed this view and pointed out
that Bartlett's evidence of reconstructive memory was more
likely a consequence of its methodology and the material
used in the experiments. Other studies supporting
abstractive memory have been reported, (e.g. Gauld, 19b7»
Kay, 1955* and Northway, 1940). One of the most inter¬
esting developments in this line of research, in favour
of abstractive memory, is the one presented by Bransford
and Franks (1971); in their experiments the subjects
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received complex sentences which were made up of four
simple ideas. A. complex sentence was for instance, "The
rock which rolled down the mountain crushed the tiny hut
at the ed^e of the woods" . This complex sentence can be
decomposed into four simple ideas as follows: 1 - The
rock rolled down the mountain. k - The x*ock crushed the
hut. 3 - The hut was tiny and 4 - the hut was at the
ed^e of the woods. One of the tasks of the subjects was
to give his ratin^ of confidence that the sentence read
in the second part of the experiment has been read in the
first part. The results showed that the subjects inte¬
grated the simple ideas and reported that the complex
sentence had been read to them before.
Analrf jirio t.iese experiments and others of the same
kind, Coffer concluded (1973) that he agreed with Bartlett
and that "memory can be shown to be reconstructive, genera¬
tive and productive". These results in support of Bartlett
can be considered as the product of the improvement in
methodology, -.ince with the original method (complete
stories) it was very difficult to obtain the abstractive
characteristics of memory, as well as the effects of the so
called confabulation.
*Yhere such ambiguity exists concerning the general
applicability of the theory, it is essential to examine
its postulates in greater detail. Itlurdock (1974) has
already pointed out that there is a pressing need to
clarify the basic elements of the theory since these are
difficult to tease out from Bartlett's original work.
182,
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Moves in this direction, have already "been made by Meudel
(1971) and Smith (1973).
Summarizing, some of the most important aspects of
Bartlett*s theory of memory are as follows! (A) An active
process is invoked whereby information about an object, or
event, stored in memory is brought to consciousness.
(3) There is an active reconstruction of an internal
representation or image, in consciousness of the specific
object or event recalled. This process of reconstruction
involves general as well as specific information previously
obtained. (C) There is an active manipulation of such
representation(s) or image(s), by the subjects. (j) The
generation and elaboration of novel information or response,
is not directly learned in advance.
In order to investigate this aspect of Bartlett's
theory more precisely, it is necessary to construct tasks
that meet the following criteria:
1. The presentation of eacn stimulus must act as a cue
for the use of old material; 2. It should be considered
that the only way of arriving at an appropriate decision
concerning tue stimulus involves the generation and active
manipulation of an image of the object or event in question.
3* That the information about the object must be novel to
the subject, so that it leads to a decision not previously
reached by him/her.
Ivleudell (1971) used a paradigm meeting some of these
criteria, and found that an orderly relationship exists
between reaction-time and the number of elements a subject
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had to recall from memory. One of the major implications
of this finding, which relates directly to Bartlett's
theory, is that the retrieval of information, the recon¬
struction of an appropriate representation of the object,
ana tne manipulation of such information, are all activities
that require time for their appropriate execution. A
prediction tnat can be derived from this is that the time
taken by the subjects to decide, and respond accordingly,
will vary in monotenic increasing fashion as a function of
the number of items recalled. Moreover, and this is
quite important, the latency of response should also
reflect qualitative differences between the items recalled.
Lore specifically, the obvious fact that some items are
more difficult to remember than others could be due to
their familiarity or that they are easy to relate with
other familiar items in memory.
In order to test some of these implications, two
different tasks involving the counting of objects, were
constructed for use in the following experiment. There
were two kinds of counting, 'open' and 'closed*. In
open counting the elements in a figure were available to
the subject for inspection. Closed counting entailed the




One hundred and twenty male and female students of
the Department of Psychology of the University.
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Procedures
The subjects were told that this was an experiment
in memory and that they would have to answer simple
questions. They were told that a click sound would
indicate the end of each spoken question. They were
instructed to answer correctly and as quickly as possible
without using their fingers or any other external means of
counting. The experimenter recorded the latency of
response as well as the answer, which in every case was
a number. At the end of the experiment the subjects were
encouraged to introspect freely on how they arrived at the
correct answers.
The subjects were randomly assigned to four different
experimental conditions: A - Closed counting of objects,
B - Closed counting of angles in letters and words, C -
Open counting of angles in letters and words, D - Open
counting of angles in figures, thirty subjects in each
condition.
The subjects were required to answer the following
questions: In condition A: 1) How many wooden objects are
in your living room? 2) How many pairs of shoes do you
own? 3) How many doors are in your house? 4) How many
letters are there in your father's surname. 5) How many
light bulbs are in your house? Condition B: The subjects
were read twenty letters from the alphabet and thirteen
words having between five and ten letters each. After
each letter, or word, the subjects were asked to report how
many angles it had.
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In condition C: The same letters or words as in condition
B were uaed, but in this case, they were printed on white
cards, (10 x 15 cm). Each card cont ined one stimulus.
The subjects were asked to count the total number of angles.
In condition D twenty irregular figures were presented,
one by one to the subjeots. The figures were presented,
one by one to the subjects. The figures were similar to
those used by Vanderplas and Garvin (1959), (Pig. 9).
Each figure contained a different number of angles from the
others. The subjects were asked to report the number of
angles in eaoh figure.
hesuits
The mean reaction times were tabulated for each
question. Using regression analysis, the slope of the
function relating the reaction-time and the number of
elements recalled was obtained together with the intercept
on the ordinate. The intercept values represent the
average minimum reaction time to respond correctly to each
of the questions in the various conditions. These values
are reported in Table IV together with the slope of the
function which represent the rate of counting. The
Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient was cal¬
culated for the mean latency of response and the number of
elements reported (Table IV). In all cases, these
correlations were statistically significant.
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CONDITION B CONDITION C
CONDITION D
Fig. 9 : The structures presented in the second condition
(B) were used to show the Sj3 the kind of letter
representations wanted from them. Under (B) and
(C) are examples of the cards presented to the Ss
in condition (B) and (C). Finally, under (D) Ts
an example of the kind of figures presented to












































































Wooden Objects 0.614*** 1.26 0.867 mm
Shoes 0.281** 1.81 0.347 -
Doors O.496*** 1.99 0.413 -
Surname 0.369*** 1.14 0.509 -









0.896*** 0.24 0.442 0.'
CONDITION D
Open Counting
(Figures) 0.737*** 2.89 0.402 0.!
Discussion
Condition A: It is difficult to interpret the results
obtained in this condition since there is no way of checking
if the answer is correct. However, the results show a
linear monotonia increase in the reaction time a3 a
function of the number of elements reported. T>iis
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result could be taken as support for the suggestion that
subjects constructed a representation of the corresponding
set of objects prior to giving their answer. Perhaps,
the subjects deal with the items individually, counting
one by one as if the elements were actually externally
available for inspection.
The mean latency of the reaction time for each
question taken individually, indicates that the time taken
to answer correctly depends largely on the nature of the
items considered. For instance, the estimated rate of
counting for question 1 was slower than for the other
questions (Table IV). It is reasonable to suppose that
perhaps the subjects had to judge whether or not the
objects were made of wood, taking therefore more time to
give the answer. In contrast deciding the number of
shoes they own yields the quickest response, with the
fastest estimated rate of counting. The time taken to
report the number of letters in the father's surname was
very similar to that reported by Weber and Buck (19b9)»
Condition B: The results in this condition which is
better controlled, are more precise. Unlike condition A,
in this case the answers could be checked by the experi¬
menter. Once more the correlations between the mean
reaction time and the number of items reported was very
high, (Table IV).
Conditions C and 1): Highly significant correlations
between the mean reaction times and the number of items
reported were also found. Once more the mean reaction
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times were also found to vary in relation to the nature
of the items to be counted. The major point of interest
arises from the comparison of the results for 'open' and
'closed' counting; the remarkable similarity of salient
features of the data strongly indicates that the processes
underlying both tasks are fundamentally alike. In closed
counting conditions where the stimuli were not physically-
present it is reasonable to suppose that the subjects were
using stored information about the particular items in
question in order to generate an image of them; then
proceeding to count the items in the image as if they were
actually available for direct inspection. Efforts were
made to choose questions which were essentially novel to
the subjects, so that they did not know the correct answers
in advance; but of course the unlikely event that a
subject, on some past occassion enumerated to himself the
number of wooden objects in his room, can not be ruled out.
In general the results give support to the suggestion
that the reaction time increases linearly as a function
of the number of correct responses increase. This linear
inorease in reaction time occurs in both open and closed
counting and the estimated rate of counting varies as a
function of the number of items counted.
The general aim of this study was to examine and
extend by means of a different experimental paradigm one
of the most important aspects of Bartlett's theory. The
reconstructive part. One of themajor implications of the
results obtained in this study is that for simple or
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highly familiar stimuli, the corresponding internal
representations are quite rich in detail. Questions such
as how many wooden objects are in your room, involve the
retrieval of information about highly familiar objects as
well as the specific key attributes which define them.
In order to answer such questions, not normally posed, it
seemed as if the subjects were making stratetic use of the
stored information in order to arrive at a novel and
correct response. The characteristics of this process
fit with Bartlett's initial notion of reconstruction in
memory.
According to the introspections of the subjects, about
how they arrived at their answers, it is reasonable to
suppose that a process of reconstruction is involved. In
order to be able to count the various elements in a set
the subjects claimed to be making use of a sort of "mental
picture" which included these items. If this is so, it
could be proposed that special features of the various
items must have been represented as well, othefwiae it is
difficult to appreciate now closed counting would have
taken place. It appears, therefore, that the subjects
were indeed making use of internal representations or
images of the items in question.
In a previous reaction time study (Figueroa, 1974),
in which essentially the same stimuli and paradigms as in
condition A were used, the same positive correlation be¬
tween the reaction time and imagery resulted. Also,
other reaction time studies of internal representation
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give evidence suggesting that subjects can generate and
manipulate internal representations of external objects
in order to make certain decisions about them (Shepard, 1975).
Very little is known about the mechanisms involved in
the internal representation. Alternative forms of rep¬
resentation may also be involved such as propositional
information (Pylyshin, 1973). Other processes than
internal representation can also be involved in these
tasks. Some of these could be the control processes post¬
ulated by Atkinson and Shiffrin (1968) which enable the
access, transfer and selective analysis of salient features
of information from memory. It is also possible that
other processes such as the "mental eye" proposed by Paivio
(1971) pl^y an important role in such tasks. Keconstruc-
tive aspects of memory have been observed in linguistic
tasks, which may not involve imagery (Smith, 1973). He-
construction in memory can be proposed in a large variety
of tasks involving the active retrieval and manipulation
of information from memory. The scope and application of
this concept may well include such phenomena as mental
transformation of various shapes (Shepard, 1975)» internal
psychophysics (Moyer, 19731 Paivio, 1971) and abstraction
(Bransford and Franks, 1971). In thi3 sense, the notion
of reconstruction may prove heuristically more fruitful
than alternative systems such as those postulated by Craik
and Lockhart (197k). G. Bower (1977) and others, since
these theoretical systems cannot fully account for the wide
variety of phenomena. Bartlett's notion of reconstruction
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has remained a less precise and specified system which,
in turn, gives rise to its general and appealing applic¬
ability. However, there is need for specification in
greater detail of the process and nature of the internal
representations which enable and guide the process of
reconstruction.
198.












Subjects made timed decisions concerning the size
of a visually presented circle relative to another one
shown five seconds earlier. The reaction time function
for correct LABG3B/SMALLSH responses was found to decrease
rapidly and linearly when the relative difference in
size between the circles increased from 17fi to 45$» This
function then became asymptotic for any greater difference
in size between the stimuli. The results are related to
an existing theory of visual memory involving the compari¬
son of visual images in memory (Shepardf 1975)* It is
concluded that the use of imagery in these tasks may be
restricted to discrimination involving fine grained
analysis of visual features of the stimuli. The implica¬
tions of this methodology to the study of the representa¬





Possibly one of the most active and representative
areas of research in cognitive psychology is the one
referring to how information i3 represented in memory.
The implications and results in this area promise to
alter radically the way that psychological research is
conducted. One of the most wellknown forms of this
problem is the discussion about how information is coded.
There are two main positions, One is the position involving
imagery which argues that visual imagery is the way in
which the information is codified and that this codification
is special and modality specific. The other position
states that codification is an abstract propositional
format. Between the two is a series of alternatives (e.g.
Pylyshyn, 1973; Paivic, 1971; Heed, 1974; For a review
see Anderson, 1978).
It would be interesting to develop more knowledge
concerning the difficult problem of how information is
coded without having to play the game of taking up one
position and treating the other as if it were completely
wrong. The History of Psychology is full of such sterile
approaches which lend in most cases to the conclusion that
both are partially true (e.g. Restle, 1965). This is
perhaps the consequence of the rather limited logic
employed (Kvale, 1975)•
Anderson (1978), has clearly described the limits of
such an approach when applied to the problem of the
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codification of information. He says that language
limitations play s a very important part as a source of
argument. For instance, the concept of image has been
used in one way or another as similar to a picture. This
metaphor, however does not say much about the process.
Another concept which causes confusion according to
Anderson, is the one of propositional format, (which in
some cases is equivalent to a verbal format). This con¬
cept has not been clearlydefined and is different from the
concept of proposition used in logic, which implies that
it is abstract, has a truth value and rules of formation.
Anderson (1978) also suggests that the validity of any of
these positions (or one stating that both are true),
depends on the postulated processes which are going to
take place for manipulating representations. He considers
that a representation must be considered to be an operative
system, or as he puts it: "... We cannot test representa¬
tions but representation-process pairs"• He suggests
that representations are strongly influenced by the task
demands and that it is possible to find certain tasks which
involve the translation from one code to another (e.g.
Paivio, 1975)* Anderson states that it i3 not possible
to distinguish imaginal and propositional representations
strictly on the basis of behavioural data. The experimen¬
tal support for imaginal propositions is full of indirect
data such as introspective reports and the imagery value
of words. These imagery values of words serve to predict
performance accurately, (e.g. Paivio, 1971). The scarce
direct evidence in favour of imaginal propositions comes
from Shepard et al (1978) who are mentioned later on. An
interesting conclusion that Anderson (1978) draws from his
study is that "... barring decisive physiological data, it
will not be possible to establish whether an internal
representation i3 pictorial or propositional". The re¬
action to this conclusion, and the data presented by the
author is going to be determined by what emphasis we
attach to the study of the physiological (biological?)
basis of the processes. Thi3 should not be confused with
reductionism where the explanation given i3 at a different
level.
It is important to examine more closely an important
point made in Anderson's paper, viz. that "...There are a
number of reactions to the possibility that we
may not be able to identify the nature of the
information representation. Frequent among my
colleagues are disbelief and dismay - this would
imply that cognitive psychology is not possible.
However, I think the implication of this possi¬
bility is not that cognitive psychology should
be abandoned; rather it should undergo a slight
change. Our goal should be to develop some
model capable of accounting for human intelli¬
gence, that is, predicting behaviour in a wide
variety of situations where human intelligence
is manifested. The fact that the model may be
indistinguishable scientifically from other quite
different models need not be a source of unaappi-
ness. In fact, it is possible to take comfort
in such equivalences. If a particular model is
equivalent to many other models, we can be more
confident in its basic truth" • As can be
appreciated, Anderson suggests that the problem is not in
the discussion "per se" but in the problem of representation.
Nowadays, this problem and mainly the possibility of repre¬
sentation, is based on the methaphor of "Images", which is
not a very well defined concept.
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If somebody really wants to contribute to the solu¬
tion of the problem of representation, he can follow one of
two groups of alternatives. The first consists in
extending the problem and including more phenomena and
different experiments. The second consists in analysing
the limits of the interpretations about codification of
information and representation, such as images, or propo-
sitional formats, not taking too much into account.
A concrete example of the first option is given by
the studies of cros3-modal functions, (For a review see
Freides 1973 and Marks 1975)• la these, evidence is given
about the interaction of information coming from different
senses for animals as well as for children and adults.
The work presented below emphasises the second
approach. We examine the limitations of the image meta¬
phor and study how images interact with other processes.
let us accept that an objective study of imager is
possible. The effects due to imagery may take the form
of facilitation, disruption or delay in the execution of a
particular behaviour. One, or several, of these effects
can be a regular feature of the data and their study can
enable useful inferences about internal representation.
Influential studies such as those of Bower (1972)
and Paivio (1971) have demonstrated the functional signifi¬
cance of imagery. In a typical experiment of this kind
subjects are asked to give their ratings from 1-10 to
indicate the extent to which words read to them produced
an image. Afterwards tueir ratings were used to predict
i/
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their performance in an experiment on memory. It was
found that the higher the ratings of imagery the "better
the subjects performed on the memory task.
Some evidence concerning the modality of coded form
of internal representations in memory is now available.
In these experiments the subjects are asked to use in one
way or another an image, which they have to compare to a
picture presented by the experimenter (uegal and Fusella,
1970; Segal and Gordon, 1969). In some cases the task
consists in saying if the image is the same or different
(Posner, 1969; Posner et al, 1969)» in other cases the
subjects have to indicate if the image has certain charac¬
teristics (Brocks 1968).
In a recent series of reaction time studies, Shepard
and his collaborators have obtained evidence concerning
not only the internal structure inherent in visual images
of various shapes, but also provided insight into the nature
of the mental operations that subjects carry out on these
representations in order to reduce uncertainty about them
(Cooper, 1975; Cooper, 1973; Cooper and Shepard, 1973;
Shepard, 1975 and Shepard and Metzler, 1971). The origin
of internal psychophysics, a subject to which Fechner (l8bO)
gave much emphasis. Accordingly the work of Shepard and
his colleagues can be regarded as directly related to that
of Fechner. Anderson (1973) states that Shepard*s works
are "... one of the most influential phenomena uncovered
in recent research in cognitive psychology". Moyer,
(1973) another author who has worked on this problem also
uses the concept of internal psychophysics.
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One of the most representative studies of this kind
of work is that of Shepard and Metzler (1971)* Subjects
were shown pairs of drawings of perspective three-dimen¬
sional shapes and had to decide as quicxly as possible
whether the shapes were the same or mirror images of each
other. The reaction time for correct decisions was found
to increase linearly as a function of the angular differ¬
ence in orientation between the 3liapes. This linear
relationship has been obtained with sequential presentation
of normal and backward (mirror image) versions of alpha¬
numeric stimuli (Cooper and Shepard, 1973; Corballis,
Sbrodoff and Roldan 1976), and random outline shapes
(Cooper 1975} Cooper 1976).
Shepard (1975) and Cooper (Cooper and Shepard, 1973)
have carefully examined some theoretical implications of
this linear relationship between the reaction time and
angular difference in portrayed stimulus orientation. In
agreement with their subject's introspective accounts of
how they performed the task, they proposed that the visual
discrimination of shapes involves the mental comparison
of internal representations corresponding to the external
stimuli. This process is thought to be a rapid, parallel,
point-to-point, template-like comparison. The greater
angular difference in relative orientation, the longer it
takes the subject to mentally transform (rotate) one of the
shapes into congruence with the others. The process of
visual discrimination in this kind of experiment is thought
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to be due therefore, to an internal analog® of the
external process of template-like comparison (Sekuler and
Abrama, 1968).
It is possible that the linear relationship between
reaction-time and relative stimulus orientation is not
tied exclusively to orientation manipulations such as
those repox-ted by Shepard and Metzler (1971), and Cooper
and Shepard (1973), but may also be found to vary as a
function of the relative size between stimuli. Corcoran
and Sesncr (1975), reported that in a letter-matching task,
the reaction time to two physically identical letters
could be selectively increased by varying the relative
difference in size between the letters. Timed decisions
concerning the relative size of objects in memory have
also been found to vary linearly with size. For example,
Moyer (1973) asked subjects to judge as quickly as possible
the larger of two named objects and found that the larger
the difference in the actual size of the objects the more
quickly the judgement was made. Later, Paivio (1975)
extended Moyer's finding using visually portrayed represen¬
tations of the objects. Again, it seemed as if the
subjects in these tasks were mentally comparing internal
representations of the stimuli and responding on the basis
of a match-mismatch between these representations.
One of the major implications of an account of visual
discrimination which appeals to the mental comparison of
images corresponding to the external stimuli, is that
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analogue transofmration and template-like comparisons may
be the 'modus-operandi' of the brain in such discrimination.
The studies of Cooper and Shepard give evidence regarding
this issue. And Cooper (1975)» arguing against altern¬
ative interpretations of the result, has argued only
indirectly that mental rotation and comparison was the rule,
at least in the kind of task he examined. likewise, the
data given by Moyer (1973) does not provide sufficient
evidence to conclude that this is so. From his results,
it would appear that subjects were indeed making strategic
use of internal representations. Nevertheless, since
these reaction-time studies of imagery were not aimed
directly at investigating whether imagery is a necessary
stage in visual comparison, the issue remains unresolved.
Given the importance of the idea of images as a form of
internal representation, or as in experiment III where
metaphor of internal representation is used as a tool in
the generation of responses; it is necessary to extend
the analysis and the studies of Shepard et al (op.cit.) in
conditions in which the experiment does not have a ceiling
effect (that is limiting the possibilities of rotations
of images), in which possibly other strategies could be
found for the generation of responses.
In an attempt to determine whether visual imagery
alone is involved in discrimination of visually presented
3hapes, an experiment was conducted in which subjects made
timed decisions concerning the relative size of sequentially
presented oircles. A related aim of the experiment was
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to investigate a hitherto unexplored implication of visual
imagery in visual discrimination. Thi3 implication
concerns the assumed representational accuracy or fidelity
of visual images. Accordingly, discrimination must
depend on the fidelity or resolution of the image compared.
An index of such fidelity in representation may then be
ascertained from the minimal difference in the relative
size of the stimuli at which discrimination performance
does not differ from chance.
Method
Subjects: seven volunteer students of the University
without visual defects or glasses.
Stimuli: Seventeen outline oircles varying from
1.5-22.2 cm. in diameter in equal increments of 1.5 cm.
Procedure: The subject sat facing a 50 x 50 cm screen
at a distance of 2.5 metres. On a table in front of him
were two telegraph keys. The subject's task was to press
one of the keys if the second of two sequentially presented
outline circles was larger than the first of these, or the
other key if it was smaller in 3ize. The larger of the
two circles could appear as the first or second stimulus
with equal probability.
The subjects initiated each trial by pressing a
microswitch provided for this purpose. 3ach trial began
with a 5 second exposure of a circle followed by the
exposure of the illuminated screen for another 5 seconds
and finally, the second circle was presented for the same
period of time. Simultaneously with the onset of the
second stimulus an electronic timer was activated. The
timer was stopped and a measure of the time elapsed was
given when the subject pressed one of the two response
keys (see Fig.15 ). The reaction time (msec) as well as
the accuracy of the response were recorded. From the
set of 17 circles generated, 7 different groups of circle
pairs were chosen. In each of these groups the difference
in diameter between the pair of circles was always the
same. There were 6 such pairs in each group. For the
7 groups the difference in diameter between the circles
in each pair was 1.6, 3.2, 4.8, 6.4, 8.0, S»6 and 11.2 cm.
respectively. 3ach subject received a different series
of 10 block replications.
jtesults
Whenever the subjects responded "larger" when they
should have responded "smallei", the response was considered
an error and the reaction time was not included in the
analysis.
The mean of the reaction times for each group was
computed and subjected to analysis of variance. The
reaction time was found to decrease significantly as a
function of the difference in size between circles,
(F s 5.I6 P < 0.05), Closer post-hoc comparisons using
the Newman-Keules test revealed that this difference in the
mean reaction time was restricted to differences in diameter
3iza of 1.6, 3.2 and 4.8 cm. (See Fig. 16 ). The mean re¬
action time as a function of tae difference in diameter is
shown in Fig. 16 . The actual values of the mean reaction














Fig. 15: Sequence of events during the experiment.
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Fig. 16: Relation Between the Mean Reaction Time and the


















The results of tuis experiment indicate that reaction
time does not maintain a linear relation with the differ¬
ence in diameter of tne circles. rthere tne difference
in size between circles was small (1.6 cm), the subjects'
reaction time was very long and the accuracy of the
response was no different from chance. This result would
indicate that subjects were slow in responding because
they were unable to come to an appropriate decision con¬
cerning the relative size between the circles. Simultan¬
eous presentation of tne two circles at tue end of the
experiment revealed that the subjects could distinguish
their difference in size, whereas they could not do so in
the experiment when the interval between the presentation
of the circles was five seconds. This in turn suggests
that over a five second interval, the resolution of the
internal representation of the externally presented test
circle. tfhen tne difference in size between the circles
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was greater than 4.4- cm the relative difference in size
did not seem to affect the subjects response latencies.
This finding argues strongly against the notion that the
subjects in performing the task were comparing internal
representations of the circles, or internal estimates of
circle size. Rather, a comparison not implicating visual
imagery is indicated. For intermediate differences in
size of 1.6, 3»2 and 4.8 cm the ensuing reaction time
function can best be fitted by a straight line.
The results of this experiment could indicate that
perhaps the use of imagery in visual discrimination is
invoked by the requirements of discrimination. Where
discrimination entails a fine-grained analysis of the
stimuli the best strategy available to the subjects is to
generate visual images representing the stimuli and to
operate on these images as if they were internally avail¬
able for superimposition or point-to-point comparison.
Where discrimination can be achieved without detailed
analysis an appropriate decision seems to be reaohed on a
different kind of comparison process, perhaps not involving
directly the consoious visualization of the 3hape3. It
may be that the fine-grained or coarse level of analysis
distinction made here can be experimentally manipulated and
proved of great heuristic value in studying not only the
limited uses of imagery but also in providing evidence
concerning the fidelity of such representation of external
objects and events in memory.
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It could be proposed that the brain decides
selectively which type of representation system to use
in visual comparison. If the analogy between imagery
and the "mind's eye" is to hold, we could perhaps consider
both its "acuity" and when it is best for the brain to
keep it closed.
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B. OIHTLIAL JICCCCSIOIT OF II^ TCP1II: "J ACTION
" If the Lord Almi jhty Had
oonaulted me before embarking
upon the Creation; I should
have recommended something
simpler*1
King Alphonso X (The Wise)
of Castilla.
21b.
The main purpose of this discussion is to emphasize
which are the following, steps which can. be taken after
these experiments presented in this section. And at
the same timet study their possible conclusions and
aneralizations.
The first important point that mas to be indicated
is that the methodology used in the experiments is not
in any way special. On the contrary, it is standard and
easily found in any journal ouch as the Journal of
Experimental Psychology. It has all the defects and
qualities of any other method used nowadays. This
methodological point is important if it is considered in
relation to some of the problems studied, mainly about
Bartlett'a ideas and the ideas of human information
processing.
As has been mentioned in the section devoted to
reconstructive memory, this approach represents a diffext¬
ent alternative to standard memory research. This
alternative has had an important influence. However,
some of its more important aspects have been denied due
to lack of experimental support. The experiments in
support of this approach did not fulfil all the character¬
istics of control which nowadays are required. However,
wuen the experiments are done in the appropriate way, the
results indicate that some of the most important aspects
of this approach are valid.
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On the other hand, when striot methodologies are
used to study other phenomena which seem to have a mis-"
leading aasumption the results question traditional ideas.
In the experiments of iconic memory it is assumed that
letters are novel stimuli and it is assumed that with
themt the characteristics of memory and its trace can be
elucidated. According to the results reported here
letters are not novel stimuli and the classic conception
of iconic memory, of trace, and flow of information should
be revised.
From the results obtained in the experiment on rep¬
resentation it can be appreciated that tae results are not
as simple as they should be according to the proposal that
all the basic form of representation, and current proposal
concerning the information (e.g. Faivio 1973? Shepard,1978).
From a methodological and experimental point of view
it seems interesting to repeat these experiments and study
the affect of certain variables. Since these experiments
are about what in general terns can be called imagery, it
seems interesting to study this variable in more detail.
Mainly, in relation to the experiments III and IV (as in
Figueroa, et al 1974).
The effect of the time of presentation of the stimuli
in experiment should be studied in more detail. A para¬
metric study could give some interesting results about the
fidelity of the images.
The difference in the reaotion times in the experiment
as a function of the stimuli used, suggest an interesting
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area of work. It should be possible to plan a series
of experiments since it seems that the methodological tools
are enough to produce more results.
As can be appreciated the "modern" methodologies are
flexible enough to allow the study and to enrich (or
distort) our knowledge about memory phenomena, either using
" old" or " new" id eas.
At a different level of analysis, the implications
of these experiments can be studied in a more general way
and some indications about what to do next can be analysed.
With this broader aim in mind let us recapitulate the con¬
clusions of e&oh experiments
From experiments I and II we may conclude that novel
stimuli alter the characteristics of the trace. These
results suggest that experiments on iconic memory have
succumbed to a misleading assumption using known stimuli
in stiuations where it is assumed that the information is
yet to be learned. It is important to point out that
the results do not deny the existence of a trace, but
suggest that with letters it is possible to find iconic
memory whereas with novel stimuli the situation is differ¬
ent. If the memory trace is to be studied (which is
different from the trace left by the light or visual per¬
sistence) it is important to make sure that the information
is "novel", since it is not possible to study information
acquisition processes with information which is already
in the system. It is in tuis spirit that the findings
from studies of iconic memory should be interpreted (Dick,
1974) not as the first step in the flow of information,
but in terms of a comparison between the input and what
is stored. These studies could be suggested that are
referred to the way in which the information is 'activated',
which has complex relations with the time of presentation
of the cues.
If it is true that the processes of manipulation of
information are a function of novelty of the stimuli, a
great deal of the ideas used nowadays have to be reform¬
ulated, (e.g. 0. Bower, 1977, 3hiffrin,1977? Murdock, 1977
and Glanzer, 1977). Mainly, in relation to the idea of
trace and stages of information processing. One of the
moat important implications of this study is the need to
study the processes of acquisition of information and to
distinguish between acquisition of information and reorgan¬
isation of what has already been acquired. With this in
mind it would be interesting to study the acquisition of
information in babies and children. But in those studies
using adults, it should be kept in mind that novel stimuli
may be an important variable to consider. It is possible
to consider that in adults there are sophisticated forms
by which the information is used and manipulated, and that
in a certain way this information is based on a series of
basic components. Maybe one of the most important aspects
is the acquisition and regulation of new combinations of
elements inside the total information already acquired.
An illustrative example of this problem is the automatic
translation from one language to another.
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It ia assumed that the problem consists in having some¬
thing similar to a dictionary of relation between words
and some grammatical rules. However, it seems that
translating from one language to another requires something
more general which can only be described as knowledge of
the language. This situation can be paraphrased in the
following form: in order to translate (analyse) from one
language to another (stimuli) it is necessary to know the
whole language (inform&tion).
A great deal of research has put more emphasis on for¬
getting and its different characteristics. In these
situations it ia also possible to suggest that what has
been forgotten is only part of the information given to the
subject. For instance, in the curves presented by
Scbinghaus, (1685) it can be observed that subjects forgot
the combinations of letters which had been read to them,
but not the letters taemselves. This is important to
analyse carefully since it may be relevant for a theory of
memory.
From experiment III it is possible to conclude that
if some of Bartlett's iaeaa are formulated in a more specific
way, it is possible to develop experimental hypotheses
which can be examined in detail. It is possible to see
that the subjects can bring past information to the present
and oan generate something which could be called an
" image" in order to give an answer. It is possible to
suggest that this process is the process of reconstruction
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mentioned by Bartlett, that is different to the simple
memorization or to the process of abstraction. The
suggestion that this is an active process is based on a
comparison between the control and the experimental condi¬
tions. In the control condition subjects had to count
the elements of the stimuli presented. This counting
took a certain time which was correlated with the number
of events. In a similar way comparing times it oould be
said that in the experimental condition the subjects do
something similar to direct counting, but using represent¬
ation of events, possibly in the form of an image.
This experimental situation suggests something similar
to what other verbal reports suggest. Artists and
scientists when giving accounts of how they solved a partic¬
ular problem "in their minds", point towards a similar
situation of reconstruction (e.g. Koestler, 1964). As
has already been pointed out, reconstruction does not
necessarily have to be visual, it can also be verbal (e.g.
Smith, 1973).
If it is true that a process of reconstruction exists,
it is possible to suggest that subjects in an active way
manipulate information and generate "new" information which
in turn oan be stored. This aspect of generation of
information is very important since it is possible to
suggest a relation between this process and what in general
terms is called problem solving. An extension to the
prooleai of reconstruction refers then to the alteration of
the information which the subjects can do, which can be
222.
conscious that is the subjects can be aware of the changes.
The direction and form of this change can be determined
by different factors. Some data and experiments in this
direction are found in £vale*s work (1974). The origins
of this problem can be found in the ideas of the gestaltist
psychologists (e.g. Xoffka, 1935) about the reorganisation
of the perceptual field. The study of the subjects*
knowledge (memory bank) is an interesting problem, mainly
in relation to how this knowledge is altered, without the
direct participation of learning (in the sense of acquisition).
This point of view leads us to the question to what extent
is memory permanent? This poses an experimental problem
since, in order to obtain an answer, a great deal of
technical and experimental developments have to take place.
Some of the elements to examine this question are available
maybe more than any thing else, what is needed is a special
interest in posing this kind of problem and attempting to
search for an answer by experiment. Maybe the task is not
as difficult as it seems at first since the "methodology"
ia there and there are some ideas which can serve as a
guide, such as the ideas of schemata, reconstructive memory,
processes of motive modification of information, and so on.
In the experiment IV reference was made to the problem
of representation in general and in particular to the
limits of the manipulation of information with images. If
in the experiment III images were mentioned in relation to
reconstructive memory, this does not imply that the metaphor
is accepted as such in an absolute way. The idea of an
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internal picture and one "internal eye" (e.g. Paivio,
1975? Shepard, 1978) ia maybe too wide as a simple
explanation.
The most important result from this experiment ia the
no linearity between the stimuli and the reaction time.
This can suggest the participation of another process in
the generation of responses when the difference between
the stimuli is big, (automatic response). In the same way
when the difference between the stimuli is very 3mall, the
reaction time and the amount of mistakes are very big
(limits in the image). As was mentioned in the introduction
to this experiment, one of the best strategies at the
moment, is to study this representation in combination with
other processes. For instance, it could be proposed that
a process of comparison takes place in imagery in which it
is important to emphasise that images seem to have a limit
in their existence as a representation of stimuli. It
seems that images (in this experiment) are analogues of
the external event, but do not have very good fidelity,
since subjects are oapable of distinguishing between the
two stimuli when presented together, but are unable to do
so if the stimuli are presented with a short interval in
between each other. The possibility tnat the subjects had
used two or more different processes during this task
suggests the importance of studying these processes.
Already other authors have pointed out the limits of the
images in a point to point relation (e.g. Anderson 1978).
These reports agree with the results obtained in this
experiment.
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Each, of the experiments reported in this section are
directed towards solving a hypothesis and are related to
different processes and operations in memory. 3aoh experi¬
ment (and related hypothesis) has independent life and forms
part of a series of a wide theoretical and experimental
study. In chapter II several problems facing the
psychology of memory were analysed. In this experimental
section an example has been given of how to tackle some
of these problems, with the intention of searching for an
experimental solution. It could be said that if any other
problem in the study of memory is analysed in this way, in
one way or another interesting data is going to be obtained.
This task of tackling problems in an experimental way is
very important and must not stop, since it i3 the one that
gives life to research.
However, it is important to point out that together
with research there must be an effort directed towards
trying to put some order and give meaning to the data
obtained, mainly if the experiments are considered as
symptomatic of the need to widen and strengthen our ideas
about memory. For this reason, in the next chapter, an
effort will be made to present, in a unified way, suggestions
which can be derived from the experiments reported in the
experimental section.
Obviously from a few experiments a new explanation
of memory cannot be derived nor to say the conclusion that
the present explanations are wrong or limited. However,
it is possible to try to give soms general conclusions.
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The first possible suggestion refers to the way in
which information processing takes place. The idea of
flow of information from iconic memory to short-term
memory and then to long-term memory, cannot be taken in a
literal sense. It is neceasary to study this problem of
how does iconic memory work. To do an intensive study
with new information, with non-familiar stimuli. It is
necessary to analyse carefully which are the interactions
between what is stored and what is entering the system.
If this interaction is to hold, (as has been supposed for
many years), then it is necessary to give a more active
roll to the stored information and not only to regard it
as a box full of material.
It is also possible to suggest that the ideas of
Bsrtlett, instead of being regarded as M classic?1 can be
used and extended with modem teciiniq.uas. It is possible
to do experiments with the most creative and active aspects
of memory. This does not imply that one approach should
be substituted by the other. Unfortunately, Bartlett's
point of view has not had the developments of other
approaches. What can be done is to try to expand and
develop the point of view of the active memory together
with the great deal of knowledge accumulated, considering
it from the passive point of view.
Another aspect whioh can be suggested from the experi¬
ments presented in tuis experimental section, intimately-
related to the previous one is that if memory is considered
as having reconstructive aspects, it could be related to
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intelligence and creativity. As it is indicated in some
isolated experiments, and in a great deal of other every
day life situations, the idea of reconstructions does not
seem to be mistaken, therefore, it could be suggested that
it could serve as a powerful tool in the development of
our knowledge about intelligence and creativity.
If memory is something more than a phenomenon observed
in the laboratory it could possibly be related to more
important material than nonsense syllable or associated
pairs and is really related to humans in a real world.
If this is true, the functions of memory are something
more than a store of information.
An important aspect is that in all these experiments,
and in many others reported in the literature, there are
indications of processes which are altering, moving, and
modifying information, which should be incorporated in a
more direct way in the models of memory. The processes
that can be used or postulated mu3t be very important
characteristics, must not be considered as fixed mechanisms,
but as mechanisms dependent on the information as well as
on the task to be performed. Po33ibly, several mecuanisms
are activated at the same time.
Another fundamental aspect is the need of taking the
problem of internal representation with all the possible
means and not to try prematurely to give the simplest
explanation. If somebody tried to collect what is known
at the moment about representation using data dispersed in
the psychological literature, it would possibly present a
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similar report to the one given recently by Defeudi3 and
Sefeudis, (1977), when reviewing naurophysiological
literature about codification and representation of
information in the brain. The authors described a great
deal of variables affecting the state of the neurophysi-
ological system of codification and derive different
levels in whioh several behavioural aspects may be partially
codified. In short they give a review waich describes
multiple types of codes whose value is undeniable and
avoid premature discussions.
The problem of representation as an explicit problem
to be solved« ha3 been in existence for relatively few
years and the possible difficulties in trying to give some
answer are only beginning to appear. This is why it is
necessary to be careful when proposing solutions or models
of representation.
In conclusion, the experiments reported in this section,
give data whioh are of interest to memory research. These
experiments no doubt need to be expanded and related to
other significant variables. At the same time these
experiments give some indication of the limitations of the
possibilities of the present models of memory.
Without denying the need for mora experiments, it
could be considered that the next step should be to try to
study which are the theoretical aspects which need to be
developed in order to give direction by research. There
are no rules to say which 3hould be the next step? actually
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to suggest which of two alternatives should be followed,
is a problem of personal ohoioe. Following the theo¬
retical approach, with an emphasis on the integration of
knowledge, some of the possible ways of developing and
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"..... Thar® is no 'scientific method?
Thar® is no single procedure! or set of
Hules that underlies every piece of
Research and guarantees that it is
•Scientific' and thereforet trustworthy.
3very projecti every theoryt every
Procedure has to be judged on its own
Merits and by standards adapted to the
Processes with which it deals.1'
P. Feyerbend
1978
" Round f like a oirole in a spiral
Like a wheel within a wheel
Never ending or beginning




In previous chapters evidence was given concerning
the limits of some memory models, as well as data which
suggests modification of current ideas about the way in
waioh memory operates. The reasons for suggesting a
modification or extension of models of memory is not
restrioted to the experimental data presented here. For
example there is a large amount of data about different
phenomena, which simply repeats or modifies older experi¬
ments such as data contained in Baddley (197b). The
Impression obtained from reading this book is that the
search for new data is not systematic and not directed by
models or theories; it seems like a random beaaviour.
As its author points out " ... we lose track of what we
have already accomplished and simply go round in circles
discovering and rediscovering the same phenomena."
Another x'aason for suggesting a change in current
models of memory is that in contemporary research there is
clear evidence of certain processes of manipulation of
information which however have not been incorporated into
the models of memory. such processes are for example
the high speed-scanning described by Stenbarg (1975) or
the phenomena of visual matching studied by Posner (1973).
On the other aand there are other very impox-tant phenomena
that ware studied many years ago which, possibly because
they suggested another model of memory, have not been
studied in more detail. Representative phenomena of this
kind are the ones involving reminiscence studied by
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Ballard (1913)t which have been replicated and extended
by 1k*delyi and Kleinbard (1978). The main idea of theae
studies is that, after learning there is a period in which
performance is increased and then forgetfulness takes
place. Since this idea is different from others proposed
which do not mention forgetfulness, it has not been incor¬
porated into the present models of memory.
An interesting situation is that these present models,
(e.g. G. Bowerf 1977) in most cases are too restricted and
cannot interpret or describe the richness of the problems
of memory. 3ven more importantly, if everyday life situ¬
ations are taken into account, or if classic philosophical
problems are emphasized, these models become very limited.
Given the present state of research, it is better to
propose general views instead of precise, specific theories.
A way of supporting this point of view is to use what is
called " cognitive psychology*', which is the alternative to
behavioural psychology. It should be possible to study
the research of memory as a particular case of cognitive
psychology and try to process characteristics of a cogni-
tivist conceptual structure of thi3 area of research.
As was described in chapter II, some of the works
which have been considered part of oognitive psychology
are influenced by methodologies, concepts and explanations
used in behavioural psychology. A concrete case is given
by Anderson and 3ower,(1973) who deny the importance of
Bartlett-Neisser reconstructive hypothesis is a workable
idea; <#3ut why should anyone favour it over the reappearing
trace hypothesis?•*'
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It should be possible to propose a cognitivi3t
conceptual structure, which could be applied and used in
memory research. This task is not easy. For one thing
thi3 new structure or framework will have to be compared
to the structure of the behavioural psychology which is
very well elaborated and developed. Unfortunately, there
is a lack of a clear statement of the cognitive point of
view. The specific suggestion herein is that instead of
patching together a theory of memory, it is better to
suggest a g0nerax conceptual structure which can serve as
a guide to research. Instead of giving a definition of
a conceptual structure it is best to give an example and
in this way demonstrate which are the most important
characteristics of this kind of methodological tool.
1. Sample of a Conceptual Frame.?ark» jfcbin^haus' >.ork
Let us take an example, Sbbinghaus' work (Idol?) and
deaoribe the structural framework which he used in nis
research on memory. it is possible that the ooaceptual
structure used in research has great importance nowadays,
as has been pointed out by Crowder (137c).
The first important aspect in TLbinghaus1 work is the
supposition that "all" aspects of memory are being studied,
as he put its "... The term memory is to be taken here in
its Qroadest sense including learning, retention, associ¬
ation and reproduction." he considered that all mental
3tates suoh as ideas, sensations, or feelings waioh at a
certain time are in tue conscious and later disappear,
have not ceased to exist or have bean destroyed but in a
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certain manner they continue existing, stored up, ao to
speak, in memory, and can appear or disappear either
voluntarily or unvoluntarily. large individual differ¬
ences were proposed, in the way in which memory contents
are reproduced as well as how the process takes place,
several factors affected retention and reproduction,
according to Sibinguaus, like attention and interest? but
the most iiaportant factor in fox^eting was time. One of
the moat important aspects in his studies on aeaory was
the use of aethoda from natural sciences and the description
of the results in numerical form. This methodology
opposed introspective and qualitative analysis. On this
approach to memory, tne stimuli had to be simple and con¬
stant • This is why for some of his experiments dbbinghaua
used and developed nonsense syllables. The most important
method he used was counting how many times it was necessary
to read the stimuli in order to obtain complete learning,
that is, the generation of responses without mistakes. A
particular form of this method consisted in counting how
many repetitions were necessary to obtain the same perform¬
ance after a certain period of time had elapsed after the
original learning, (saving method, " ersparnismethode" ).
Besides the detailed methodological considerations of
constant ruythm in reading,, rest periods and forms of
pronounci&tion, it was considered that the most important
variable to control, because of its negative effects, was
the meaning ox the material and to avoid all kinds of
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mnemotechniques. The most important variables to study
were rapidity or learning of syllables as function of
their length or as a function of repetition.
As a result of his studies, ISbbinghaus described
curves of forgetting and attempted an explanation of for¬
getting. He postulated that it was due to either inter¬
ference of new learning, or due to decay with time. His
results discussed the concepts of association and found
some data related to remote associations.
This conceptual structure includes methodological
restrictions, recommendations of the kind of analysis
required (mathematical), kind of data to be collected,
variables which are necessary to study (although he did
cot study all of them), clear recommendations about how to
avoid the influence of external variables (meaning and
anemotechniques) as well as concrete results and some
explanations. A conceptual structure contains some
methodological aspects, some implications and some data.
It is distinguished from a theory because a theory does not
contain methodological recommendations and supportive data
13 not part of & theory proper. The conceptual structure
used by Ibblnghaus (1885) is not described in an explicit
form in his book, but his data and conceptual structure
were used, extended and criticised for many years after the
book's appearance.
Boring (1950) described the impact of 3bbinghaus'
ideas on experimental psychology and pointed out something
very important? that the conceptual structure of the (1885)
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book of memory is different from the one given later by
Tbbinghaus in 1905. This latter account nas an inter¬
mediate 3tep between the atomism of his book of aemory and
the future Gestalt psychology. This aspect of change and
evolution of a conceptual structure in the study of memory
ia interesting since, as Brow and Beffenbacher (1975)
remark, 25uiller and other researchers of the time greatly
developed 3bbingh&us1 approach, but their work has not been
evaluated, and i3 rarely appreciated nowadays.
This example indiaatea the most important character¬
istics of a conceptual structure: the interest in general
problems, methodological suggestions, emphasis on the
important variables to study, interpretations of some
phenomena, indication of which are the variables to control
in order to avoid misleading interpretations, and so on.
One of the most important aspeots in an evaluation of this
kind of theoretical structure, is how useful it is as a
guide of research. It is difficult to deny that in this
particular case, Sbbinghaus* ideas are still in use.
Nowadays there are other theoretical structures, such
as the ones presented by Neisaer (19b7) on in G. Bower (1977),
which are used more than Bbbinghaua* and which represent
new alternatives. This does not prove, however, that
Tfobinghaus* theoretical structure is wrong or that it should
be supplanted by another one. This would he an overly
simplistic way of seeing and developing research. What
actually seems to happen is that other general forms of
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studying oertain problems develop without necessarily
considering the other approaches to be mistaken. Deciding
between theoretical structures is a very important
scientific task, and must not be confused with the experi¬
mental test of the theory itself.
B. PROPOSITION OF A CONCEPTUAL STRUCTURE
Before describing a conceptual structure for the
study of certain memory phanoaiena, 3oae forms and problems
of evaluation of this oonceptual structure will be analysed.
1. The Problem of Evaluation
The first way to evaluate a conceptual structure is
at a limited level, laainly related to experimental data.
Referring to the conceptual framework of the experimental
section presented here, the data suggests that there should
be some changes in the present models, mainly to theories
such as the one proposed by Atkinson (1974) described in
chapter I. In particular changes should be made in the
way in waich iconic memory and phenomena of reconstruction
are interpreted.
Another way to evaluate this conceptual structure is
to interpret and study the problems and data discussed in
Chapter III. Atkinson's theory does not seem to have the
necessary power to explain most of the set problems. This
in no way indicates that his theory is wrong, but suggests
that it is limited in the range of phenomena it can encompass.
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Independently of how much knowledge one ha3 about
the problems mentioned, their simple specification serves
as a guide for evaluating theories. *or it is possible
to take two or three problems and examine the explanations
given to thorn by certain theories. Of course, in some
cases a theory will be limited and not cover such problems
simultaneously. This would motivate further tneoretical
development, and, perhaps if it were done more often, there
would be more attempts to develop and expand theories.
There is another way to evaluate a conceptual frame-
work, which is to see if it is useful as a tool to generate
experiments and hypotheses. This is perhaps the most
attractive form of evaluation, but has a number of dangers
and difficulties. The first danger is to consider the
conceptual framework as recipes that indicate step by step
what an experimenter should do. This problem applies not
only to the case of conceptual frameworks, but to theories
of all kinds, from specific and restricted to 0eneral and
powerful. Conceptual frameworks are not algorithms but
heuristic tool3.
The problem of considering a conceptual framework
only as a tool to generate experiments is illustrated in
the theory of Hull (1943). As Eilg&rd and 3ower (1975)
stated, it was the most influential of the theories between
1930 and 1950, judging from the experimental and theoretical
studies engendered by it, whether in its defence, its
amendment or its refutation. However, the evaluation by
Koch (1954) of the work and research of Hull concluded that
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all that effort wa^ sterile and a complete waste of time.
In this example, the amount of research done within the
general conceptual framework cannot be considered as a
useful criterion in the evaluation of the theory. There¬
fore, the evaluation based on the generation of experiments
has to be used very carefully.
Another form of evaluating a conceptual structure
would be to study how clear it is, making the •' Zeitgeist"
explicit, mainly when it is changing. It might then be
possible to evaluate how much a conceptual structure can
help in the specification of elements of future theories.
Taking into account these difficulties in the way of
evaluating the conceptual structure, let us describe a
conceptual structure for the study of certain memory
phenomena. The first aspect that will be stressed are
the assumptions, then the methodological recommendations
and finally the most important aspects of a possible con¬
ceptual. structure, will be described.
2. Assumptions
(1) The first and most important of all assumptions
is that only if tne range of problems that the conceptual
structure covers is wide, along with its explanation, will
there be comprehensive theories in the future. In talking
about extensions of the range, general situations of
reuearcn should be emphasized, mainly the formulation of
problems directly related to everyday life. For this
reason, the need to study, e.g. the participation of memory
in dreams seem important, as has already been mentioned.
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Or the involvement of memory in solving problems, and so
on. Some authors call this characteristic of research,
ecological validity, (e.g. Heis3ar, 1976). When everyday
life situations are used it is necessary to be careful not
to confuse the experimental situation with the experimental
problem. For instance, the study of reading, is a general
problem, which should not be confused with a situation of
reading a certain language. This is a clear example of
how many authors have postulated mechanisms and explanations
(e.g. about reading) which are not general hypotheses, but
specific to the experimental situations used. And when
the same explanations are u.;ed in other experimental situ¬
ations the results are different and the explanations do
not apply, (e.g. Tzeng et al, 1977). For this reason,
posing a problem for investigation has to be done with care.
If the stimuli used by the subjects is analysed the
ooncept of extension of range beoomes clear to illustrate.
.Ivery time "more complex" material is given to the subjects
to memorize, different results are obtained which cannot
be explained with the applanations given to the results
obtained with "less complex" material, (e.g. Floras et al
1970? Jenkins, 1963, 1977).
Summarizing, the concept of extension of the range has
to be used in different contexts referring to* (A) the
material or stimuli U3ed, (3) the methodologies and (C) the
problems. On the other hand the extension of the con¬
ceptual range of theories increases the possibility of
explaining more phenomena. This concept will become clearer
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in the discussion below of the functions of memory, where
it will be employed.
(k) A second assumption refers to the relations
between a payonoiogicui anu a neuropsychological view of
memory research* The prooiem here is tuat tnere are two
disciplines studying the same subject from different points
of view, which produces a confiiot tuat can not be solved
by one approach triumphing over the other, but only by co¬
operation between botu disciplines* A possible way in
whiou iuis co-operation could take place could be trying to
relate the prooesses and phenomena studies in tne two
disciplines by a briuge theory* An example of this is
found in hull's theory of learning which tries to relate
learning to the theory of personality of fraud, (e.g. Jollrrd
and filler 19bO)* however, the present possibilities of
this kind of relation are scarce, basically due to the
limits of anowled&e in both disciplines* However something
that must ue done is to emphasize and recognize this situ¬
ation and to be alert to any possibility of relating these
areas of Knowledge, in order to avoid the temptations of
giving explanations cased on physical processes of doubtful
nature as with some of tne explanations given in artificial
intelligence*
relating tnis point to the present work, if experiments
1 and II suggest limits to tne concept of trace* This
does not mean that the whole idea of trace is wrong. The
problem lies in that tue idea of trace used is simple and
it will be necessary to give a more sopuisticated version
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In order to understand the biological basis of memory.
As was suggested by Jefeudis and Dofsudis, (1977) the
"codes* represent information in the brain are varied and
span a whole range: from changes that could take place in
the size of the neurons to possible changes in the mole¬
cular structure of the transmitters. These kind of ideas
about the memory trace are only the beginning of tne system¬
atic 3tudy of representations from a neurophysiolo^ical
point of view, and differ from the simple classical idea
of trace.
(3) A third assumption presents certain prooferns, in
relation to tne kind of concepts used, and now are they
used in memory theory. bince psychology constantly usee
concepts from other disciplines, it is necessary to assume
that these concepts are t&xen in a wide and general sense
and not in a strict and specific sense. ifor instance, the
ooncepts of " information" , " process" ," code" and so on, have
exact definitions in the disciplines where they originate,
but in psychology are only tools. lor instance the con¬
cept of "coue" depends on the physical characteristics of
tne code mentioned in particular, as well as on the process
of codification and decodification. At the moment, in
psychology, it can only be supposed that tuere are codes
in the brain. however, the nature of the processes
involved are not known. Their existence is postulated as
a possible metaphor.
One of tne healtuiest afreets of cognitive psychology
is tue liberation from the operationiism which attempted
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to define all the concepts used. It is possible to
suppose thnt more flexibility in the use of concepts can
facilitate the construction of aodel3 and theories. For
example, nowadays, the concept of information is used with
great flexibility, not relating it to the mathematical
formalism involved (e.g. Baddley, 1976? BJork, 1970;
Fodor, 1975).
(4) An assumption which it should not be necessary
to make clear is the relevance of tna developmental
psychology of memory capacities. But it seems that with
the exception of riaget and Innelder, (1973) most models
do not pay attention to development an important faotor,
(e.gi. Norman, 1976; Postman, 1973; shiffrin and Atkinson,
li»w9? wiokel^reu, 1977). Xhere are many forms of develop¬
ment, illustrated in the experimental work of I. Bower
(1977). This author found tnat certain abilities appear
and then disappear in development, or tnat a process has
an affect on lateral processes and not linearly. he also
observed that the transition from >ne sta^e to the other
is sometimes gradual and some times very ^uick. In a few
words, the concept of development is very important,
complex interactions between different processes including
memory have been demonstrated in children. Peruaps the
lack of a oiear idea asout txe development of memory
processes, is due to the lack of a general theory of
development.
If t^e mo-els of memory available at the moment, are
taxen in a general sense, for instance the ones described
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in G. Bower (1977) or "orman, (197 j)» it could be con¬
sidered that from t ..e moment of birth, humans are equipped
with different mechanisms, and, that memory processes have
only tenuous relations with biological phenomena. This
is a clear example of non-attempted dualism, possibly due
to a lack of clear description of the assumptions of the
theory. Of course, most authors would dsny that their
models can be Interpreted as dualistic.
On the other hand Kvale, (1974), Ileigal, (1972) and
Hose and Hose, (1974) have indicated that a static point of
view about many different psychological phenomena i3 due
to the ideolo ;ical structure of Anglo-American research that
emphasizes isolated problems and the existence of immutable
elements, which have to be studied separately. These
authors are especially critical about the study of develop¬
ment and change of memory.
In summarising, the most important assumptions
necessary for the elaboration of a conceptual structure to
guide research in memory aret
(1) Only if one tries to expand the range of problems
covered by the conceptual structure, will future
theories be general enougu to explain a significant
variety of phenomena, inoluding those of everyday life.
That is, it is necessary to have a tendency towards
generalization of methods, procedures and explanations.
(2) Because there are other disciplines trying to
explain the same phenomena studid in the psychology
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of it la useful to raoommend, whenever
possible, to give compatible explanations uetween
areas of knowledge, mainly in relation to neuro-
puysiology. Besides, a number of phenomena (not
all) have biological ba~.es, and it is necessary to
ba careful in order to avoid dualist explanations.
Perhaps in tue future a more direct relation with
neuropu/aioioop will be possible.
(3) More flexibility in the use of the concepts is
needed, since a number of them originate in other
disciplines and when used in psychology only part of
their original meaning is maintained. Therefore it
cannot be expected that a concept has to be defined
in psychology in the same way as in the area from
which it originates. On the other hand not all con¬
cepts have to be borrowed from other areas, completely
new concepts can be created in psychology.
(4) Memory phenomena develop in different ways, and
therefore it is necessary to pay attention to phenomena
of change. without restricting the changes to tnose
of a biological nature.
The limits and difficulties of tne present theories
lay precisely in taeir assumptions, and especially in those
which are not explicit.
3. Methodological Conoiderations
One of the forms in which a conceptual structure can
be very useful is in the methodological sense, since it
a*.-.
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&ives some explanation- of "now' to obtain information,
mbbinghau-' conceptual structure ^ives «oie indication of
the methods to be u^ad in this area of research. It is
important to remember the difficulties described by
Tbbinghaus, (X8Sb)» ha stated that!
"1 - The constant flux and caprice of mental events
do not admit of the establishment of stable experimental
conditions.
2 - Psychological processes oner no means for measure¬
ment or enumeration."
3>bin&haua suggested also that only in a partial way is it
possible to solve these problems in memory research.
A researcher in the field of memory, has to bear in
mind these difficulties, since his task is to overcome the
difficulties and not as had happened in the past, to continue
using the methods of Tbbinghaus, without considering their
limitations and with only a very few changes, (e.g. Kausler,
1974). It is important to emphasize the limits described
by Sbbiaghaus himself, and it is necessary to improve the
methodology available.
The first methodological problem refers to how much
is it really possible to study the acquisition or learning
in a "pure" form without the interference of biological
variables and phenomena of development and previous learning.
A possible solution was the one given by the behavioural
school on one uand, and on the other by Pavlov, who reached
the conclusion that only if learning is studied in animals
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will it be possible to "discover" the principles and laws
governing learning without the influence of certain compli¬
cations, such b 3 language. A clear example is Hull (1943)
who tried to study learning laws and other phenomena in
animals. Nowadays it is considered that even this alter¬
native is limited since the phenomena considered as proto¬
type of learning, classical and instrumental learning, are
themselves influenced by biological factors.
One of the best methodological alternatives for
studying "pure" memory is to investigate the development
of memory. For example, T. Bower (1977) found clear
examples of complexity of memory in infants. Howevert it
has often been thought that the "most important" variable
in the acquisition of new material is the information
already present in. the system. This proposition was made
explicit by Ebbinghaus and part of his methodology emphasized
the control of the effects of meaning and past information.
Even nowadays, this is considered the most important
variable that has to be controlled. Experimental evidence
in support of this proposition is given in the works of
Wallace et al (1957) who instructed the subjects to use as
much past information as possible, in a paired associated
task. His results were different from those obtained in
conditions where past information was controlled as much
as possible.
A change in the way in wuich .eaory phenomena are
conceived, giving emphasis to the use of acquired inform¬
ation, can lead to a number of new and interesting results.
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This Ouan&e in Sue interpretation 01 memory, from a con-
caption ox a passive wniah oolp receives information
aau stores it, to the notion oi a uyugem ..hicn receives,
searon.ee, relates, ana modifies information as tue result
oi comparison, witu stores information, is a theoretical
and matuod©logical step that it is necessary to take*
uesiues enquiring asout tue specs, amount or character*
istios oi t.*e stimuli presented, one should ask (ana control)
wuat iuj.oriScA.lion uoes tue subject ali-e&d^ save, which will
facilitate or limit the acquisition of the information or
stimuli being uses in an experimental situation* There
are ways of studying past information which can be found
using " new" stimuli, compsrin& the results with those
obtained in experiments using non^enua syllables or another
kins of verbal material familiar to the subject. Examples
of novel material are found in the figures designed by
Vandarplas and uarvin (1999) and in the stimuli used by
Garner (1974)» who demonstrated that patterns of stimuli
used in experiments have an internal relation wnioh has
significant effects on performance. The effect of past
information cannot sc limited to its direct effects, for
tuere are a number of indirect factors which influence the
acquisition of information, as for example the effect of
attituses on perception and attention (a.a,* irdalyi, 1974).
Often subjects manipulate a certain physical dimension,
of a stimulus in a different way than it is manipulated by
the experimenter. This idea is expressed in the results
of psyohophysics expariiuents, (e.g. htevens, 1979} 19oo),
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especially a extreme values are used. There are a
number of implications which can be uerived from this
fact. Tor instance, in experiment 17 above, it was
observed that the relation between, the physioal dimension,
and the reaction time is not linear, bh8pard, (1373) in
his experiments u~ed reaction tine an a direct criteria
of the relation setwean tme physical and "mental" dimension;
but in hie experiments the limit in the -manipulation of
information was imposed by the tank (in whica rotation was
restricted). In the experiments described in Chapter III
the manipulation of information was lass limited and it
was observed that there are not such linear relations in
the representation. This difference in results has
repercussions for the interpretation of memory phenomena.
A number of experiments in memory at the moment are
still using the conceptual structure of Cbbinghaua. In a
few cases there are attempts at new experimental designs,
some of which are >puite sophisticated (for instance, multi¬
factorial experiments). Batting (19o3) stated about the
experiments on paired associates that there should be more
research "involving the simultaneous orthogonal manipula¬
tion of all known tasks and procedural variables known or
suspected to have any effect whatever within any kind of
paired-associated learning". Although Batting referred
only to paired associates, his comments can be applied to
all memory research. This kind of approach requires the
"
co-op i-ration of a large number of researchers" , but
possibly one of the ways to increase our knowledge of
ast:
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memory consists in'^sing an X.C.B.LI. Inter-Continental
Batting Method" such au the one proposed by Tulving and
Kadigan, (1970).
One extension of the olassical form of memory experi¬
ment consists in giving as little information as possible
to the subject and make him use the information which he
already has. This approach can jive some results about
aanipulatiun of old Information in order to produce "new"
responses (see experi.tent III, Chapter III). This approach
can also give an idea of how the information is stored,
mainly in rel; tion to semantics (e.g. Fi.jo.eroa et al 1976;
Brachman, 1977; Collins and loftus, 1975).
Summarizing, the experimental results as well as the
study of the forms in which the experiments are done,
suggests the need, in the area of memory research, for a
change in the kind of material used as well as the U3e of
sophisticated experimental designs in order to surpass the
forms of research proposed by Tbbinghaus (1885) which are
still used nowadays.
C. THE CENTRAL ASPECTS OF THE CONCEPTUAL STRUCTURE
OF M3I0HY RE3 EAACH
The criticisms of various authors about the present
state of memory research have already been discussed,
(Chapter I). It was suggested that one way of improving
the situation is to study the most relevant and signifi¬
cant problems in memory. A series of problems, concerning
memory were then given. Special attention was given to
250.
those problems relating to everyday life situations.
If the list of problems in itself is interesting and
significant, the detailed research into characteristics
and relations of theproblems has to be guided by a concep¬
tual structure, t the beginning and 1- ter by a general
theory, which ideally should be more explicit and complete
than the one3 already proposed.
Any conceptual atx-ucture is only a transitory step in
the development of rese-rch, which has to be directed to¬
wards this approach is to propose conceptual structures
which 3erve as general guides for interpreting experiments.
An example of a simple conceptual structure is the
one presented by Tulving (137<_) which refers to the distin¬
ction between epi.odic and semantic memory, as follows:
"Let us think of episodic and semantic memory as two
information processing systems that (a) selectively
receive information from perceptual svstems (Gibson,
19ob) or other cognitive systems, (b) retain various
aspects of this information, and (c) upon instructions
transmit specific retained information to other
systems, including those responsible for translating
it into behaviour and conscious awareness. The two
systems differ from one another in terms of (a) the
nature of stored information, (b) autobiographical
versus cognitive reference, (c) conditions and con¬
sequences of retrieval, and probably al30 in terms of
(dj their vulnerability to interference resulting in
transformation and erasure of stored information, and
(e) their dependence upon each other. In addition,
psychological research on episodic laeiaory differs from
that on semantic memory in several respects.
episodic memory receives and stores information about
temporally dated episodes or events, and temporal-
spatial relations among these events. A perceptual
event can oe stored in tae episodic system solely in
terms of its p rce^tiole properties or attributes, and
it is always stored in terms of its autobiographical
reference to the already existing contents of the
episodic memory store. The act of retrieval of
information from the episodic memory store, in addition
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to mxkiog the retrieved contents accosuiuxu to
inspection, also serves as a special type of input
iato spino-ic memory und tnun changes tue contents
of the episodic memory store. Wnlle the specific
form ia waica perceptual input is registered into the
episodic memory can at times be strongly influenced
by information in semantic memory - we refer to the
phenomenon as encoding - it is also possible for the
e^isouic mernorj to operate relatively independently of
the semantic system.
Semantic memory is the memory necessary for the use of
ian0ua0>a. It is a mental thesaurus, the organized
knowledge a person posses about words and other verbal
symbols, tueir meanin0 and reference, about relations
among them, and about rules, formulas, and algorithms
for the manipulation of symbols, concepts, and rela¬
tions. Semantic memory does not register perceptible
properties of inputs, uut rather cognitive reference
of input signals, The semantic system permits the
retrieval of information from the system, leaves the
contents unchanged, although any act of retrieval
constitutes an input into episodic memory. The
semantic system is probably much less susceptible to
involuntary transformation and loss of information
than the episodic system. Finally, the semantic
memory may be q.uite independent of tue episodic system
in recording and maintaining information since
identical storage consequences may be brought about
by a great variety of input signals."
Although this distinction does not say anything about
how to obtain more information about memory (there are no
methodological indications), it is a powerful tool which
has clarified research. In a certain way, perhaps more
relevant, it has also influenced certain kinds of research
in giving meaning to aspects of transformation and utiliz¬
ation of information with special emphasis on meaning.
Thus, this conceptual structure of Tulving, is different
from the conceptual structure of Ibbinghaus and his
followers who avoided the use and study of meaning. Tulving
(197b) introduced in a more explicit form the idea of
memory as an active phenomena. However this conceptual
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structure is not rich enough to give an idea of the way
in which memory functions, specially if the phenomena
already mentioned in the list of problems (Chapter II)
are included.
Analysing the limits of the present models of memory-
such as the ones proposed by Norman (1969)» Atkinson and
•Yescourt (1975) and in G. Bower (1977), and also the
results of the experiments done and the list of important
problems in memory, it becomes clear that there is a need
to propose a conceptual structure of research, that con¬
ceives memory as an active phenomenon. "Active" can be
understood, in the context of the memory concepts of
Bartlett, (1932) and Tulving (1972) who, emphasized the
use and transformation of meaning in memory. In other
words, they gave emphasis to the function of memory. It
is in this direction that our ideas about memory should
be expanded. Additionally the operations and transform¬
ations snould be studied and a way found of analysing the
problem of representation.
Summarizing, three of the most important aspects of a
conceptual structure arei
1. The description of the moat important functions of
memory •
2. The description of the moat important processes for
the realization of these functions of memory.
3. The description of the representation or states of
information.
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As these aspects are intimately related and in con¬
stant interaction, it i3 difficult to study them separately.
Consequently every attempt of research has to take into
account the whole memory system. This is true for other
systems, for instance, the perceptual one is equally as
difficult to decompose into separate units* This does
not mean of course that experiments cannot be done on even
the most specific aspects of the system of memory; what
it does mean is that we cannot forget that the whole system
la involved.
1. IK3 FUNCTIONS 01 MEMORY
The belief that memory is only a store of data or
information is a relic of a former stage in the development
of research. Nowadays, experimental data has forced us
to abandon it. The view of memory as a simple store goes
back to Plato thusi
•'There exists in the mind of nan a block of wax of
different sizes and qualities in different men. This
tablet is a gift of memory, the mother of the-inuses,
and when we wish to remember anything which we have
seen or heard or thought, we hold the wax to it and
the material receives its impression a3 the seal of a
ring. We remember and know what is imprinted as long
as the images last; but when it is affeoted or cannot
be taken, then we forget and do not know." (Taken from
Jowett, 1931).
Some contemporary models sustain this static conception of
memory, changing only the concept of wax for that of a
store, (or box like short and long term memory). However,
after Plato, Aristotle considered the functions of memory
to be muoh more complex, active and internally related to
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thinking and to intellectual procesaess, (e.g. Sorabji,
1972). The idea of memory aa a complex system is
ancient; however, the model used in psychology so far have
been more Platonic than Aristotelian. If, on the other
hand, we pay attention to the Aristotelian model and bear
in mind current findings, we can define the functions of
memory more completely and, what is more, in relation to
the conception of men a3 intelligent and active beings.
If one wants to explain memory, we must abandon the
simplistic idea of memory as a store or simple trace, (e.g.
Gomulicki, 1953) and substitute for it the idea of memory
aa a complex system composed of different functions,
processes and states of information. Accordingly,let us
point out some of the functions which could be considered
a3 most relevantJ
FUNCTION It The Construction of a Model of the World
The interaction of human beings with their environment
leads to the development of a model of the world, wherein
many events and constant factors are ordered as a whole.
As time goes by, this model becomes more articulated and
interaction with the environment becomes easier. As the
model is articulated, every "new" experience becomes
assimilated into it and slowly brings about a series of
regularities which facilitate behaviour. Memory is a
system whioh organises constants in this model which are
the active results of different processes elaborating
received information. In that sense, memory does not
only receive information and store it passively.
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The development of this model of the world is a
process which uses certain skills of biological origin,
which allow for instance, a neonate to exhibit the first
forms of information seeking. One of these mechanisms
is the ability of infants to orient their eyes in the
direction of sounds (audio-visual co-ordination)? as was
originally studied by Aronson and Eosenbloa (1971).
Similarly, Fagan (1976) found evidence suggesting that
7 month old infants are capable of recognizing the in¬
variant features of faces. From this it is possible to
see that infanta are capable of using classes of informa¬
tion, not only information relating to specific events.
This ability of manipulating information can be considered
as the basis for the development of the model of the
world. As T. Bower (1977) commented, babies at this age,
give tae impression that they remember not only the experi¬
mental situation but what they have to do in it. The
development of powerful forms of memory such as are
involved in the recognition of invariant features is related
to th<2 general development of intelligence. The result
of this is the development of adaptive forms of inter¬
action with the environment.
Although it is in children where the moat important
features of the model of the world are developed, in
adults the function of the model becomes clearer. The
existence of such models is expressed in the way in which
humans manipulate a large number of factors in their
environment. For example, an intuitive idea of gravity
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and its effects exists which is independent of culture.
In a more restricted way, the model of the world can be
observed for example in people's ideas about the function¬
ing of society. Another case is observed in people with
religious ideas, which organize, interpret and render
" logical" a number of events, e.g. an earthquake or an
illness can be considered as a "divine" punishment.
Another way of describing the model of the world, is
to say that it represents values, traditions and customs
which are all abstract entities and nets of information
that the subjects acquire. The concept of a model of the
world is a powerful tool in the study and explanation of
complex behaviour. for a model of the world is conceived
of as giving rules and pattern to behaviour. However,
it i3 not possible in memory research to evaluate the con¬
tents of the model, the only thing that can be done is to
study and observe the sophisticated effects that it has
on human behaviour. It is possible that parts of the
model of the world are common to all people, which is an
interesting working hypothesis. On the other hand, it is
possible that parts of the model are limited to nationalities,
(e.g. Americana, French, 3nglish)| or to certain groups
(e.g. army, navy, boy-scouts) in which more specific
information oontent is found and whose effects are dramatic,
as in terrorist groups, who have a model of the world
which gives reasons for bombing cities.
All these examples suggest that people have in " memory"
a great deal of informtion which help3 to direct behaviour
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and to establish orderly interaction with the environment.
On the other hand model3 of the world need not behave
logically. In jmiay ways they seem to be composed of
totally independent different sub-models. Since the con¬
struction of this model of the world depends on behavioural
confrontation with the environment, to some extent the
model will vary according to the environment. However,
as much of the environment is constant, several aspects
of the world will be identically represented in different
subjects1 models. Using the terms in their Piagetian
sense, it oan be said that the aocommodatory and assimil-
atory powers of the memory system are very great and highly-
flexible. The possession of models of the world is not
an exclusively human traitj they are also found in
animals, (Griffin 1976).
FUNCTION lit The Construction of an Internal Model for Action
Previous experience, especially of interaction with
other people, creates a model of rules, plans, intentions
and so on, which guide an individual's behaviour. Thi3
internal model is highly individualized, based on personal
experiences and serves as a general guide to aotion. Some
parts of this internal model form perfectly structured
information nets for aotion. These are unique and are
the product of apeoific training which organises and forma
a knowledge net that helps to generate specific actions.
The interaction of the model of the world with this
internal model for aotion, creates a style of individual
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aotivity waose purpose ia to solve contradictions within
or between models and between models and the environment.
In the model of the world as well as in the internal model,
the basic component is information, but this is integrated
in sub-units which are not simply sums of elements. The
models have an internal structure which is not the passive
result of the accumulation of information? the contents
are related in specific ways by processes of the memory
system.
The idea of an internal model for action was suggested
by Craik (1943). He postulated that one of the fundamental
functions of brain is the creation of an individual model
of the world. He referred specifically to individuals,
their experiences and specific abilities.
Two examples of the importance of the internal model
for action taken from everyday life are, first, the
importance of biographies of great personalities, especially
of the fidelity with which the ideas and psychology of the
person is expressed. Other people try to learn from the
ideas and actions of important people. A second example
is the interview which is important for similar reasonsi
to obtain information about how muoh a person knows in
order to be able to perform in a job for instance, or, in
general to know more about a person to whom some responsi¬
bility will be given.
The development of the internal model for action
develops gradually over time. It may be the product of
formal or informal education, or the result of practice.
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For instance» a person can have a detailed knowledge of
the laws of meohanlos and engineering, without being
capable to repair a machine because of lack of practice.
Similarly, in certain kinds of learning tasks the develop¬
ment of the internal model will be relatively alow and
require much practice, as in the case of some forms of
medical practice. The internal model for action is the
result of continuous learning and experience in which not
only the solution to a problem is stored, but also the way
in which it was solved in order to use the same procedure
in the future. Another important question is how an
internal model for action facilitates or limits new learning
situations. For this reason, it is important to try to
know the quantities, qualities and relations of the inform¬
ation in the internal model for action in order to under¬
stand and predict behaviour.
An extension of the postulate of the internal model
for action, is the supposition (of long history in philosophy
and psychology), that the subjects not only have knowledge
about something but are acquainted with what they know and
possible know how to know. Some concrete steps in this
direction were given in the experiments on memory-monitorlng-
prooesses by Hart (1967), but there is not much known about
this phenomena.
There is some oontinuity between the model of the world
and the internal model for action. Possibly, the oontents
of information in memory as a whole are organized in sub¬
sets which are to some degree independent and which can
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generate actions that may even he contradictory. For
instance, people might not be able to make a comprehensive
analysis of all that is in their ♦'memory" at a given time.
All these possibilities suggest limits to the workings of
the memory system.
The postulation of models of the world and models for
action could be considered as a contradiction within
psychological science which ordinarily consists in finding
universal or constant aspects of behaviour. These models
are Influenced by individual idiosyncracies and personal
experience; however, it has been known that in the study
of human variability aspects in humans a number of kinds of
behaviour find their explanation in several kinds of
behaviours.
These models of the world and the internal model for
action, are conceptual tools which allow us to entertain
a wider point of view ooncerning memory funotion, this
should be especially helpful in trying to understand people
in realistic situations.
FUNCTION I1I» The Generation of Hypotheses
One of the great differences between S-fi models of
memory and cognitive ones, lies in the difference between
conoeiving of a human being as a reactive system and as a
system capable of predicting ohange. A fundamental
function of memory is the generation of hypotheses about
the present and future behaviour both of the environment
and the organism. The basis for the creation of hypotheses
is the model of the world and the internal model, since
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these store the experienced information which allows for
the detection of regularities. It may he postulated that
this information is formed into struotures containing
enough information to generate possible future outcomes.
In the beginning of the 1930's Krechevsky (1932)
(nowadays David Kretoh), experimentally demonstrated the
existence of hypotheses in rats (e.g. Will 1974)# This
theoretical concept became an element of Tolman's cognitive
theory, as well a3 that of Bruner et al (1956), who demon¬
strated the fundamental role of hypotheses in concept
learning and thinking in humans. In spite of the import¬
ance of the concept of the hypothesis in modern cognitive
psychology, there has not been much interest in its develop¬
ment. An exception i3 Levine (1975) who has demonstrated
the use of hypotheses in rats, monkeys and humans by means
of sophisticated experimental techniques. As Levine aaidi
"After two decades of subterranean existence, the
hypothesis theory re-emerges victoriously, solving old
problems with new insight and new techniques."
The mirror image of the generation of hypotheses is the
generation of random responses. Interestingly, Wagenaar
(1972) reviewing the literature on this topic, asserts
that humans are incapable of generating random responses
even taough pressure is put on them to do so. In other
words, humans are unable to produce random series of
responses and instead always use a pattern. This supports
the notion that the generation of hypotheses is as an
important process in the manipulation of information.
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Mental hypotheses can be considered from two points
of view: the first is Krechevaky*3 (1932) which consists
in the description of behaviour of rata in a maze* where
it is found that the animals use a systematic pattern of
responses. A tendency to respond in a particular manner
was found where it was not expected, and where there were
only two alternative behaviours possible. The second
point of view from which hypotheses can be considered is
in subjects1 performance on more complicated tasks where
behaviours take on a pattern, (e.g. Levine, 1975). Most
importantly, here subjects report that they are using a
"hypothesis" or prediction about the relations between the
stimuli in the experiments. This seoond point of view
is possibly the most interesting since there is a relation
between performance and the verbal report of the subjects.
The study of hypotheses in human behaviour has
developed in the last years, primarily in the study of
concept formation. Bourne and Bominowski (1972) writ#
"... It is probably fair to say that the use of a hypothesis
theory has become the predominant theory today at least
for behaviour in conceptual tasks." (See also Brown 1974).
It is very interesting that it has not been possible to do
experiments in which subjects do not use hypotheses in
conceptual tasks, (e.g. Watson, I960).
Although there is considerable evidence about hypo¬
thesis use there has not been any interest to relate this
evidence to memory research, and even less interest in
trying to see the importance of information as the basic
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material for the construction of hypotheses. Taus,
even though in studies on concept formation the most
powerful explanation available is the hypothesis theory,
the origin of hypotheses and the variables that partici¬
pate in their construction are unknown.
A way of increasing our knowledge about the participa¬
tion of hypothesis in memory funotion is to see how these
hypotheses operate. let us consider first an organism
- X - without reflexes (biological reflexes) and in¬
capable of learning. Ihi3 kind of organism is going to
survive only if its environment is completely stable, and
it will not be able to reproduce itself. If one gives to
this creature a mechanism for reflexes then it will react
to its environment, it will be able to reproduce, and
survive as a species, but it will not survive if there
are changes in its environment. If the organism has the
ability to learn and react to changes it will "learn" every
time there is a cuange. However, if it not only learns
but is capable of generating some learned behaviours at
random, it is going to confront changes with these be¬
haviours and it will not have to learn something new for
every change in its environment. More effective would
be if, instead of generating a learned behaviour at random,
the organism were capable of matching the characteristics
of the present situation with those of situations already
learned, and thereby select an "appropriate" response.
In this case the possibilities of survival are increased.
If in addition to the matching process it is capable of
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predicting the effects of a situation based on past
information, then the organism will have an even greater
chance of survival. The ability to predict events before
they take place is a very important advantage for survival.
The prerequisites for prediction are infornation and the
ability to foresee an event before it fully takes place.
This situation can be described metaphoricallyi when
a lion is pursuing a gazelle it is able to 3«e the gazelle
"with its internal aye", not in the place it is at the
beginning of a jump but where it will be at some later
time. Thus, it can catch its prey. If animals and
people were merely reactive systems (that is stimulus-
response) and not predictive ones, the biological order we
know would be impossible.
The hypothesis theory can help interpret everyday
life problems. For instance, Lindsay and Norman (1972)
gave examples where subjects who have 3ome information
about stimuli find it easier to recognise the stimuli
later on. Similarly, when Coltheart et al (1975)» gave
their subjects information about a class of stimuli which
were presented, the reaction time decreased significantly.
In these cases positive information facilitated performance,
but in other oases negative information inhibited per¬
formance. For instance, in an experiment on discrimin¬
ation, Levine (1972) presented evidence about how having
information facilitates or inhibits performance in a
certain task. A more concrete example of the affeot that
certain hypotheses or information oan have on a task, can
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be observed during reading or in the recognition of
combinations of letters without meaning, (e.g. Tstes,
1976). The effect of hypotheses can also be observed in
memory for plans, where subjects organize a pattern of
behrviour and modulate them before actually doing something.
When somebody is playing the piano, for instance, he is
not reading the notes being performed, but the ones that
follow. In such cases, people have to organize a
behavioural pattern before its performance. A related
problem is drivin^ a car; where a final target organizes
the responses before their performance, and in this case
often without a detailed knowledge of the particular steps
to be done.
To summarize, the simple hypotheses are patterns of
behaviour as opposed to the generation of random responses.
More complex hypotheses are the employment of past be¬
havioural patterns when the organism is confronted by
similar situations. In this case there is a process of
selective soanning for similarities between past and present
situations. At a third level, subjects are capable of
using part of previously acquired information and of manip¬
ulating it so that when they are confronted with their
environment, they can produce an appropriate response.
The response here may be a "new*' one (as in experiment III,
Chapter III). In this sense hypotheses are related to
the processes which modify information. At another level
subjects verbalize the relations between events to come.
The constant use of hypotheses in humans can be seen when
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a person is walking in the street. In this situation,
the stimuli reoeivod help to predict the behaviour of
other people around, and also the behaviour of the cars,
traffic lights, and so on. At the sane time the person
is combining this information with his own particular
plans of behaviour and with hie internal model for action.
Although this example is merely a personal report it gives
an idea of the constant flow of past and present informa¬
tion that subjects use in a number of situations where
information is used prediotively.
The above ideas about the functions of memory can
help to extend models of memory and to give a point of
view which, while not new, is more powerful than the storage
models of memory such as the one described in Chapter I.
It cannot be denied that one of the functions of memory
is to store information, but if we take into account that
information is transformed and organized before it is
stored, and that once it i3 stored it is constantly modi¬
fied, the concept of a store in itself becomes less
important, although it is necessary to analyse it.
FUNCTION IV: The Information Store
Information is not statistically stored, but is
constantly used and altered. The construction of models
of the world, of internal models, the generation of*
hypotheses and the use of processes manipulating informa¬
tion are all the product of stored information. The
concept of a store, is a metaphor in psychology, which has
to be considered very carefully in order to avoid making
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errors suoh as relating it in &a overly simple form with
neurophysiological mechanisms* lor instance, to try to
find certain relations between ahort term memory and
certain neurophysiological struotures or processes, is
very simplistic, since short term memory phenomena are
not sufficiently understood* Yet discussions of this
kind can be found in studies on animal memory which use
the concepts of short and long term ^emory, (e.g. Media,
197o). Also this kind of discussion can be found in
studies concerned with neurophysiologies! processes in
humans, such as the work of hhalliee and Harrington, (1970).
The biggest difference between the models influenced
stimulus-response psychology (such aa those found in
Mausler, 1974) and the cognitiviat point of view, (such
as Reisser, 1971; Reisser, 197b) is that this latter
approach is interested in describing how information is
stored and not only in describing functional relations in
the acquisition of information* This interest in how
information is stored is manifest in the attempts to
speculate about representation, a concept wuich ia as the
centre of memory research and, as Anderson (1977) puts in
at the centre of cognitive psychology. But the interest
in having a Hscientific revolution" in psychology (Lipsay,
1974), has resulted in premature discussions concerning
the nature of representation, such as the discussion
between raivio and Pylyshyn. This kind of activity is
premature oecause concrete ways of representation are
postulated (for instance propoaitional versus pictorial
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representation), although the words ara used only la a
metaphorical sense. Thara has bean a 3udden effort to
postulate how information is represented, without analysing
the difficulties of this kind of theorizing.
Before trying to discover how representation processes
take place it would be advisable if a more detailed analysis
were done to distinguish the neurophysiologies! codes of
memory from the psychological study of representation. If
one asks how it is that humans represent information, the
answer would seem to involve reference to a neurophysio-
logical code. However, it might be that memory function
and representation are something more than biochemical
activity in the brain. If this is so, it would be necessary
to maintain a psychological level of analysis without
reducing it to processes at the neurophysiologioal level.
This is why it is necessary to mention other processes of
information manipulation when talking about representation,
making reference to form3 of representation different from
the metaphor of pictorial or propoaitional representations.
In the experiments presented in the experimental section
(Chapter III), it was argued that considering information
in conjunction with other processes sheds more light on
function than only considering pictorial representation.
It is possible to propose other fora3 of representation
baaed on the data already known concerning representation.
Examples of this are representations in a dual pictorial-
propo3itional system, (e.g. Paivio, 1974) or representation
as a form of statistical manipulation of the redundant
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aspects of information, (e.g. Pribram, 1971)• There
are speculative aspects of representation* such as the
ones that use holography translating it to a psychological
model, (e.g. Pribram, 1977 or Cavanagh 1972). 'Jvana*
(1967a,19w7b) experiments illustrate a study in which
Bartlett's (1932) schemata oonoapt is defined as a sort of
statistical analysis of structural constancies, and as a
form of representation. These examples demonstrate the
need to obtain more information in order to understand the
forms of representation, and also illustrate how other
forms of representation aan be proposed using the same data.
It is necessary to create working hypotheses and not
to reduce taeoretical activities to the study of two
alternatives (pictorial and propositional). Examples of
some working hypothesis of this kind are the ideas of
I odor, (1375) who proposed that in order to represent
language, an "internal Language" must exist which is aa
rich aa the language that is represented. In other words,
it is proposed that it is not possible to conceive a rep¬
resentation as an " internal picture", and that also machine
languages should not be confused with representation and
interpretation.
Later on, this problem of store of information and
representation will be discussed further.
As was previously remarked, to understand how human
memory work3, it is necessary to study memory as a complex
system composed of different functions, processes and states
of information. Having analysed some of the functions
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which were considered most relevant, lot us consider some
of the processes which, according to the general conceptual
structure proposed, should bo emphasised.
2. phodzi^::. or li^iohy (poa Tin incoir.titgctiqh and pss
of inrorilation)
In order to perform its functions, a memory system
needs a aeries of mechanisms to receive, alter, modify,
store and U30 information. In most current models of
memory, it is assumed that there are a series of wboxes*'
and that there are ways of transferring information from
one "box?' to another. A number of models related to and
derived from Shiffrin and Atkinson (19^9) lay some
importance on the processes of control of information,
(e.g. Atkinson et al 1974; Schneider and Shiffrio, 1977),
and some evidence for different processes of information
manipulation has been found. Typically these processes
have been experimentally demonstrated, but not incorpor¬
ated into a modal. It seems necessary therefore, to
introduce these processes of information control and, more
importantly, their characteristics, into a conceptual
structure. When these processes are 3een as unified
and working together, the advantages of the kind of
conceptual structure which emphasizes mechanisms as
opposed to stores, oan be better appreciated.
Some, of the information control prooesses are of
biological origin and others are the result of interactions
between genetio and developmental processes. Examples
271.
of these processes are those described as orienting
reactions by Sokolov (1963). In working with human
beings it is difficult to distinguish between a process
and the information as such. This, among other things,
suggests the dependency of certain processes on speoifio
information. An example of this is found in the
experiment II (Chapter IV) where the characteristics of
the stimuli effected the speed of processing. Another
example of this interaction between a process and the
information is found in the relations between span of
memory and the kind of material used in tasks of recogni¬
tion, (Cavnnagh, 1972).
It is important to mention the distinction between
voluntary and automatic processes. In the first case the
process is under partial control by the subject,(e.g.
Schneider and Shiffrin, 1977) and Smirnov, 1973). Auto¬
matic processes are considered to be independent of the
subject's control. An important factor in distinguishing
between voluntary and automatic processes is that subjects
are able to give 3ome kind of report about voluntary-
processes. The current literature suggests that this
ability is very limited, (e.g. Nisbett and Wilson, 1977).
Another oharaotaristic of the memory process for which
there is evidence i3 the use of two or more processes at
the same time. This has been colled parallel processing,
(e.g. Cofer, 1976? Istes, 1975). An important implication
of the function of two processes operating at the same
time is that it shows the limits of artificial intelligence
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simulations. Also by postulating parallel processing
it may be easier to elaborate a theory about how informa¬
tion is codified. Memory processes are limited in speed,
capacity and in how they are used. These characteristics
may have some relation with other cognitive processes.
A. The Moat Important Processes
At the moment, there is knowledge about the nature of
processes, but what is suggested below suffices to explain
a great deal of data. Let us examine some well known
processes.
1) The Process of Scanning
This is a olear example of a process whioh manipulates
information. Usually what is meant by Mscanning" i3 the
selection of stimuli from a set, for example, this process
takes place when a subject has to indicate whether or not
a stimulus was present in a set of previously presented
stimuli, (e.g. Sternberg, 19t>6, 1975). From this kind of
experiment two complex types of scanning can be inferred.
One involves the use of symbolic representation of stimuli,
the other the search in memory for a series of events
using only a single cue, (a part of the stimulus).
Scanning may be general, for example, in response to a
request to find the " similarities* between one stimulus
and a past sample: in other oases, the selected stimulus
or target event is general and the information the subject
has to find is specific.
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Sternberg (lpuw) presented a set with a variable
number of letters, to the subjeots. Later on a jingle
letter was presented, and tue subjecta h. i to indicate if
tue letter was part of the previous set or not. The
results indicates that the larger the number of letters in
the set, the greater the reaction tine. These studies
have been replicated and extended to a number of different
oonditiona and have been interpreted in more than one way
as Sternberg (137b) points It out. However, these results
possibly indicate the existence of a process which is
probably composed of a aeries of specific operations of
information manipulation. It is possible that this is a
process that can be applied in a variety of situations and
is not only observed in a laboratory.
The original experiments on scanning, were restricted
to situations involving short term memory, but Juola et al
(1371), have observed that this process is more important
in situations involving information contained in long term
memory. Juoia et al asked subjeots to indicate if a word
was part of a set composed of lo to u4 words. It was
reported that the reaction time wa3 affected by many vari¬
ables, but tu&t there seemed to be a process of scanning
for information. In most of these experiments, the kind
of stimuli affects the speed of response, and this supports
the idea of an intimate relation between information and
processes of information manipulation. In experiment III
(Chapter III) subjects used some sort of scanning in order
to move the "imaae" of letters later on, used other processes
in order to generate "new" information.
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In everyday life situations, several examples of
scanning can be found. For instance a person can be
unable to give an answer to a question immediately, but
when later involved in other activities, suddenly remembers
the answer. In these cases it seems as if the response
" jumped" from somewhere in memory when the person was no
longer trying to remember. It may be proposed that
scanning continued while the person Involved himself in
other tasks.
2) Process of -Detection
In this case, the process involves finding a particu¬
lar event from a whole array of information that the
subject receives at one time. It may involve "simple" or
automatic situations like detection of gradients of bright¬
ness. For example, Neisser, (19&4J, asked the subjects
to indicate how many times specific letters appeared in a
list of many letters presented. In simpler oases it is
not easy to see the participation of memory, but in more
complex cases it can be seen that, in order for the subject
to detect "something' in the environment, he needs "to
know" it in the first place. This process is the central
part of attention, which was at one time thought to be
independent of memory. There seems to be a complex
relation between past information, strategies and attention,
(e.g. Norman, 19b9).
3) The Process of Codification
This consists in the transformation of information
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into a code with which the memory system can operate.
The way in which information is codified seems to involve
the following characteristics*
(1) - It is unique.
(2) - It has information about the sensory modality
which received it.
(3) - It has contextual information concerning other
events already known in the same sensory modality a3
well as in others.
(4) - There is a rapid change to an abstract code.
(5) - Codes oonaerve many of the basic parameters of
information, (in other words, codification is achieved
without loss of information).
There are some indications as to how oodification
occurs;
(1) - By the structure of the codifying system which
codifies. for example, there is evidence that optical
illusions are the product of the kinds of filters used
in the perceptual system (e.g. Ginsburg, 1975)*
(2) - There is evidence that codifioation is categoric#
although the elements are not necessarily fully
differentiated (hatenson and Chantrey, 1972» Garner,1974)»
(3) - There i3 evidence that cultural factors affeot
the codification of events.
For Instance the work of Tzeng et al (1977) that
demonstrates that codification of letters can be done in
two way3. The first is as acoustic encoding and the other
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as semantic encoding. In this last one phonological
aspects do not seen to be important. These kinds of
encoding change according to the characteristics of the
language studied. for instance, English codification of
words seems different than German codification of words.
German speaking subjects the acoustic confusion of letters
is much less common than in English speakers. If it is
true that codification depends in this case on the language
used, the researchers who emphasize encoding in short term
memory (e.g. Saddle/, 1978; Morton, 1978) will have to
modify their theories since it seems that the form of
encoding they propose is language dependent.
Differences in languate not only affect the way in
which information is codified, but using letters which are
codified in a phonologic form or in a form of idiogram
(Park and Arbuckle, 1977), seems to affect the memory per¬
formance. Additional data relating to the way in which
language affects codification comes from the study of
dyalaxi&s, which is difficult to find in Japan, because
Japanese is an ideographic language (Makita, 1968).
These examples of codification are interesting because
they indicate the limits of the available models of memory.
There is a confusion between the experimental variables
(in this case phonetic variables) and the theoretical
propositions of codification (in this case acoustic codi¬
fication). If the models of memory in Norman (1970) or
in G. Bower (1977) are analysed it can be observed that
moat models mention acoustic codification, but the experi-
laenta that give support to the models are done only with
Dnglish speakers.
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4) fhe of ^uabellin^ and
One of the factors which facilitates the acquisition
of information# is the ability to form cu -egories to handle
new information. That is, to use old pre-sworeu inform¬
ation in the process of acquiring new information. fhis
process is not exclusively verbal, there are many other
forms. In a sense, ever,/ event that enters the system of
memory is first related to what is already known. In
this wa^ the system *oas not need to "learn" the same event
several times. Tver,, stimulus which reaches the system
is analysed usiiq, several processes and grouped in some
information net.
The results of experiments I and II (Chapter III)#
imply that in most experiments of memory what Las been done
is to activate a process of labelling and grouping. In
most experiments the subjects are receiving stimuli that
consist in material already known, therefore what they
probably do is to group it. Despite the vast number of
experiments, knowledge concerning information grouping is
scarce and is limited to the studies on clustering by
Bouafield, (1953) who studied the organization of material
into groups is determined by stimuli or by the subject
(Cofer, 197b). Thus, the problem is still open, and this
process needs to be stusiea more systematically.
5) The Process of Analysis
In cases in which information is not easily elasai-
field, a more detailed study of the information is initiated
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by the memory system* This sort of study uses learned
strategies to analyse information, for instance, it uses
loft to right procedures in the analysis of non-sense
words, (e.g. Wickelgren 1977). A vast amount of past
informstion is also used to detect similarities, (e.g.
Katona, 1940; JPosner, 1973)* There is evidence that this
analysis of stimuli doss not work from the more specific
to the more general aspects, but the reverse, from general
categories to details, as suggested by Mi&sky, (1975)•
Likewise, the question of constancy does not only involve
physically simple forms. There are examples of more
"abstract" kinds of constancies, (e.g. Jule3Z, 1971).
6) The Process of Comparison
Posner (1973) demonstrated this process by asking
subjects to indicate whether two stimuli presented were
different or similar, (the similarities of the events
varying from being physical to being semantic). By
measuring the reaotion time, he observed that the time it
took the subject to give an answer is a function of the
complexity of tne comparison. Subjects had both to com¬
pare stimuli presented in the same sensory modality and
ones presented in different modalities.
This process of comparison can be generalized to a
great many situations, many of which have not yet been
studied experimentally. For instance, it may be the basio
process involved in decision making and may also be
involved in the comparison between the "real" and the "ideal"*
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A situation which illustrates this point is whore informa¬
tion given to the subject is incomplete end although the
subject knows "something" in missing, he cannot specify
what it is, (e.g. Flores, 1970). Many comparisons in the
memory system may require "metrical systems" of which we
have no knowledge at all, as it is shown in the experiment
17, (Chapter III).
A3 it was mentioned in the introduction of the experi¬
mental section, (Chapter III), the idea of mental comparison
can be found in Fechner (1860). However, it is only now
that representation is being considered, that it is possible
to 3tudy the processes of comparison. Iven in the case
of "simple" comparisons such as the one3 in psychophysical
studies, (e.g. Stevens, 1957? 1966) it is necessary to
postulate the participation of memory, sinoe although the
stimuli are "outside" the subject, the comparison is
probably based on subjects* internal representation of
events. However, there have been no suggestions about how
comparisons take place, even though they are supposed to
occur.
7) The Process of -Decision
An extension of the previous process is the capacity
to make decisions based on incomplete information. This
process required the help of other processes. The pro¬
cess of decision i3 therefor®, not perfect and predictable
but influenced by knowledge and often even by " irrational
information" structures.
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8) Prpocsa of 3^aylflg
As there is so much information, in the memory system,
it is necessary to postulate a system of buffering* which
consists in the retention of certain information for easy
access and use. This process does not involve bestowing
an intermediate status on the input of information! but
ratherf is a process of extracting old information in
relation to what is entering the system at any given time.
This process is an important and necessary part in the
activity and results of other processes.
An example of this process can be observed in experi¬
ment XI (Chapter III). In this experiment, subjects
moved the information that was contained in the "buffer*
(which in this particular case is called "imager/') and
manipulated it, probably using other processes in order to
generate an answer not previously known. Other examples
of buffering as an active process of manipulation of
information are found in the work of Baddlay and Hitch
(1974). There is in the literature, vast information
about this process of buffering, (e.g. in G. Bower, 1977)l
it seems that researchers on memory consider short term
memory as a phenomenon in which information enters and
leaves from either the environment or long term memory*
In other words, short term memory is used to explain this
process of buffering, (e.g. Hitch, 1978). This shows how
more sophisticated ways of understanding the storage
systems are being proposed herein.
231.
9) The Process of Change
This process allows the combination of two separate
groupings of information and the production of new inform¬
ation which can be used in different ways from the original
groupings. When two groupings of information are combined,
they are not only "added"; rather, their internal relations
ere Integrated to produce new relations. For instance,
this procs33 seems to operate when two words are combined
to make a third one, -with a different meaning and character¬
istic, (e.g. M episteaio-maohine"; "dialectical-psychology" )•
This process of change -works with real or ideal information,
and its results are complex. The basis of this process
may he found in the use of abstract characteristics of
reprejentntion or internal codes and not simply in the
manipulation of physical characteristics, (e.g. Zvale, 1974)«
Possibly the biggest difference between present models
of memory and the conceptual structure proposed here, is
that herein'it is supposed that information in memory
changes. To suppose that the content of the information
can be altered by memoi*/ processes implies that the memory
system is capable of generating more information without
the need for learning as 3uch. If it is true that memory
is reconstructive in this sense, (experiment III; Chapter
III) then the kind of memory models available will have to
be modified. This raises the possibility of explaining
certain " intelligent or creative" processes by which humans
generate new combinations of information. A simple case
is that of artists who oombine known elements (colour, words)
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in new structures of information. Other craea are
observed in the capacity of people (mainly children) to
understand and generate combinations of new words (e.g.
Clark and Clark, 1377). Although the example of language
is well known in linguistics, it is absent in sodels of
memory.
10) The Process of Transfer
A great deal of literature is directed to the problem
of transfer of information, especially referring to the
transfer of information from short term to long term memory,
(e.g. Baddeley, 1976? Wickelgreen, 1977). However, even
though in memory models some "boxes" (short term memory,
long term memory, etc.) are presupposed from which "arrows"
denote the movement of information from one "box" to the
other, the process of transfer of information is rarely
made explicit. Possibly it i3 thought that information
flows in the 3ame way a3 electricity or water. This idea
of flow of information was probably taken from cybernetic
iaodel3 where electricity flows from one location to another.
The evidence of movement of information in the memory
system does not imply that this movement takes place from
one metaphorioal box to another. In order to be able to
understand this process it will be necessary to have more
information about the internal codes and their character¬
istics. Nevertheless, the idea of transfer of information
is a process that can help to explain several aspects of
memory. *or instance, in experiments I, II and III
(Chapter III), it may be supposed that there was flow of
information.
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Transfer of inform'.tion may also explain experi¬
ments where what seems to happen is that there is a
problem of accessing information (not rely forgetting),
(e.g. Shiffrin and Atkinson, 1969, Murclock, 1974). A
specific example of the limits of this process of transfer
of information is the Mtip of the tongue" phenomenon
studied by Brown and McNeill, (1969). In this case the
subjects who have to give an answer cannot give it even
though they report that they know it.
11) The Process of Hesponse Generation
This process is complex, especially in relation to
language. It could be proposed that a master control is
necessary in order to classify and direct which informa¬
tion net should be used and in what order, as well as to
determine the modifications necessary to the algorithms,
for their adequate performance in different situations.
Sometimes the generation of responses involves only the
performance of skills already known, but in other cases,
new patterns have to be produced. If the new patterr.s
are effective they may be stored for use in future similar
situations.
The processes described here are not an exhaustive
list and only indicate examples of the kind of phenomena
which are to be found in the literature. As was mentioned
in the previous chapter, the supposition of a reconstructive
memory necessarily requires the postulation of processes
of ;ianipulation of information; since reconstruction in
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memory clearly Indicates an active change in information.
However, if memory research is to be used to explain
other phenomena, it will al30 be necessary to postulate
such active processes. For instance, the experiments of
Baddley and Hitch, (1965) demonstrate that there is an
interaction between short term memory and the solution to
various intelligence tasks.
In conclusion, the utilization of various processes
plays a significant part in memory functioning. Support
for this suggestion is found in the fact that*
(1) - The various processes of manipulation of information,
are not only experimental, observed phenomena, but are
necessary for the construction of memory theories.
(2) - A number of phenomena and problems, such as the ones
suggested in Chapter II, cannot be explained using only
the available models, (Chapter I). (3) - The most
important aspects of the present models of memory are,
first, their dependence on the concept of static-trace,
(experiments I and II, Chapter III) and, second, their
lack of interest in the reconstructive aspects of memory,
(experiment III, Chapter III). The introduction of these
processes in future models of memory is important as a
motivation for the designing of future experiments to oome.
3. HOW IS INFOItelATION STOHID AND B^U^33TT1D?
Having described the functions and the processes of
memory which according to the oonoeptual structure proposed
here, are considered to be of most interest, a basic point
nevertheless remain-. so be analysed - namely, Low ifc
information stored. ILe anewer so ieis <4ue©sion, iss -
** a common answer xn P*"*^ -^uolof t/ ^uu xu
science in 0enerai. The enswere wnicn t«ive been attempted
Lave only 0iven uo Jo.ae analogies (or metupLoru)i
(1) Information is represented in humans in the form of
images whioh are a point-to-point codification of events,
represented as an "internal picture' ♦ (e.g. Paivio, 1971,
Anderson, 1977).
(2) Information is stored as propositions that oan be of
different kinds* (A) As propo3itional representation where
the events are translated into a system similar to the
predicate-calculus, where the events are something like
axioms or propositions. For instance, Clark, (19o9)»
comments that in a logic system of the following kind*
"A is smaller than Bj B is smaller than C, etc." it is
possible to manipulate information using logical tools
similar to the ones used in theoram proving in mathematics.
(B) Another propositional form in which information can be
stored is as a network where the information is assumed to
be based on units (which represent one thing or subject);
properties, (whioh represent characteristics of the unit)
and pointers, (associations of various types among units
and properties). This model of Collins and Quillian
(19L9) describes some forms in which information can be
represented, and meikes several predictions. This model
has bean extenueu and modified by Anderson (1976) and
Anderson and Bower (1973)*
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(3) A third form of an interpretation of memory as a
propositional form is aa a set .madel in which it is
assumed that information is represented as a series of
features in which it is supposed that some features are
essential and others are accidental. "his work is rep¬
resented by Smith et al (1974). These three versions of
memory as a propositional representation were arbitrarily
chosen and are only used to illustrate the active form of
tueorization about representation of this approach.
(4) Another anauogy found about now information is stored,
is modelled on the statistical analysis of events (Ivans,19o7).
All these attempts to give an answer to the problem
of how information i3 stored are simplistic although for
each of the alternatives there is some experimental support.
However, it should be emphasized that these are attempts
to give an answer to questions different from those posed
about the problem of memory in-the-past when the problem
of memory referred to its parametric characteristics. Then,
the questions referred to how many repeititions are necessary
in order to remember something; how big does the list
have to be; what are the effects of the material or of
different kind of presentation; how much is going to be
stored; how many kinds of stores are available; and so on.
It seems that the concept of internal representation,
embodying how the information is stored, is a relatively
new concept around which research in this area is developing.
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The hypotheses discussed 1;train, are only n first
attempt end will require more elaboration. These are
hypotheses relatinj to a series of questions which are
relatively new, and they will be useful only if this is
kept in aind. To propose explanations between which a
researcher must decide has led to premature discussions,
as has already been mentioned, in the case of propositional
versus pictorial representation. A symptom of how pre¬
mature this discussion is, i3 the lack of elaboration of
the different positions as well as the apparent disinterest
in other possible alternatives, (e. Ivans, 19b7). Like¬
wise it also seems that there is a lack of interest in a
number of alternative models, .jud ;in; from those which have
not been taken into account (e.g. Pribram, 1977).
Before an answer can be given, it will be necessary
to analyse in more detail the problem of how information is
stored. One way of analysing this problem is to specify
the characteristics of possible solutions. Instead of
deciding on one of the hypotheses mentioned, (or several
others found in the literature), criteria might be elabor¬
ated which could be useful in seeking a solution to the
problem.
As was already mentioned, the problem of representation
is relatively new. However, some of the terms and
phenomena mentioned have a long history. For instance the
metaphor of images, as presented by Kannay (1971) has
ancient antecedents. Representation is mentioned nowadays
as one of the most important aspects of cognitive psychology
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(a.g. Andorson, 1977). As Pylyshyn (1973) comments:
"Cognitive psychology is concerned with two types of
questions? What do we know?, and How do we acquire and
use this knowledge? The first type of question..#
concerns Itself with what might be called the problem of
cognitive representation". One of the ways to study how
we represent information, is pointing out the difference
between codes and abstract codes. The term "codes"
refers to the neurophysiological approach to the study of
memory. It lias been observed that there are different
forms of codification in the C.N.S., as well as different
forms of processes participating at this level of study,
(e.g. Defeudis and Defeudls, 1977)* The term "abstract
codes" refers to those used in psychology as "constructs".
For instance, to talk about images, supposes an abstract
code that represents information in the form of a grid of
a x n elements, where the values assigned to these elements
are continuous, that is, represented in a form of a picturs.
To refer to a model of images, does not specify concretely
in which form the abstract code is presented in the brain.
The same happens with the idea of propositional represent¬
ation where it is only assumed as a possible analogy.
Perhaps this form of abstract code is not so abstract,
since examples and descriptions are being used, and the
object represented is almost a copy of the real object.
In one ease the relation between representation and object
seems direct, as in the case of images, but in the case of
propositional representation, an analogy is given to
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computer (e»a« Anderson, 137u) or a metaphor
OX -ICv*J. aUu aSmmntX0 XdutUTOa io US6U , (s.^,. wuiXta st
ai 1974-)* In snort mu ay a tract co-s, involves rulea of
corrjeapendence cetween code and object. -pacifyin& the
nature oa abstract code x~> dixficuiv, mainly because of
wne lack ox relevant uata. This also indicates the limit¬
ation*, of the pictorial representation and propooitioaal
representation vocals. If it is not possiule to specify
the dinferences between neuropil sioio0ical and abstract
cooes, the concept ox representation in a psychological
sense will remain unclear. borne researchers, (e.g.
Anderson, 1977 J -nepard, 1978) have attempted to specify
the characteristics a code at a psychological level should
have, but they have not made a distinction between this and
the neurophysioio^ical code. She idea, of an abstract
code has been used in an axiomatic way, that is wuere proof
of its validity is not necessary. Another simpler hind
of code mi^ht se proposed; for instance, postulating a
continuity between neurophysiologieal and abstract codes.
But the results wouls be different, and the kind of theory
that could be proposed would have a hybrid character. On
the other hand, it mi0ht be supposed that codification
does not always take place at one level, and that certain
" events' are codified at one level while others are codi¬
fied at more or less abstract levels, (Pribram, 1977 and
iodor, 1975).
Another criterion that may be useful for solving the
problem of uow information is stored involves the notion
of a genetic program. It has been •..•ug_9sted that a part
of the abstract code is biologically determined. A clear
example of this postulate i3 Chomsky's (1963) concept of
"deep structure". He suggests that there is a "universal
grammar" biologically determined. 9 is postulr.tion of a
genetic program refers to two things: first, to the
structure of the cognitive system, end second, to the way
in which the system works. In both cases it is supposed
that there is biological determination. An interesting
example of this kind of programming is the study of basic
colour terras dons by Berlin and Kay, 1967 and Kay, 1975
who studied the number of terms uoed in different cultures
to describe colours. These authors, observed that the
amount of beoic terms that different roups use range from 2
to 11. The terms are not produced at random but have a
structure. For instance in the language U3ing only two
terms, these are black and white. They also observed that
in languages with more terras, these are used in a systematic
form, that is taking colours from the following hierarchy,
from left to right:
It al30 was found that if persons from different groups are
asked which i3 the most representative red colour from a
set of tokens, of different colours, there is a high
degree of consistency. An extension of these studies is










four month old babies respond in a categoric way to
colours, that is, pay more attention to those colours
considered by adults as best representative! blue, preen,
yellow end red. In other words, it seems thrt babies
give a categorical response to a physically continuous
dimension.
These results can be considered as examples of inter¬
actions between biological aspects of coalition and language
development. Although the fact that children use a bio—
lo ;io-»l system to detect colours, formed by 3 or 4 basic
colours, is not that significant, the development of names
to indicate colours in a systematic form is relevant to
how information is represented.
This criterion of biological programming leads us to
the next criterion for the problem of how information is
stored. This refers to internal representations due to
psychological development. Any model attempting to explain
representation has necessarily to describe the development
of representation. The example Just referred to, about
the dsvelopnent of colour terms i3 a clear example of how.
it seems possible to find rules about some aspects of
internal representation, and how the development of colour
terms is a specific process and not the result of random
activity. Another example of development of forms of
representation is found in Piaget*s idea (Piaget and
Inhelder 1973) of stages of development, for instance in
the use of images. The concept of memory development
3hould not be limited to conceiving of processes which grow
in size or ^uttnLity of information, but ex*enuea to
COUCOiviilt, Ojl hu« p»*P wiciy iiiQU Ox. US'iv lO-U^i Oii manipulation
Oi information.
Another i^portunt criterion for solutions to the
problem oi' aow xiutx'.xtiou is stored involves ^ecxij 1%
the processes oi' manipulation oi inform- tion. iuis
criterion x*a- already seen mentiones, but iw is only when
i"epre~»ontation is oou-viuereu taut to &o-> tux-..-1c such
procaine* produce*a a substantial di-xerence between a
' **o« sm' tneox'y or representation and the traditional models
oi memory. irocasses u©lp to give a more active sense to
the models. ihis poiat was illustrated in the experiment
III, (Chapter 111), where the idea oi' reconstruction
depends on the existence oi processes capable oi" transferring
information*
In conclusion, the problem oi now the internal repre¬
sentation takes place, is one oi tne critical points in
memory research before it will be possible to give a
thorough explanation. If knowledge in this field is to
develop, there is a need for new data (for example experi¬
ments 111 and IV, Chapter III) and new ideas (as the ones
mentioned here). io decide in favour of one party, or
one of the hypotheses, is a waste of time since the
explanatory hypotheses now available aro too limited. An
example oi how limi ted these hypo tmeses are is that they
are not explicit about the criteria mentioned here, namely
difference between code and abstract code, role of genetic
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program., development of representation, nd participation
of processes. Changes in emphasis in the stud/ of memory
can be seen recently in work ouch as 7odor*s (1975) on
representation.
4) ::::,iu:.iio:: a" T::: CQ:;G-I?tuai - ;:u:: FHOPOCID
As was mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, it
is difficult to find criteria of evaluation of conceptual
structures and not only' that, it is difficult to define
conceptual structure. However, it is necessary to
evaluate the conceptual structure presented here.
Throughout the chapter,two conceptual structures have
been illustrated wits examples such as Ibbinghaus* (1835)
or Inlying*s (1971). An evaluation of Cbbinghaus* work
indicates its theoretical and experimental influence, in
the amount of research that it generated, as well as the
generation of different kinds of theories and 'hypotheses
in memory research. Likewise, the conceptual structure
of Tulving, albeit more limited than Hbbinjaaus*, also
seems to be as a valuable tool mainly for the understanding
of semantic aspects of information. Tulving made explicit
the distinction between learning with and without meaning,
and suggested that learning with meaning was important,
(even though the concept of meaning is not clear). The
conceptual structure presented by Tulving is not the only
one that can be found in the literature. For instance,
there are others, such as the idea of levels of processing,
proposed by Craik and lockhart (1972) which has generated
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some activity. However, it has not boon very valuable
as an instrument of work as demonstrated by Nelson (1977)t
Bnddeley (1973); and iroadbent (1977), 1 hough it has
also been modified by it: authors, (e.g. Cr-ik and Jacoby,
1975; Lockhart, Cr ik and Jaooby, 1975)•
The conceptual structure presented -ere and especially
the description of processes, is p rtially an evolution
of certain ideas of Bartlett together with some results
from more recant lenory research. It has been suggested
that the study of the possible function • of memory can
give a new perspective to resoaroh, especially if the
variety of important problems related to memory are taken
into account, (Chapter II).
A special way to evaluate this conceptual structure,
which may be useful for figure memory resoaroh, is to
compare it with the theories of memory such as the one3
represented by Shiffrin and Atkinson (1939) or the version
proposed by Atkinson and Sestoourt (1975), which was
described in Chapter I. This comparison is partial and
limited since the orthodox theory is elaborated in a
precise way and the conceptual structure proposed herein
is only a series of propositions and possible ideas for
future use.
In order to evaluate the conceptual structure
presented in this chapter, let us emphasise some points
which are considered to be weak points in other theories
(mainly the orthodox theory) and rel- to them to the
possibilities offered by this conceptual structure. V.'hen
pOSSXfclxO , UUij SXp —a. inCkJ. uUtw- pl'SSQii «uU XU WaUp WSX' 111
,aii ue mentioneu, ~s x* is aa expression oi tue conceptual
struc -are px^oposeu. xue xirst limitation that sue
orthodox tueory uas xa it.o catenaenca on tue idea oX trace
axcwi^XXxleu in specific form Xa the a«u ox iconic memory*
iuis limitation xs ucmonstratea 0/ tus re-uits ox experi-
msn t-j X uud xx (vux^ii^X1 ixx/ • xuxu xxmita tlcn is OUx^f
tue elaboration ox a misleading assumption xa uxemory
igjd-x'Ou. xo oonsiuer letters, nonsense syilauie ana
related material tw novex elements to 00 reamed instead
Ox as opportuni^is- Xor the re-ox*ganiscat ion ox oiu material,
le<*do to many mistakes* xne implies,tions oX tuia mis-
xeadiug assumption are many, one example of this problem
is tue fact that much ox tae eviueaoe about short term
memory and long term memory is based oa experiments which
make the same mistake*
xxelated to this misleading asouraptioa is the ioea of
information received ia a statxc way, either in short term
memory or ion6 term memory, where it is supposed that old
information is not important and does not play any role in
the collection of new information. rata supporting the
notion that memory ifi a static trace come from studies
on reminiscence* Ihese stasias indicated that in some
situations over time instead ox forgetting, there is, on
the contrary, an improvement in performance, and that this
change in memory is no;, affected by interference or other
experience after learning, (e.g. mlerlyi and klienbard,
1973). Experiments such as taese ^ug^est the need for
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totally different interpretations of memory. Experiment
III (fir ptor III) can be taken as evidence for Bartlett's
idea, which is absent in the orthodox theory, that memory
is a system capable of generating and changing information*
however, 3artlett#s ideas have not been elaborated in a
more complete way and it is necessary to take some hypotheses
from recent work, in order to postulate a possible way in
which reconstructive memory might work.
Two important ideas for the development of the kind
of approach in memory research as is proposed herein are,
first, the experimental demonstration of different
processes of manipulation of information (scanning, com¬
parisons, etc.) and, second, the ideas of representation
with images is not alone sufficient, (e.g. experiment IV,
Chapter III), for it will be necessary to h^ve more
elaborate ideas in order to explain.
Another limitation of the orthodox theory is the
specificity of its postulates, which do not allow the
solution of the great number of problems in this area, as
was described in Chapter III. This leads to one of the
most important limits of the orthodox theory, that is, its
lack of ecological validity. Specifically the orthodox
a
theory, is related to and directed towards the explanation
of Mlaboratory problems" and in many oases it is restricted
to "old verbal material" and is not directed towards the
phenomena involved in learning and memory in general.
One of the characteristics that would be desirable in
a theory of representation, as well as in a theory of
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memory in general, ;ould be a description of the process#®
of development of the forms in which information is
acquiredt as well as the development of the processes
involved in memory. If it is true that a number of
learning situations are studied with familiar material, it
will be necessary to describe which are the forms in whioh
basic events are acquired, and this probably can only be
achieved by studying infants. Therefore, it would be
desirable for a new theory of memory to include studies on
infants and emphasize how basic events are acquired and
organised.
Another limit of the orthodox theory is that it is
a passive system and not a system capable of predicting
changes in the environment. One of the ways to analyse
the capabilities of the cognitive system to predict events,
is to propose a process of generating hypotheses for
particular tasks which in turn leads to the concept of
the model of the world and the model of action proposed
in this chapter. These postulates are not an attempt to
make more complex memory models, but to try to give a more
realistic answer to specific phenomena found inside and
outside a laboratory, such as the serial order of behaviour,
or to try to explain the personal knowledge scientists and
artists. Cven in the most sophisticated forms of
representation derived from the orthodox theory, such as
the works of Smith et al (1974) and Collins and Loeftus,
(1375)» representation is considered as a store and not
as a tool for the solution of problems. To some degree
. t-Jw*
modems ox repx-e^ en tatiou ax*e on-y extension of
tne xt9aOCxai<j.onxs t mucus a a clearly presents* by Anderson
ana sower (±y7jj xu u-ouca. ox m^Auie
xili.0%\i&£ XXJiX i*(-« t>XO]& Oi Oi' u»xQU0a ww*80Xjf i-i iu-ii X J*
id emaoorated as an auteu^i to ^x. xu «* series of specific
expex^xnents, (e*a* experiments of sLoru term aemory) and
uaa ^rovm with uew x*esults from otaer experiments (iconic
meuoxv• differences between snort ,.uu xouu term memory),
tnus it id not tne resuxt of an attempt to -take a theory
of memory, ano fx tnerexore ximitea xu scope and ran^e of
extension.
in conclusion, i-he orthodox theory of memory, which is
repre*entutive ox current fcueorisa oi memory, Lao carious
limitations, mainly fa its dependence on the strict concept
of trace and its basis in experiments usin^ verual material*
.because of tuis, one ox tad characteristics that would he
deairaoie in a xuture theoxy of memory is special emphasis
on tne reconstructive aspects of memory information use.
nowever, some 01 tne aspects of the orthodox tueory, such
as the postuxation of processes of information manipulation,
will certainly be useful in the explanation of memory* It
appeal's that memory Lias a number of functions eacn of which
has important influence on behaviour, only if all these
functions are taken into account will it be possible to
understand tne cognitive processes. Although it is
possible to ueveiop some hypotheses about the functions,
processes anu reconxtractive aspects in information use,
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the specification o* vow information is represented is
still on open problem. Perhaps at the moment to solve
thi- problem will involve colleotiop more clear emneri-
ment^l data. This cert?inly will be necessary before we
will be able to decide between possible interpretations of









Ms work has been an attempt to evaluate some
experimental-theoretical relations in contemporary memory
research. On on© hand, some theories can be found like
the theory of Shiffrin and Atkinson (19b9) which is
based on a series of ideas such as the concept of static
trace and stages of processing. On the other hand, a
great deal of phenomena and problems in memory research
are open to investigation and cannot be integrated in a
general view. This is due not only to a lack of interest
in theoretical work but it is also possibly due to a
limitation of some of the basic ideas, as it was suggested
by the experimental results presented here, (Chapter III).
Baaed on this evidence it ia considered that there is a
need for a change in the conception of memory. One of
the possible alternatives consists in using the ideas of
Bartlett (1932) and some of the ideas that can be character¬
ized in a very general form as Mcognitive psychology" •
These ideas could be used as a conceptual structure for
the development of better theories in the future.
As it was suggested by the experimental evidence, the
idea of reconstructive memory of Bartlett is a tool that
together with the idea of processes of manipulation of
information helps to see the phenomena of memory in a
clearer way and related to other important cognitive
processes.
In this work the possibility of change and active
memory were emphasized, and experimental evidence was given
Xn xt-> -fUppoAm, \Ch ^ally. Xnis cc.n
help to explain some ox the phenomena of ...emory mainly if
it la considered *m»t humans are organisms moving in a
changeable environment ana are not a., -r ot entities of
laboratory. This i-ea of change must be taken carefully
in order to avoid a violation of certain semantic limits
connected with the concept of memory, mainly because the
theory ox memory is interested in constant aspects as well
as memory processm and not in the specific Changes in the
contents of information of certain particular subjects.
Xhe results of the experiments on iconic memory have
important implications for the theory and research in
memory ana uive indications of the need for a critical
analysis of the way in which work in this area is carried
on, ~>ince this moic concept of iconic memory incorporated
in most recent models of memory, does not seem to be
constant for all experimental situations.
She experiments on reconstructive memory suggest the
possibility of studying the contents and change of memory
ana not what the experimental situation or the experimenter
puts inside the system.
In the same ..ay these experiments allow the study of
the power of resolution present when working with images,
as well as the study of the limits of this kind of repre¬
sentation with a systematic technique.
One of the most important conclusions of this work is
the need to develop new views in the form of theoretical
,*orx and to overcome the empiricism (positivism), in order
303.
to take a step towards p. new way of tackling: the experi¬
mental and theoretical problems as it is done in other
sciences.
The need for more theoretical work to guide and put order
in research seems to be among the pri .ary necessities in the
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